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SUMMARY IN SPANISH LANGUAGE/RESUMEN 
 
1. Contexto en el que se desarrolla la tesis:  
Promover la eficiencia energética es, desde hace tiempo, una prioridad para los 
gobiernos de todo el mundo, y en particular para los europeos. Promoviendo la 
eficiencia energética, las economías pueden reducir sus necesidades de energía 
manteniendo constante su ritmo de actividad. A nivel agregado, esta mejora les 
permitiría reducir los efectos negativos del cambio climático, los niveles de dependencia 
energética y, por lo tanto, ser más competitivos. A nivel sectorial destaca el sector 
residencial, ya que aumentar la eficiencia energética de este sector tiene importantes 
implicaciones sociales y equitativas. Un aumento en la eficiencia energética de las 
viviendas puede producir un descenso de los gastos en gas y electricidad, puede mejorar 
las condiciones de vida de quien en ellas vive y puede reducir el cada vez más 
importante problema de la pobreza energética. 
Sin embargo, los investigadores llevan años observando que el ritmo de adopción de 
medidas de eficiencia energética, tanto en el sector residencial como en el resto de 
sectores, es menor de lo que predicen los modelos matemáticos. Esta diferencia se 
conoce generalmente como la Paradoja de la Eficiencia Energética y se debe en parte a 
la existencia en el mercado de una serie de barreras que impiden que la eficiencia 
energética se difunda de la forma esperada. Entre estas barreras se encuentran la 
información imperfecta, el problema del principal-agente, las irregularidades en la 
fijación del precio de la energía, los costes de transacción, las dificultades para acceder 
a financiación para inversión en eficiencia energética o los fallos de comportamiento 
(entendidos estos últimos como desviaciones de los supuestos de racionalidad asumidos 
por la teoría económica convencional).  
Estas barreras son particularmente numerosas y preocupantes en el sector residencial. 
Por un lado, el comportamiento de las familias no sigue los principios de minimización 
de costes propios de una empresa, lo que hace que algunas de sus decisiones no sean 
óptimas desde un punto de vista económico. Por otro lado, el ahorro energético 
individual de cada hogar puede no suponer un incentivo lo suficientemente grande para 
impulsar las decisiones relacionadas con eficiencia energética. Además, el sector 
residencial se caracteriza por un número de agentes heterogéneo, lo que convierte los 
procesos de toma de decisión en una tarea compleja. No solo existe dualidad en el 
mercado del alquiler entre propietarios y arrendatarios o entre constructores y 
compradores, sino que los individuos que residen en edificios (que en España son la 
mayoría) se enfrenan a procesos de decisión en los que participan múltiples agentes, y 
hacen que llegar a acuerdos resulte más difícil. Todos estos factores evidencian la 
necesidad de una intervención pública más intensiva y atraen el interés de los 
investigadores. Esta es la razón por la cual la presente tesis hace del sector residencial 
su objeto de estudio. 
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A la vista de estas barreras y de los múltiples beneficios que se derivan de la eficiencia 
energética en el sector residencial, los gobiernos llevan décadas diseñando y aprobando 
políticas públicas que reduzcan o eliminen esas ineficiencias y promocionen la 
eficiencia energética en este sector. Esas políticas han consistido básicamente en la 
implantación de códigos de la construcción y estándares que garanticen unos niveles 
mínimos de rendimiento energético, tanto para las viviendas como para los principales 
sistemas energéticos. También se han utilizado instrumentos económicos para tratar de 
internalizar las externalidades negativas derivadas del consumo energético. En general, 
existen diferentes impuestos energéticos y subvenciones u otras medidas fiscales que 
penalizan o benefician el uso de energía y la adopción de medidas de eficiencia 
energética. Sin embargo, y a pesar de que estas medidas se llevan aplicando durante 
varias décadas, los resultados no son todo lo buenos que se esperaba, y diversas 
instituciones mundiales advierten de que todavía existe un gran potencial de ahorro 
energético en el sector residencial que no está siendo explotado.  
En este contexto, atraen un interés especial por parte de los investigadores y de los 
responsables políticos las tesis apuntadas por la corriente académica conocida como 
economía del comportamiento. Estas teorías, que llevan años siendo aplicadas en otros 
campos, identifican y modelan una serie de situaciones en las que el comportamiento de 
los individuos se desvía sistemáticamente de los supuestos de racionalidad que asume la 
teoría económica convencional, y sobre los que se diseñan los modelos de decisión. 
Estas tesis resultan especialmente interesantes para el análisis de la Paradoja de la 
Eficiencia Energética y, junto con la información incompleta, abren la puerta a formas 
de intervención pública alternativas, que no están basadas en la intervención vía precios. 
Por esta razón, durante esta última década ha proliferado el uso de instrumentos de 
información, así como las intervenciones basadas en el comportamiento conocidas por 
el término en inglés “nudges”. 
 
2. Objetivos: 
El objetivo de esta tesis es profundizar en el análisis de la Paradoja de la Eficiencia 
Energética y en la evaluación de las políticas de promoción de la eficiencia energética 
en el sector residencial. Dado que la eficiencia energética en el sector transportes 
presenta una serie importante de paralelismos con relación a las viviendas, esta tesis 
también analiza las decisiones de los hogares en relación con la eficiencia energética en 
los coches. De esta forma es posible verificar los resultados obtenidos y saber si éstos se 
extienden a otros campos. Para ello se centra en dos aspectos fundamentales: el papel 
del comportamiento de los consumidores en relación a la adopción de medidas de 
eficiencia energética, y el análisis de los instrumentos de información como alternativa 
para promocionar la eficiencia energética.  
El rendimiento energético de una vivienda, así como de sus principales sistemas 
energéticos, es una característica intangible y secundaria de éstos. Es decir, la propia 
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naturaleza de la eficiencia energética es inobservable, y este hecho da lugar a una serie 
de fallos de información (y a veces de comportamiento) que afectan de forma negativa 
las decisiones futuras de los consumidores en materia de eficiencia energética. Por 
ejemplo, un individuo no puede observar cual será el consumo medio de una 
determinada vivienda antes de adquirirla o alquilarla. De forma similar, un individuo no 
puede observar cuál será el consumo medio de un sistema de calefacción o aire 
acondicionado. Éste es un atributo inobservable de los productos y servicios 
energéticos, y los consumidores tienden a no valorar aquello que no conocen. Sin 
embargo, esta información sí que puede ser suministrada por un agente especializado en 
este campo, con unos conocimientos previos determinados. Por lo tanto, el mercado de 
la eficiencia energética está afectado por información incompleta, asimétrica y costosa.  
Además, existen evidencias empíricas de que los consumidores no siempre actúan de 
forma racional, sino que en ciertas ocasiones se desvían sistemáticamente de los 
supuestos de racionalidad establecidos en los modelos económicos. En ciertos casos, 
estas desviaciones pueden deberse a las limitaciones cognitivas a las que los individuos 
están sujetos. Al mismo tiempo, algunas teorías establecen que ante decisiones 
complejas los consumidores aplican reglas heurísticas, como por ejemplo, tomar solo en 
consideración las variables más destacadas, las que resultan más familiares, un grupo 
inicial de ellas, etc. Y por último, las decisiones de los consumidores también pueden 
estar determinadas por el modo en el que se plantea la elección y por el punto de partida 
del consumidor; es decir, el marco en el que se presenta la información, y el status quo 
del propio consumidor pueden afectar la elección.  
Como consecuencia de lo anterior, ha aumentado el interés por parte de los responsables 
políticos y también de los académicos por las políticas de promoción de la eficiencia 
energética que consideran estas hipótesis. En particular, durante las últimas dos décadas 
ha habido un gran auge del uso de instrumentos de información como certificados o 
etiquetas para la diferenciación de los productos según su rendimiento energético, el uso 
de feedback que permita a los consumidores conocer de forma rápida y sencilla cómo se 
traducen sus hábitos diarios en el hogar en términos de energía, o también las auditorías 
que ofrecen información personalizadas sobre cómo conseguir ahorros energéticos. 
 
2.1  Capítulos: objetivos, metodologías y resultados. 
El segundo capítulo de la tesis, The Role of Information for Energy Efficiency in the 
Residential Sector (El papel de la Información para la Eficiencia Energética en el Sector 
Residencial) pretende ser una introducción para el resto de la tesis. En él se hace en 
primer lugar una actualización del estado del debate sobre la Paradoja de la Eficiencia 
Energética. Después de presentar de forma detallada la problemática en torno a los 
fallos de información y de comportamiento, y de forma resumida las principales 
limitaciones que las políticas convencionales tienen para promocionar la eficiencia 
energética, el capítulo ofrece la primera revisión de las evidencias empíricas que existen 
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hasta el momento sobre la efectividad de los tres tipos de instrumentos de información 
más aplicados: certificados o etiquetas de eficiencia energética, feedback y auditorías 
energéticas.  
Los certificados o etiquetas de eficiencia energética llevan años siendo utilizados como 
modo de diferenciación de los productos, de forma que el nivel de eficiencia energética 
resulte más visible y fácil de identificar para el consumidor. En 2002, la Unión Europea 
aprobó la Directiva sobre Rendimiento Energético de los Edificios (Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive), que obliga a los dueños de edificios o partes de 
éstos, a mostrar en el momento de la venta o alquiler un documento en el que se 
certifica el nivel de eficiencia energética al que pertenece el edificios o parte de él 
(generalmente el nivel más alto corresponde con la categoría A y el más bajo es con la 
G). El objetivo de estos instrumentos es que los consumidores tengan información 
rápida, fiable y sin coste alguno sobre el consumo futuro de ese edificio o vivienda. De 
esta manera se prevé que aumente la valoración de los consumidores por la eficiencia 
energética, y dado que los consumidores pueden establecer comparaciones entre las 
viviendas, es probable que se generen incentivos para que los propietarios aumenten el 
nivel de eficiencia energética de las viviendas que quieren vender o alquilar. 
En la Sección 2.3.1 del Capítulo 2 resumimos las principales evidencias empíricas 
sobre el efecto de los certificados en la disposición a pagar de los consumidores por 
viviendas eficientes. Este capítulo recopila las evidencias empíricas que existen sobre el 
precio implícito de los certificados, o lo que es lo mismo, la disposición a pagar de los 
consumidores por viviendas certificadas como eficientes energéticamente. En base a los 
resultados obtenidos, existe un consenso importante sobre la valoración de los 
consumidores por edificios certificados. La mayoría de estos estudios muestran que los 
consumidores tienen una disposición a pagar positiva por edificios o viviendas con un 
certificado de eficiencia energética alto, manteniendo constante el resto de 
características. Sin embargo, entre las conclusiones que se extraen de esta sección 
destaca la importancia de un buen diseño y la necesidad de analizar el efecto de este 
instrumento sobre el excedente del consumidor, ya que existen indicios de que los 
productores podrían estar aumentando el precio relativo de aquellos productos con un 
nivel de eficiencia energética mayor.   
En la Sección 2.3.2 se resumen los resultados de los experimentos sobre el efecto del 
feedback. Según esta recopilación de estudios, ofrecer información detallada y rápida 
sobre el consumo energético (a través de contadores inteligentes o de facturas que 
contengan información comparativa) reduce el consumo energético de forma rápida y 
poco costosa. Sin embargo, el principal inconveniente que tiene este instrumento de 
información es la corta duración de los efectos una vez concluido el tratamiento. 
Por último, la Section 2.3.3 recopila las escasas evidencias que existen sobre el efecto 
de las auditorías energéticas en el sector residencial. En este caso los resultados no son 
tan unánimes, ya que las evidencias encontradas hasta el momento son inconclusas. Las 
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primeras limitaciones de este instrumento vienen determinadas por el alto coste de esta 
medida. En segundo lugar, existen limitaciones a la hora de analizar sus efectos debido 
a un problema de autoselección de la muestra, ya que la realización de las auditorías es 
siempre voluntaria, lo que podría producir un sesgo de selección.  
En el Capítulo 3, Pro-Environmental Households and Energy Efficiency in Spain 
(Hogares Pro-medioambientales y Eficiencia Energética en España) se investigan cuáles 
son los factores que afectan a los hogares españoles a la hora de tomar decisiones 
relacionadas con la eficiencia energética. El objetivo de este capítulo es identificar las 
barreras que pueden estar limitando la adopción de medidas de eficiencia energética en 
los hogares, y también aquellos factores que favorecen dicha adopción, en el caso de 
España. Para ello se ha utilizado la información contendida en la encuesta Hogares y 
Medio Ambiente 2008, elaborada por el INE. Esta encuesta representativa de la sociedad 
española, contiene información detallada sobre características socio-económicas, 
hábitos o actitudes de más de 26.000 hogares españoles. Además, contiene información 
sobre algunas características estructurales de la vivienda y del tipo de equipamiento 
energético instalado.  
A partir de esta información, se han seleccionado siete medidas de eficiencia energética  
que nos permiten modelar la probabilidad que tienen los hogares de adoptar diferentes 
medidas de eficiencia energética: nevera, lavadora, horno y lavavajillas con certificado 
de eficiencia energética A+ o A, doble ventana, bombillas de bajo consumo, y grados 
centígrados a los que se fija la calefacción en invierno, cuando los individuos están en el 
hogar. Estas medidas de eficiencia energética se corresponden con las principales 
fuentes de consumo energético dentro del hogar: calefacción, electrodomésticos e 
iluminación. Además, dichas medidas presentan costes de adopción muy diferentes: 
desde un coste nulo o casi nulo hasta costes altos.    
Entre las variables que se incluyen en el modelo como variables explicativas constan las 
características socio-económicas de cada hogar, la composición del propio hogar, 
algunas características estructurales del hogar, y destaca la información sobre actitudes 
y comportamientos en relación al medio ambiente. Mediante la inclusión de estas 
últimas variables en el modelo es posible saber si aquellos hogares que muestran unos 
hábitos diarios de respeto con el medio ambiente o que muestran actitudes 
medioambientales tienen una mayor probabilidad de adoptar medidas de eficiencia 
energética, o si por el contrario, no existe efecto entre estas variables y la adopción de 
eficiencia energética. 
La metodología utilizada consiste en modelos probit y ordered probit. Los resultados 
obtenidos coinciden con los encontrados previamente para otros países europeos y 
norteamericanos. Los hogares pertenecientes a niveles de renta más altos, o aquellos 
cuyo miembro de referencia tiene estudios de mayor nivel, tienen una mayor 
probabilidad de invertir en electrodomésticos eficientes, aislamiento o bombillas de bajo 
consumo. Como sería de esperar, los hogares con miembros mayores de 65 años 
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muestran el efecto contrario. Por otro lado, a la hora de adoptar comportamientos de 
ahorro energético, los hogares pertenecientes a tramos de ingresos más altos actúan de 
forma menos eficiente, al igual que los hogares con miembros mayores. La educación, 
sin embargo, no parece afectar al comportamiento energético en el hogar.  
Con respecto a los hábitos y actitudes, los resultados sugieren que los hogares con 
comportamientos diarios respetuosos con el medio ambiente (aquellos que reciclan o 
que participan en actividades de protección del medio ambiente) tienen una mayor 
probabilidad de invertir en eficiencia energética o de practicar hábitos de ahorro 
energético. Sin embargo, los resultados muestran que aquellos hogares con actitudes 
favorables al cuidado y la protección del medio ambiente (los que estarían dispuestos a 
pagar más por energía renovable o los que están de acuerdo con la introducción de un 
nuevo impuesto sobre los combustibles más contaminantes), no necesariamente 
trasladan esas actitudes a la hora de invertir en eficiencia energética o de adoptar hábitos 
de ahorro energético.  
El objetivo del Capítulo 4, The Price of Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Car Market 
(El Precio de la Eficiencia Energética en el Mercado de Coches Español) es contribuir al 
estudio sobre la valoración que muestran los consumidores ante la eficiencia energética 
en el sector transporte. En particular, este capítulo estima la disposición del consumidor 
a pagar por vehículos con un nivel de eficiencia energética alto. Para ello se utiliza el 
modelo de los precios hedónicos. Esta metodología ampliamente aceptada en el sector, 
permite estimar el precio implícito de cada uno de los atributos del coche mediante una 
función de precios que desagrega el precio del vehículo en sus atributos.  
Para realizar este estudio se encargó a una empresa especializada la elaboración de una 
encuesta basada en el método del comprador misterioso. De esta forma se recogió 
información sobre el precio de venta en concesionario de una muestra de coches 
representativa del parque de vehículos español. Esta información se fusionó con una 
base de datos de todos los vehículos que estaban a la venta en el momento de la 
elaboración de la encuesta, en España. Esta base de datos contiene información sobre 
todas las características de los vehículos (peso, velocidad máxima, potencia, número de 
puertas, marca, gama, tipo de vehículo, etc.), el precio de venta al público que publica el 
productor y el certificado energético que clasifica a cada coche de la letra A a la G, 
según su nivel de eficiencia energética.  
Los aspectos novedosos de este estudio son el uso de dos aproximaciones al precio de 
transacción: el precio oficial que publica el productor y el precio de venta en 
concesionarios; y el uso de los certificados de eficiencia energética como medida de la 
eficiencia energética del vehículo, en lugar de la medida generalmente utilizada 
(consumo por quilómetro). Esta variable muestra una menor multicolinealidad con el 
resto de variables introducidas en la función de precios lo que nos permite aislar el 
efecto de la eficiencia energética sobre el precio del resto de atributos. 
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Los resultados muestran que los coches con etiqueta A o B se venden a un precio entre 
un 3% y un 5.9% mayor que un vehículo idéntico con una clasificación energética 
menor. Estos resultados se encuadran dentro del intervalo de valores definido por los 
estudios previos, lo que confirma que los consumidores españoles sí que valoran la 
eficiencia energética de los vehículos. Al comparar estos resultados con el valor 
presente de los ahorros energéticos podemos pensar que los valores resultantes de 
utilizar el precio de concesionario (5.9%) sobrevaloran la eficiencia energética, y por lo 
tanto, nuestros resultados sugieren que utilizar el precio oficial de venta al público 
anunciado por el productor es la mejor aproximación al precio de transacción, en el caso 
de España. Además, al comparar la disposición a pagar con el valor presente del ahorro 
energético los resultados sugieren que el tamaño de la Paradoja de la Eficiencia 
Energética en el mercado de los coches español es muy pequeña, a pesar de que se 
requiere un análisis más detallado para confirmar esta hipótesis. Estos resultados tienen 
importantes implicaciones políticas, ya que el uso de instrumentos que asuman que el 
consumidor no valora la eficiencia energética no estaría justificado.  
El último capítulo, Valuing Energy Performance Certificates in the Portuguese 
Residential Sector (Valorando los Certificados de Eficiencia Energética en el Sector 
Residencial Portugués), también utiliza el método de los precios hedónicos para estimar 
el precio implícito o disposición a pagar de los consumidores por viviendas con un 
certificado de eficiencia energética alto. El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar la 
efectividad del sistema de certificación energética para edificios aprobado por la 
Comisión Europa en 2002. Como ya fue explicado anteriormente, el propósito de este 
tipo de instrumentos de información es ayudar a los consumidores a tomar decisiones 
eficientes en materia de eficiencia energética a través de la provisión de información. En 
este sentido, este capítulo representa el primer estudio que examina la valoración que 
muestran los consumidores hacia los certificados de eficiencia energética en el sector 
residencial para un país de Europa del Sur.  
Este análisis se llevó a cabo en Portugal ya que éste fue uno de los países pioneros en la 
aprobación e implantación de la Directiva sobre Rendimiento Energético de los 
Edificios, lo que ha permitido que en la actualidad este sistema de certificación esté bien 
establecido, los consumidores lo reconozcan y exista un importante número de 
viviendas certificadas. Adicionalmente, Portugal representa un caso de estudio 
interesante ya que pertenece al grupo de países del sur de Europa, los cuales se 
caracterizan por una serie factores económicos, culturales y geográficos, que los hacen 
diferentes al resto de países Europeos. A partir de la información publicitada en la 
página web de una de las empresas inmobiliarias más grandes de Portugal, se ha 
construido una base de datos única que recoge una gran cantidad de información sobre 
más de 21.000 viviendas. Esta base de datos contiene información sobre el precio de la 
vivienda, sus características estructurales principales, características relativas a la 
eficiencia energética de la vivienda, la localización exacta de cada vivienda y el 
certificado de eficiencia energética, entre otras muchas. Después de limpiar la base de 
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datos se ha completado la información mediante un arduo proceso que consistió en 
extraer palabras clave del campo “definición” en donde cada agente inmobiliario ofrece 
una descripción de la vivienda. Para aquellas viviendas para las que la localización 
exacta no estaba disponible se ha utilizado el programa QGis, que permite recuperar 
información geográfica (coordenadas). Además, a partir de las coordenadas geográficas 
de cada vivienda y del programa QGis fue posible estimar la distancia de cada vivienda 
a los servicios más importantes (escuelas, jardines, centros de ciudad, centros 
comerciales, estación de metro).  
Después de testar la representatividad de esta muestra de viviendas frente al parque de 
viviendas a la venta en Portugal, se ha definido una función de precios para cada 
vivienda y se ha estimado el precio implícito de cada uno de sus atributos utilizando el 
modelo en dos etapas de Keckman. El hecho de que para algunas viviendas el 
certificado de eficiencia energética no aparece en la página web (a pesar de ser 
obligatorio por ley) hace que la muestra pueda estar afectada por un problema de sesgo 
de selección. Para evitar este problema primero se estima una ecuación de selección en 
donde la variable dependiente es la probabilidad de que el anuncio contenga la 
información relativa al certificado de eficiencia energética. A continuación, se estima la 
función de precios en la cual se incluye la lambda de Heckman para corregir el sesgo de 
la selección.  
Los resultados muestran que los consumidores portugueses valoran positivamente las 
viviendas con un certificado de eficiencia energética alto. A pesar de que la base de 
datos utilizada incluye información sobre la vivienda mucho más detallada que los 
estudios realizados hasta el momento, los valores obtenidos son mayores, lo que lleva a 
pensar que la valoración por la eficiencia energética en edificios es mayor en Portugal 
que en los países del norte de Europa o que existen otras variables inobservables que 
nuestro modelo no es capaz de identificar y que sobreestiman el valor de los certificados 
de eficiencia energética. Ambas hipótesis podrían deberse a las particularidades de 
Portugal, y podrían ser comunes al resto de países del sur de Europa.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
The present thesis studies the diffusion of energy efficiency (EE from now on) in the 
residential sector using an economic perspective. The research is concentrated on the 
analysis of the Energy Efficiency Paradox and on the evaluation of EE policies. The 
thesis consists of five independent chapters (including this chapter), some of which have 
been already published in specialized journals.  
Although increasing EE in the residential sector has been for long time one of the 
targets of many governments, several reasons have led governments to intensify their 
efforts in this area. The negative effects generated by climate change, urban pollution 
and fuel poverty, together with the growing political instability in energy-producer 
countries, are some of the reasons that are behind this renewed interest both in 
developed and developing countries. Moreover, engineering studies have identified the 
residential sector as the one with the largest potential for cost-effective energy-savings. 
Despite the fact that mathematical models have identified “win-win” situations for 
households if they adopt EE measures, and the large number of public initiatives to 
promote EE applied by public institutions, the diffusion rate of EE continues to be lower 
than expected. Thus, this field of research has gained much attention, not only from 
policymakers but also from the society and academics. Despite the fact that engineering 
models have identified “win-win” situations for households if they adopt EE measures, 
and the large number of public initiatives to promote EE applied by public institutions, 
the diffusion rate of EE continues to be lower than expected. Thus, this field of research 
has gained much attention, not only from policymakers but also from academics and 
other stakeholders.  
Up to now, most of the interventions were oriented to internalize the negative 
externalities of energy through the use of price instruments (e.g. through Pigouvian 
taxes) or codes and standards that ensure a minimum level of energy performance. 
However, the empirical evidence has shown important limitations associated with such 
policies. They could be partly given by the general assumptions about perfect 
information and rationality that these models use. Indeed, much attention has been 
recently given to the ideas of behavioral economics, which has identified several 
situations when consumers systematically deviate from the rationality assumptions.  
The inclusion of behavioral economics approaches in the field of EE has opened the 
door to new interpretations of the Energy Efficiency Paradox but also to non-price 
interventions as an important complement to promote EE. Additionally, the 
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development of experimental techniques has allowed researchers to evaluate the 
effectiveness of non-conventional public interventions.      
Therefore, the present thesis has the double objective of understanding household 
decisions regarding EE and of evaluating novel instruments to promote EE. On the one 
hand, with this research I tried to contribute by providing new academic evidence on the 
factors driving consumers’ choices. This first step is essential to explain the divergence 
between the level of investment in EE predicted by engineering models and the real 
level of EE (previously mentioned as the Energy Efficiency Paradox). Besides that, 
given that EE in the transport sector presents several parallels with dwellings, this thesis 
also analyses consumer’s decisions related with vehicles’ energy efficiency. By doing 
so, I verify whether the results can be applied to other fields of consumer decision 
related with EE. On the other hand, my research tries to evaluate the results of 
informational instruments, in particular energy performance certificates or labeling 
systems, now a widely-used tool to promote EE that has experienced a rapid diffusion in 
the last few decades.  
In this sense, Chapter 2 can be seen as an introduction to this thesis. The objective of 
this chapter was to acquire the necessary knowledge that provided me with a complete 
overview of the field of EE. This task consisted of the revision of a large number of 
studies and reports from different research lines: energy demand, fuel poverty, 
behavioral economics, electricity markets, environmental economics, etc. 
Furthermore, this chapter works as an introduction and serves as a guideline for the rest 
of the doctoral thesis. Firstly, it contextualizes the research on EE in the residential 
sector from an economic point of view. It updates the current debate about the Energy 
Efficiency Paradox with special attention to the growing role that informational and 
behavioral failures play in explaining this gap. Secondly, the core of the chapter is a 
review of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the informational instruments 
that have been rapidly adopted by many governments during the last decade. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on energy certificates, feedback programs, and energy 
audits.  
As far as I know, this is the first study that gathers together the results from economic 
research in all the existing informational instruments. Results show that energy 
certificates and feedback programs can be effective, but only if they are carefully 
designed: yet energy audits seem to have little effect on efficiency. In addition, the 
chapter points out the large potential for new instruments as well as for combinations of 
existing ones. Finally, it identifies the experimental techniques implemented in the last 
few years, highlighting the robust approach that use large and random samples and have 
a large potential in for future policy evaluation in this field. 
Chapter 3 empirically evaluates the determinants that drive household decisions 
regarding EE adoption in Spain. The objective of this chapter is to get insights into EE 
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in Spanish households. Several studies have previously evaluated the factors that 
determine households’ choices. However, Spain presents some specific characteristics 
that demand for ad hoc analysis: an aged population, a remarkable increase of 
purchasing power, ownership status or the size and composition of the stock of 
buildings, among others.  
Using information from a large and representative official survey, in this chapter I 
focused on the effects of socio-economic characteristics on the probability to adopt EE 
measures or energy-saving daily habits. By doing so I was able to identify the barriers 
that prevent consumers from taking EE measures, and the characteristics that make 
them favorable to invest. Since EE measures can show different up-front costs, I used 
information on well-differentiated measures: from energy-saving habits, such as 
lowering indoor heating temperatures, to low cost measures, such as low consumption 
bulbs, and higher cost measures, such as energy efficient appliances or double glazing.  
When dealing with the Energy Efficiency Paradox, there is a general concern with the 
heterogeneity present among households. In this chapter, I focused on the effects of 
household environmental attitudes and behavior as a potential explanation for 
differences in the rate of EE adoption. The chapter shows that households with eco-
friendly behaviors are more likely to investment in well-differentiated EE measures as 
well as to steer daily habits towards energy savings. However, no effects were found for 
households with environmental attitudes based on stated willingness to pay to protect 
the environment. In addition to this, households belonging to higher income groups and 
education levels are more likely to invest in EE but not to adopt energy-saving habits; 
while households with older members are less likely to invest in EE and show fewer 
eco-friendly habits.  
In sum, this chapter provides the first empirical results for Spain on the factors driving 
household choices regarding EE. Moreover, it contributes to the existing literature by 
giving insights on pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors.  
One of the justifications for the use of command-and-control policies is the hypothesis 
that consumers do not value EE. Hence, the objective of Chapters 4 and 5 was to study 
consumers’ willingness to pay for EE and their valuation for EE labels or certificates in 
dwellings and light duty vehicles, respectively. This is particularly relevant because EU 
legislation has introduced the mandate to apply labeling systems to differentiate 
products based on their level of EE. The objective of those regulations is to help 
consumers to take efficiency decisions in a market with imperfect information.  
In Chapter 4 I estimate the implicit price of EE vehicles, measured as those with label 
A or B. I have used two samples, one with all vehicles on sale in Spain containing 
official information on attributes and commercial prices of vehicles, and another where 
a subsample of these vehicles was selected and matched with the price of retailers. For 
this subsample, the method of “mystery shopping” was carried out by a specialized 
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company. This approach consists in asking directly the retailer about the price of certain 
vehicles as if this process was part of a real acquisition. A main objective of the chapter 
was to test the hypothesis of changes in willingness to pay for EE using official prices 
and retailer prices. Additionally, I used the European labelling system for light vehicles, 
which classifies automobiles according to their relative fuel consumption levels, as a 
novel and alternative indicator for EE. 
The results of this chapter indicate that vehicles labelled A and B are sold at prices 3 to 
5.9% higher than those with similar characteristics but lower energy-efficiency labels, 
using official commercial prices and retailer prices, respectively. By comparing this 
results with the present value of the energy savings, it can be seen that the use of retailer 
prices overestimates the value of EE. Although, there is sizeable research on this field, 
as far as I know this is the first evidence for the Spanish car market. Furthermore, our 
results fall in the range of magnitudes previously found.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 I estimate the implicit price of Portuguese dwellings rated as A, 
B, or C, keeping constant the rest dwelling attributes. Given the lack of official and 
complete databases for the stock of buildings, I have downloaded the information on 
dwelling sales from the web page of one of the largest real estate companies in Portugal, 
and constructed a unique database with complete information of dwelling attributes. 
This database includes general dwelling attributes but also information on the level of 
EE of the dwelling and its energy performance certificate. Moreover, since location is 
one of the most important factors when purchasing a dwelling, I have used spatial 
economic techniques to control for the exact location of each housing unit.  
The results show that Portuguese consumers positively value high certified dwellings. 
Despite the fact that the database used for this study includes information on a larger 
number of dwelling attributes than in previous studies, reported values are higher. This 
suggests that the valuation for energy performance certificates is higher in the 
Portuguese residential sector than that in other European countries. Yet, it can also be 
the case that our model cannot control for unobservable factors related with energy 
performance certificates, and this overestimates the results. Indeed, as other researchers 
have pointed out, there could be effects such as reputation or status that models cannot 
control. Thus, the chapter highlights the need for further research in this area even 
though there is an unfortunate lack of official information.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
The Role of Information for Energy Efficiency in the 
Residential Sector
*
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Many international institutions (IEA 2013; European Commission 2011; OECD 2003) 
suggest that energy efficiency (EE) is the best tool to keep energy demand under control 
and key to facilitate the transition towards a low-carbon future. This consensus extends 
to the key role of the residential sector in this strategy, in particular buildings, given that 
it presents the highest cost-efficient potential for mitigation
1
. 
Figure 1. Energy Consumption per Dwelling with Weather Correction 
(toe/dwelling) 
 
Source: IDAE (2012) 
Therefore, many governments have made it a priority to improve EE levels in this sector 
and they are seeking to promote this through several different policies. These policies 
have generally consisted in building codes and standards, and also price instruments 
                                                 
* A previous version of this chapter was published as Ramos, A, Gago, A., Labandeira, X., Linares, P. 
(2015) in Economics for Energy, WP 04/2014. 
1 Currently, buildings consume one third of global final energy, and the same share of carbon emissions is 
directly or indirectly related to this sector (IEA 2013). In the EU, houses, offices, shops and other 
buildings consume 40% of primary energy and are responsible for 36% of greenhouse gas emissions 
(European Commission 2013). Moreover, these figures are expected to grow due to the increase in 
building stocks and energy intensity in emerging countries such as China or India. 
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such as taxes and, more frequently, subsidies (Markandya et al. 2015). However, in 
spite of the significant efforts and resources devoted to these policies, the results have 
not been as expected. In Europe, for instance, a comparatively intense use of EU and 
national policies to promote EE has coexisted with a growing energy demand in the 
residential sector, with an apparently large unexploited energy saving potential 
(European Parliament 2014). Figure 1 shows for example how energy consumption per 
dwelling has been quite stable in many European countries since the beginning of this 
century. 
Indeed, a close look at the situation highlights the existence of several barriers 
associated to EE measures in the residential sector and which help explain, at least in 
part, the Energy Efficiency Paradox, understood as the divergence between the cost 
effective potential identified by energy‐economic models and the levels of adoption 
observed in practice (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). Optimal EE levels are rarely met in a 
sector characterized by dualities in stock (existing vs. new buildings), in the use of 
buildings (commercial vs. residential) and in the preferences of the agents that 
participate (owners vs. renters), and this is due to many barriers. Hidden or transaction 
costs (not accounted by models, but real) are also pervasive in this sector. The 
consequence is that EE does not reach levels corresponding to the “win-win” 
opportunities that models have usually identified in this market, that is, that the 
opportunities identified by models may not be consistent with the willingness to pay 
(WTP)
2 
expressed by consumers. 
Until recently, the standard framework for dealing with the Energy Efficiency Paradox 
was based on the traditional analysis of market failures. This resulted in public 
interventions through economic (price or quantity) instruments and standards. For 
example, energy prices usually do not internalize environmental (or other) externalities 
derived from the use of energy and this, in turn, determines excessive pollutant levels or 
a higher than optimal energy use (Gillingham et al. 2009). If the price of energy does 
not correspond to the real marginal cost, the adoption of EE measures is disincentivized. 
This market failure demands public intervention to take prices to their right level, 
including social costs. 
But the use of conventional regulatory instruments has shown many limitations. For 
example, Iwaro and Mwasha (2010) collect information about 60 countries in Africa, 
Latin America and Middle East, and argue that, in spite of the recent growing use of 
                                                 
2
 In the last few years a significant amount of empirical research has tried to estimate the WTP for 
insulation measures or efficient cooling or heating systems, usually concluding that WTP was positive. 
Banfi et al. (2008) reported positive WTP for a hypothetical change of insulation and ventilation systems 
for apartment renters and house owners in Switzerland, although the analysis of the determinants was 
limited because they could not include socioeconomic variables. Also for Switzerland, Alberini et al. 
(2013) found a positive WTP for owners of semi-detached and detached houses, even though this was 
only for those owners who expected increases in energy prices or those who were convinced of the 
relevance of house retrofitting programs within climate policies. Similar results have been obtained for 
Germany (Achtnicht 2011), South Korea (Kwak et al. 2010) and Hong Kong (Chau et al. 2010). 
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energy standards in these countries, most of these standards are far from the ones set in 
developed countries. But even in advanced economies the effects of building codes on 
energy consumption seem to be reduced: Levinson (2014), for instance, uses three 
different approaches to test whether California’s building codes met their objectives in 
terms of energy savings. He compares energy consumption from 8.700 homes in 2003 
and 11.000 in 2009 constructed under different standards, controlling for several 
factors, such as size, ownership status and weather. Aroonruengawat et al. (2012) 
additionally control for building code intensity, electricity and gas prices and the share 
of new construction, to compare per capital electricity consumption in 48 U.S. states; 
while Jacobsen and Kotchen (2013) compare billing data on electricity and gas 
consumption in more than 60.000 dwellings in Florida before and after an increase in 
the code’s stringency was produced, controlling for the observable characteristics of 
each residence and weather. A common finding in the previous papers is the limited 
effect in energy consumption of regulatory instruments. The effectiveness of price 
instruments, such as energy taxes, has also been constrained by the low elasticity of 
energy demand, as showed by Gillingham et al. (2009) or Ryan et al. (2011) in this area. 
Finally, although subsidies could be very effective given that investment cost is one of 
the most relevant factors for consumers (Mourato et al. 2004; Nair et al. 2010a), making 
unrestricted use of them typically results in inefficiencies due to high fiscal cost and the 
free-riding effect
3
. 
The evidence of the reduced levels of EE attained through conventional policies raises 
the question of whether the traditional approach, in which consumers are assumed to 
have perfect information and make rational decisions, corresponds to real EE residential 
markets
4
 (Stern et al. 1987). Probably the preceding analysis is too limited and requires 
relaxing these assumptions and incorporating other elements such as informational and 
behavioral failures (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010; Shogren and Taylor 2008). This in 
turn has opened the way to new instruments that address these failures
5
 (Tietenberg, 
2009) as well as to the sizeable empirical research presented in this paper. 
In particular, researchers have focused on information programs as well as on 
behavioral interventions
6
 as ways to close the Energy Efficiency Paradox. Indeed, 
informational instruments have become increasingly popular as regulators may use 
them to mitigate the negative effects generated by both, informational and behavioral 
                                                 
3
 Banfi et al. (2008) and Grösche and Vance (2009), for example, observed that for a very high share of 
households in Switzerland and Germany, the WTP for certain EE measures exceeded the investment 
cost.  
4
 As already pointed out for many sectors by Kahneman (2011), Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) or 
Simon (1955). 
5
 Although in some cases the intervention may respond to paternalism rather than to efficiency concerns, 
which of course raises some ethical questions. We address this point later in the paper. 
6 These interventions try to induce more efficient behaviors through “nudges” such as feedback, 
commitments, goal setting, social comparisons, normative messages, or manipulation of default options 
(Brown et al. 2013; Croson and Treich 2014; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2010). Frederiks et al. (2015) 
present examples of how to carry out these policy interventions. 
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failures. Of course, the type of information instruments chosen depends on the problems 
targeted: i) Certificates or labels that show the EE of a product; ii) Feedback to 
customers, which can be channeled through smart meters that show real-time energy 
consumption or bills with comparative information about similar or representative 
households; and iii) Energy audits with tailored information about specific measures 
households may adopt to reduce consumption. 
Up to now, most empirical evidence had focused on the assessment of the cost-
efficiency of conventional policies (Gillingham et al. 2006; Ürge-Vorsatz and Novikova 
2008) with ex-ante models that estimated and compared the expected results of each 
instrument. Recently, though, there have been many advances in the empirical analysis 
of EE in the residential sector by using ex-post data and also by progressing in the study 
of consumer behavior. The widespread application of EE policies has provided large 
databases that allow estimating the real impacts of these policies, and the determinants 
of the agents’ decisions, thus improving our understanding of household behavior. In 
addition, experimental methodologies with rigorous design and the use of large-scale 
random samples are extensively being employed to study novel aspects of EE in 
buildings.  
This article provides a comprehensive update on the knowledge of the performance of 
EE policies in the residential sector, with a particular emphasis on informational 
instruments. We focus on the residential sector because here informational and 
behavioral problems are much more frequent: households are not typically governed by 
cost-minimizing rules or “rational” decision making, and do not have easy access to 
information. This leads to a situation with many market barriers for EE in buildings, 
vehicles or appliances, and which makes this sector an interesting field of analysis. 
However, given that the development of these informational instruments has run 
parallel to that of other markets, such as commercial buildings, we will also refer to 
them in order to draw analogies and to provide a more integrated view of the new role 
that information will have to play in sectors presenting substantial barriers for 
conventional instruments. The paper’s contribution rests on being the first attempt, to 
the best of our knowledge, at compiling all the empirical evidence about informational 
instruments applied to EE in the residential sector. Second, and based on this empirical 
evidence, it provides some insights about the pertinence of the different instruments in 
terms of cost-effectiveness, and also on the attractiveness of integrated policy packages. 
We begin by describing the way in which informational and behavioral failures 
contribute to the Energy Efficiency Paradox (Section 2.2), and then move on to 
reviewing the empirical evidence on the performance of instruments designed to address 
these problems: energy labels and certificates, smart meters, bills with comparative 
information, and energy audits (Section 2.3). The review shows that the impact of 
informational instruments on EE in dwellings is positive, although variable. The new 
approaches identified also show the potential for clearer results in the near future, 
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highlight the difficulties of using only conventional instruments, and pave the way for 
the design of new, broad, integrated policy packages for EE in the residential sector in 
which informational instruments play a big part. In Section 2.4 we provide some policy 
guidelines, before concluding and considering future research needs in the final section. 
2.2   The role of information and behavior in the Energy Efficiency Paradox 
As mentioned earlier, informational and behavioral failures may play a very significant 
role in explaining the Energy Efficiency Paradox, in particular in the residential sector. 
In this section we enumerate and describe the aspects related with household 
informational and behavioral failures that can be potentially addressed using 
informational instruments.  
 
Table 1: Possible Explanations for the Energy Efficiency Paradox 
 Informational 
failures 
Behavioral 
failures 
Potential 
informational 
instruments 
Lower-than-efficient energy 
prices 
   
Slowness of technological 
diffusion 
   
Capital markets 
imperfections 
   
Heterogeneity of consumers    
Asymmetric and /or 
incomplete information 
X  Certificates 
Feedback 
Audits  
Principal-agent  X  Certificates 
Hidden costs X   
Transaction costs X  Certificates 
Feedback 
Audits 
Uncertainty  X  Certificates 
Audits 
Decision-making heuristics 
and biases 
 X Certificates 
Feedback 
Audits 
Source: The authors. 
In Table 1 we start from a classical account of the possible explanations for the Energy 
Efficiency Paradox (from Linares and Labandeira 2010) and mark those that correspond 
to informational or behavioral failures to show the relevance of these problems in this 
context. We also include in the table the informational instruments that might address 
these problems. In this sense, a single instrument may cover simultaneously several 
problems: for example, certificates may be used to provide information that was so far 
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incomplete, or to alleviate an information asymmetry, or to create a social norm; energy 
audits may counter bounded rationality (a behavioral failure) or provide additional 
information as feedback instruments. The subsequent literature review is intended to 
identify the aspects better covered by such instruments, and the problems for which they 
may be more effective. 
2.2.1 Informational failures  
The fact that consumers do not observe the amount of electricity consumed by a 
washing machine during a washing cycle or the energy required by a house to maintain 
the standard temperature, makes EE an intangible and secondary characteristic of 
energy goods. Therefore the nature of EE itself creates several problems related to 
information, which is frequently incomplete, generally asymmetric, and almost always 
costly to obtain. As a result, consumers value this unobservable characteristic less and 
tend to not include it among their preferences when buying a new product and this, in 
turn, prevents them from managing their energy use in the right way. 
Determining the EE of a product is a complex task, generally restricted to experts, 
which also creates a situation of asymmetric information. Some agents have all the 
information, whereas for others accessing this information is difficult and costly. These 
asymmetric information problems are related with the principal-agent or split incentives 
problems generated in those situations when the incentives for the different agents 
involved in a transaction are not aligned. Since they are not able to appropriate the 
returns of the investments in EE, this leads them to an inefficient allocation of 
resources. The characteristic duality of the residential sector for rental dwellings 
(owners and tenants, buyers and sellers, or homeowners and building contractors) 
particularly affects EE decisions. If the homeowner does not live there, or if the tenant 
does not pay directly utility costs, the energy use may be higher given the lack of the 
right price signal (Maruejols and Young 2011). The benefits of energy savings do not 
accrue to the owner who, nonetheless, must pay for the new investments. As a result, 
investments in EE are lower than optimal. 
Over the last decade, a great effort has been made to identify and quantify these 
distortions, in particular the principal-agent problem. In absence of specific databases, 
some researchers have used investment in EE and the use of energy for heating or 
cooling (from household surveys) and have applied binary choice models to estimate 
the effect of ownership. This is the case, for example, of Brechling and Smith (1994), 
who identified ownership as the single socioeconomic factor that, together with the rest 
of structural characteristics of the dwelling, had a significant effect on the probability of 
investing in EE. Similar results were obtained for Ireland by Scott (1997). Also, 
Schleich and Gruber (2008), using a sample of 19 sub-sectors in the commercial and 
residential sectors in Germany, identified principal-agent and imperfect information 
problems as the most important barriers to achieving optimal levels of EE. 
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The availability of specific surveys for energy use has permitted a wider range of 
approaches and applied empirical techniques. With data from the Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey and the American Housing Survey, Levinson and Niemann (2004) 
analyzed the incidence of the principal-agent problem on the temperature set by 
households in winter. Using probit and OLS regression models, they revealed a negative 
effect when contracts included heating expenses in the rental cost. These results were 
confirmed for Canada by Maruejols and Young (2011) who, using data from the 
Household Energy Use survey, showed that multi-family buildings where households 
do not directly pay for heating were more likely to set higher temperatures.  
More recently, Gillingham et al. (2012), using a large sample of households from the 
California Statewide Residential Appliance Saturation Study, showed that households 
occupied by owners had a 20% higher probability of featuring insulation in roofs and 
attics, while households whose tenants directly paid for energy had a 16% higher 
probability of changing the temperature set during the night. With a linear probability 
model and data from the US, Davis (2012) also confirmed the relevance of the 
principal-agent problem for buying efficient appliances and lighting systems because 
tenants who did not directly pay for electricity had a lower probability of buying this 
type of equipment. 
Finally, the IEA (2007) has tried to approximately quantify the amount of energy 
affected by this problem, using as case studies the residential, commercial and end-use 
sectors in Japan, U.S., the Netherlands, Norway and Australia. They found significant 
evidence of principal-agent problems: in particular 41% of dwellings in the Netherlands 
corresponded to homes where the end user paid the energy bill but did not choose 
technology, whereas 31.4% of the energy consumed in the residential sector in the U.S. 
was affected by principal-agent situations. 
There are other informational failures that have been less studied in this sector: 
uncertainty, hidden costs and transaction costs. Consumers cannot assess how reliable 
the information provided by the expert is, which makes them uncertain about adopting 
EE measures. This uncertainty is further compounded by the variability of future energy 
prices and changing regulatory environments that, together with the preceding, makes it 
harder to estimate the economic return of investments. Given that these investments are 
irreversible, uncertainty clearly deters them. Moreover, uncertain scenarios give rise to 
specific behavioral failures (see Table A1 in Annex A).  
Hidden costs may also be included among the information barriers, but in this case from 
the modelers’ side: these are real costs suffered by consumers, but not always accounted 
for by modelers. Therefore, they are frequently not incorporated in cost-benefit analysis, 
thus leading to an overestimation of net benefits. Authors such as, Jaffe et al. (2004) 
suggest that including these costs reduces the Energy Efficiency Paradox. 
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Finally transaction costs, associated to obtaining information or of making an economic 
transaction, create frictions in the market that may result in non-optimal outcomes 
(Sorrel et al. 2004). These costs may be very relevant in the residential sector, since 
households usually experience them in a higher proportion than other sectors, and 
independently or combined with behavioral failures (see the following section) they 
typically result in lower investment levels in EE. 
2.2.2 Behavioral failures 
They are a source of inefficiencies that is strongly related with previous informational 
failures, and which can also be mitigated with informational instruments. The 
hypothesis formulated by behavioral economics on the systematic deviation of 
consumers from the perfect rationality
7
 assumed by neoclassical economics has become 
more and more relevant in assessing public policies during the last few years 
(DellaVigna 2009; Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). Following Shogren and Taylor 
(2008), we employ the term “behavioral failures” for all those situations in which the 
consumer does not behave according to rational choice theory. There are many 
behavioral failures and also many typologies, some of which depend on the theory 
considered to explain these failures, the major ones being Prospect Theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979); Bounded Rationality (Simon 1955); and Regret Theory (Loomes 
and Sugden 1982). Table A1 in the Annex A summarizes the most relevant failures 
described in the literature.  
Allcott and Mullainathan (2010), Dyner and Franco (2004), Gillingham et al. (2009), 
Shogren and Taylor (2008) or Tietenberg (2009) have already pointed out the relevant 
role that this approach may play in understanding the Energy Efficiency Paradox. Time 
and cognitive constraints, for example, may prevent consumers from correctly 
estimating the future energy performance of a house, or may lead them to consider only 
the more salient or familiar features when choosing between the many attributes of a 
house, a car or a fridge. Risk aversion or reference dependence (“status quo” bias) may 
also limit the potential to actually achieve the estimated savings. All of this may result 
again in lower than expected EE levels. 
One reason for these behavioral failures is the lack of knowledge about energy costs, 
although they represent a significant part of household income. Brounen et al. (2013) 
illustrated this possibility with a survey on 1.721 households in the Netherlands, in 
which around 50% of the respondents did not know their energy expenses (the average 
energy bill was 222 Euro, 8% of income). Nair et al. (2010b) showed that this issue also 
had negative effects on EE in Swedish households, as families considering that their 
energy expenses were high would be more active in this area. 
                                                 
7
 Readers interested in this topic may refer to the recent books of Kahneman (2011) or Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) that, although directed to the general public, compile most of the relevant academic 
literature and present it in a clear way. 
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Although DellaVigna (2009) and Gillingham and Palmer (2013) have reviewed the 
empirical evidence of this type of behavioral failures in several fields, the consideration 
of EE in the residential sector has been quite limited so far. Qiu et al. (2014), Greene 
(2011), Erdem et al. (2010) and Farsi (2010) empirically analyze time and risk 
preferences and find evidences of the effects of these factors on household EE adoption.  
It is difficult to robustly measure the behavior of consumers in a market as complex as 
EE in dwellings and considerable analysis is still required to settle very relevant 
questions, such as how these failures affect EE, how behavioral and market failures 
relate, or whether they can be corrected through learning or repetition (Shogren and 
Taylor 2008)
8
. However, the use of novel experimental techniques represents an 
interesting tool to increase the current knowledge about these aspects. 
2.3 A review of the performance of information-based EE policies 
Acknowledging the relevance of the informational and behavioral failures in the Energy 
Efficiency Paradox has promoted the design of policies that attempt to provide better 
information to consumers and enable them to avoid non-rational behaviors and adopt 
the most efficient decisions. For example, the EU Energy Efficiency Directive 
(2012/27/EU) focuses on demand management programs for households as an 
alternative to price instruments. Indeed information-based instruments, such as energy 
certificates, energy audits, or information of energy use, are not only less costly to 
implement but may be also very effective in achieving EE (Allcott and Mullainathan 
2010; Ayres et al. 2012).  
Of course, a first issue to raise here is whether public intervention is warranted in all 
cases. Addressing informational problems, which generally constitute market failures, is 
difficult to contest. But, what about behavioral failures? As mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, many behavioral failures are strongly linked to informational failures 
and barriers. For instance, those situations where consumers use heuristic rules to 
simplify complex and time-consuming decisions may be explained by incomplete and 
asymmetric information. In such cases, public intervention is justified by the existence 
of informational market failures, and informational instruments represent an 
appropriated tool to counter both problems. However, there are other behavioral failures 
(for example decisions based on Regret or Prospect theory, or status-quo effects) that do 
not properly constitute or originate from market failures. In these cases, public 
intervention may be considered a form of paternalism, which can be argued against on 
                                                 
8
 The heterogeneity of households should also be taken into account, as their behavior may depend on 
cultural or ideological factors. For example, may studies have reported empirical evidence on the 
importance of concern for the environment in energy use and EE of residential consumers (Costa and 
Kahn 2010a; Di Maria and Lazarova 2008; Kahn and Vaughn 2009; Kotchen and Moore 2007; Lange et 
al. 2014 and Ramos et al. 2015). Another source of heterogeneity is the different use of home appliances 
(Houde 2014a). 
 
28 
 
ethical grounds. Although this discussion is outside the scope of this paper, insights of 
this debate can be found in Tietenberg (2009) and Stavins et al. (2013).  
As before, now we proceed to review the existing empirical evidence on the 
performance of several information-based instruments. 
2.3.1 Energy certificates and labels 
Energy certificates or label programs have quickly expanded over the last years, 
particularly in the building sector but also for residential appliances and cars. These 
certificates or labels use different colours or symbols to show different EE levels that 
are usually determined from the structural characteristics of the products and their 
importance in its energy performance. Certificates vary depending on their public or 
private character; on the typology of the goods targeted (residential or commercial); and 
on their mandatory or voluntary nature. In some countries, such as the U.S., energy 
certificates are voluntary and only used for very efficient products
9
. In the EU energy 
certificates are mandatory for appliances, vehicles and buildings, and all products are 
classified based on their EE level (in a scale from A, most efficient, to G, least 
efficient)
10
. Furthermore, in the residential and commercial buildings, the owner must 
show the certificate to the renters or buyers every time she wants to rent or sell the 
dwelling. 
Certificates are basically designed to help consumers to take efficient decisions through 
the provision of direct, reliable and costless information that otherwise would not be 
available. Thus energy certificates or labels target several informational failures at the 
same time: incomplete and/or asymmetric information, transaction costs and 
uncertainty, and reduce those behavioral failures generated by informational failures 
and barriers such as limited attention, aversion to uncertainty, etc. Energy certificates or 
labels can also reduce principal-agent problems. When an agent wants to rent or buy a 
dwelling, energy certificates or labels give ex ante information about future energy costs 
that may influence the agent’s choice. This situation can further create indirect 
incentives for owners or builders to invest in EE.  
The diffusion of this policy tool has been accompanied by a strong development of the 
empirical research assessing their impact on consumer decisions and on the price of the 
residential or commercial goods. Some studies have also looked at the effectiveness of 
the institutional and design aspects of these instruments: Mlecnik et al. (2010), for 
example, surveyed experts in 25 countries to identify the barriers and elements capable 
of improving the diffusion of certificates, such as increasing their relative advantages 
and their visibility and transparency for consumers, or reducing complexity and 
                                                 
9
 In the U.S. there are two voluntary systems for energy certificates: the Energy Star program for 
appliances, managed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the LEED program for 
buildings. 
10
 These systems are regulated by Directives 2012/27/EU, 1999/94/CE and 1992/75/CEE. 
29 
 
facilitating the transfer of knowledge. Bull (2012) highlighted the importance of the 
frame in which information is offered, using a choice experiment to show the 
importance of informing about the monetary value of the energy savings, or of the 
economic losses incurred instead of the potential benefits. Banerjee and Solomon 
(2003) used existing studies and reports to compare the effects on consumers and 
manufacturers of five (private and public) energy-labeling programs for appliances and 
electricity in the U.S. Their results showed that public systems were more successful 
and stressed the importance of the government in providing credibility and stability to 
these programs. The IEA (2010) also confirmed that the effect of a mandatory system is 
higher because more goods are identified, but it warned that public costs increase with 
such a system. 
The market has not yet been able to generate enough data to estimate the effect of 
introducing certificates on energy demand, neither at the aggregate nor at the 
disaggregate level. However, it is possible to estimate the direct effect of energy 
certificates on the decisions of the agents. In the case of buildings the value of 
certificates can be obtained with the use of hedonic methods (Rosen 1974), employing 
econometric models that control thermal conditions of the unit as well as other hedonic 
characteristics (vintage, location, etc.) to determine the WTP of buyers or renters. 
However, results from the hedonic price model can be biased if the price function 
suffers from omitted variables bias. Another limitation associated with this model is the 
presence of correlation between the product’s attributes.  
Table 2 summarizes the major empirical evidence on WTP for certificates in buildings. 
A first group of studies were carried out in the commercial sector in the U.S., with the 
use of information compiled in the CoStar database (Eichholtz et al. 2013; Eichholtz et 
al. 2010; Fuerst and McAllister 2011a, 2011c; Reichardt et al. 2012; Wiley et al. 2010). 
These results are of major importance for our analysis since the commercial building 
market and the residential building market share many characteristics. All these studies 
estimated that energy-efficient buildings (certified with LEED or EnergyStar labels) 
obtained higher rents or selling prices than others with the same characteristics but 
without certificate. Although with smaller databases, Das et al. (2011) and Bloom et al. 
(2011) confirmed these results for San Francisco, Washington DC and Colorado. 
Interestingly, the results of these studies also show a positive relation between 
certification and the occupation rate in commercial buildings, in addition to the fact that 
part of the WTP could be attributed not only to the expected energy use but also to 
unobservable factors such as the environmental attitude of the consumers or the 
reputational effect (Eichholtz et al. 2013; Muehlegger and Gallagher 2011).  
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Table 2: Empirical Research on the Value of Certificates or Labels for Energy 
products 
STUDY SECTOR 
RESULTS: WTP 
Rent (effective) Sales 
Eichholtz, et al. (2010) Commercial U.S. 3% (7%) 16% 
Eichholtz et al. (2013) Commercial U.S. 3% (8%) 13% 
Wiley et al. (2010) Commercial U.S. 
7-9% Energy Star 
15-17% LEED 
 
30$/f2 Energy Star 
130$/f2 LEED 
Fuerst and McAllister 
(2011a) 
Commercial U.S. 4-5% 25% 
Fuerst and McAllister 
(2011c) 
Commercial U.S. 
3% Energy Star 
5% LEED 
9% Energy Star+LEED. 
18% Energy Star 
25% LEED 
28-29% Energy Star+LEED. 
Reichardt et al. (2012) Commercial U.S. 
2.5% Energy Star 
2.9% LEED. 
 
Das et al. (2011) Commercial U.S. Positive and dynamic  
Bloom et al. (2011) Commercial U.S.  8.66$/f2 
Kok and Jennen (2012) 
Commercial 
Netherlands 
-6%  
Fuerst and McAllister 
(2011b) 
Commercial U.K. Not significant Not significant 
Chegut et al. (2013) Commercial London 19.7% 14.7% 
Brounen and Kok (2011) 
Residential 
Netherlands 
 3.6% 
Högberg (2013) Residential Sweden  Positive WTP 
Hyland et al. (2013) Residential Ireland 
A: 1.8% 
B: 3.9% 
C: not significant 
E: -1.9% 
F/G: -3.2% 
A: 9.3% 
B: 5.2% 
C: 1.7% 
E: not significant 
F/G: -10.6%. 
Cajias and Piazolo (2013) 
Residential 
Germany 
Total returns: 
B: 2.27% 
C: 2.34% 
D: 2.69% 
E/F: not significant 
G: reference 
 
Yoshida and Sugiura (2011) Residential Tokyo  Negative 
Deng et al. (2012) 
Residential 
Singapore 
 4% 
Zheng et al. (2012) Residential Beijing Negative Negative 
Wall et al. (2013) Residential U.S.  
Positive for houses built 1996-2005. 
Not significant for newer houses. 
Values reach up to 20% 
Kahn and Kok (2014) 
Residential 
California 
 9%. 
Source: The authors. 
Similar studies have been carried out in other countries with varying results. Fuerst and 
McAllister (2011b) did not find any effect for the commercial sector in the U.K., 
although Chegut et al. (2013) did find it for London. Kok and Jennen (2012) also found 
a positive effect for the commercial sector in the Netherlands, showing that inefficient 
commercial buildings (those with a D or lower grade) were rented at a 6% discount. As 
for the residential sector, results also overwhelmingly point to a positive WTP for 
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certified homes. In Europe Brounen and Kok (2011) studied the response of Dutch 
households to the EU energy certificate system and found that homes certified as A, B 
or C achieved premiums of 3.6% in their selling price as compared to others. Högberg 
(2013) used the information on standard energy use included in the certificate to 
determine if energy use is capitalized in the selling price of homes in Sweden. Using a 
sample of more than 1.000 homes in Stockholm they also confirmed that there is a 
positive relation between energy use and selling price. Hyland et al. (2013), in turn, 
used a panel with data for selling and renting prices from the website of a real estate 
company from 2008 to 2012 in Ireland. Following the methodology of Brounen and 
Kok (2011) they found that an “A home” was sold at 9.3% more than a “D home”, and 
a “B home” was sold at 5.2% more than a “D home”, whereas a “F or G home” had a 
10.6% discount as compared to a “D home”. The Irish study also found that the WTP 
was 1.8% more for an “A home”, and 3.9% more for a “D home”. Cajias and Piazolo 
(2013) confirmed these results for Germany between 2008 and 2010. 
There have also been studies for Asia, with heterogeneous results. Deng et al. (2012) 
used a hedonic model with two stages to control for the location effect of apartment 
buildings in Singapore. In their results the value of the certificate used (Green Mark) 
increases the selling price of homes by 4%. However, Yoshida and Sugiura (2011) 
found that, if the hedonic model is controlled for vintage and quality of the building, 
then the energy certificates used in Tokyo could even have a negative effect on the price 
of the home due to the higher cost of the efficient systems or perhaps rebound in energy 
consumption. Indeed, Newsham et al. (2009) found that LEED buildings decrease their 
energy consumption by 18-39% on average, even though 28-35% of them had increased 
their energy consumption. Zheng et al. (2012) studied the value of buildings that were 
publicized as “green”, showing that this characteristic had a positive effect on the 
bidding price but it was not materialized in the real selling price, which could be 
explained by a lack of veracity in the information provided.  
Finally, two studies have dealt with this matter for the residential sector of the U.S. 
Wall et al. (2013) indicated that the energy certificate is only effective for the price of 
old homes, but not for new ones (may be because of the different marginal energy 
savings, which can be lower in new homes) in Austin, Portland and the research triangle 
area of North Carolina. However, Kahn and Kok (2014) found a WTP of 9% of the 
selling price for certified homes in California.  
This same outcome for energy certificates in buildings has been replicated in other areas 
of residential energy use. In particular, two papers have estimated a positive WTP for 
energy certificates for private vehicles. Galarraga et al. (2013) found that efficient cars 
(with an A or B certificate) were sold with a premium of between 2.1% and 9% in 
Spain. Alberini et al. (2014) used matching estimators and a regression discontinuity 
design to estimate the value of A labels in Switzerland, showing that the price of an A 
label ranged between 5% and 6-11% for each methodology.  
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Estimation of WTP from stated preferences for appliances has been also widespread. 
Some examples are Sammer and Wüstenhagen (2006), for washing machines in 
Switzerland; Wallander (2008), who combines hedonic pricing with discrete choice 
models for EnergyStar-certified washing machines in the U.S.; Shen and Saijo (2009), 
with a latent class approach to analyze the case of air conditioners and refrigerators with 
the China Energy Efficiency Label in Shanghai; Ward et al. (2011), with the same 
approach for refrigerators in the U.S.; Galarraga et al. (2011), with the use of hedonic 
pricing to estimate the WTP for efficient dishwashers in Spain; and Newell and 
Siikamäki (2014), for EnergyStar water heaters in the U.S. Recently, Houde (2014a) 
used a natural experiment (the change in the requirements for refrigerator certificates in 
the U.S.) to estimate the treatment effect of certificates. He obtained three types of 
answers with a structural model: agents who value the EnergyStar label even more than 
the energy savings implied, agents who only value the information about the energy use, 
and agents who do not value any of these characteristics. 
Some studies about appliances have pointed out the need to tailor the information 
included on the label to the specific circumstances of consumers. For example, Davis 
and Metcalf (2014) evaluated the quality of the information provided by the mandatory 
labels for appliances used in the U.S. They wondered whether state-specific labels 
tailored to the state of residence of each participant were efficient, and thus they carried 
out an online choice experiment where participants had to choose to hypothetically 
purchase one of three air conditioners. The control group was shown an official energy 
label providing consumers with information on the expected annual energy cost 
according to national energy prices and use, while in the treatment group an alternative 
label was shown with information on expected annual energy costs based on state 
energy prices and uses. Their results showed that state-specific labels led to 
significantly better choices, although they also indicate that consumers did not fully 
understand the information displayed in the label. 
The informational value of an energy certificate or label could also be substituted by an 
informal procedure. Allcott and Sweeney (2015) developed a natural experiment in 
collaboration with an appliance retailer, in which 20.000 customers who bought water 
heaters were offered two levels of information: some were told about the EE of the 
heaters, while others were not. Their results show that this information had a limited 
effect, although this may be due to the fact that only explicitly interested customers 
received information. Another explanation, of course, would be the lower level of trust 
that customers may have placed on the sales agents (as compared to a well-established 
certificate). 
Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) also run two randomized control trials to estimate the 
impact of information on the decision to buy compact fluorescent bulbs. The first was a 
choice experiment, through Internet, that estimated the effect of randomly providing 
information of the energy cost and lifetime of the product. The second provided 
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information through a sales agent who randomly intercepted customers in a shopping 
mall and asked them to fill in a questionnaire. Results show that information was 
significant only in the first experiment. 
Another way to offer information about the energy performance of a product is to 
express it in monetary terms. In the 1980s some experiments measured the effect of 
informing about the energy costs of appliances, with a survey on these studies showing 
mixed results (Kaenzig and Wüstenhagen 2009). The recent introduction of energy 
certificates in the U.S. and the EU has spurred renewed academic interest in this issue. 
Deutsch (2010) carried out an online field experiment in which he attempted to estimate 
the effect of providing information about the life-cycle cost of washing machines sold 
by a German online website. In this experiment consumers were randomly assigned to 
two groups, one receiving the life-cycle cost information and the other not receiving it. 
Results show that this information reduced the energy use of the washing machines sold 
by 0.8%.  
And, of course, monetary costs can be added to energy performance labels. Kallbekken 
et al. (2013) ran an experiment in Norway in which they provided information about 
energy costs through an experimental energy label (developed by the seller) showing the 
operational cost over the lifetime of dryers and refrigerators, which was additional to the 
information on the mandatory energy label. They also trained sales agents to inform 
customers about this matter. Just like Allcott and Sweeney (2015), they found no 
significant effect of this additional information in the case of refrigerators, but they did 
find a positive and significant one for dryers (although there was no effect for the 
energy label alone). 
Of course the results of all these studies cannot be compared directly. The WTP for a 
certificate would vary depending on, for example, the energy consumption of a typical 
building, or the use of vehicles in a specific region. The certification system or energy 
prices may also influence the WTP for them. Marginal energy savings (which will 
depend on different standards for energy use in buildings, vehicles or appliances) will 
also result in different WTP for certificates. Finally, comparing building with appliance 
or vehicle certificates is also problematic. Yet, beyond those differences, there is clear 
empirical evidence that consumers positively value energy certificates or labels. Indeed, 
there is evidence that they value the certificate in some cases independently of the 
higher EE it represents. 
The evidence also points to some characteristics of the design that seem to increase the 
effectiveness of this tool: reliability that might be provided by a public scheme; 
mandatory systems that increase the size of the effect; or framing the information in 
terms of monetary costs rather than in CO2 emissions or energy units. It is also 
important to include a monitoring procedure to ensure the correct implementation of the 
legislation.  
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2.3.2  Feedback 
Over the last few decades, information on the household use of energy (feedback) has 
become an important instrument to achieve energy savings. If consumers are aware of 
the way they use energy and of its cost, they should be interested in reducing their 
energy consumption. As it was mentioned before, energy consumption is intangible and 
consumers can hardly know how their daily habits are translated in energy consumption. 
Thus, feedback is an essential tool to mitigate informational failures such as incomplete 
information and behavioral failures as those generated by wrong beliefs about energy 
consumption. Of course, this strategy could also create wrong incentives (the so-called 
boomerang effect): if consumers find that they use or spend less than expected, they 
might even increase their consumption. But feedback can also work as a good 
complement for conventional instruments since it can augment their effectiveness by 
increasing the elasticity of demand. For example, Jessoe and Rapson (2014) observed in 
a field experiment that the effect of a price change was higher in households that 
received real-time information (through a smart meter) than it was in the control group. 
Abrahamse et al. (2005) reviewed 38 studies carried out between 1977 and 2004 to 
assess the effectiveness of feedback programs (through meters in 13 experiments). 
Results showed that this information can sometimes produce energy savings and that its 
effectiveness increases as does the frequency in which the information is received. That 
review also included the results of three experiments providing information on a 
comparative basis: in two of them differences were insignificant, while the third one did 
produce some energy savings in gas and electricity due to the exchange of information 
between groups of neighbors in the Netherlands (Staats et al. 2004). 
Darby (2006) also reviewed almost 30 studies in the US, Canada, Scandinavia, the 
Netherlands and the U.K., and concluded that immediate feedback through a monitor or 
meter reduced energy use between 5 and 15% (and between 0 and 10% through bills). 
Fischer (2008) updated the review of Abrahamse et al. (2005) and Darby (2006) and 
added 24 more studies carried out between 1987 and 2006. However, most of these 
studies were usually part of pilot experiences and generally used a reduced sample size 
that generated doubts on the robustness of their results.  
As already pointed out, recent advances of research in this area owe a lot to the 
diffusion of developed experimental methodologies based on random and larger 
samples that increase the credibility of the results. Additionally, the growth of internet 
services has also expanded the analysis to other channels and goods. For example, 
Gleerup et al. (2010) carried out a random field experiment in Denmark with 1.452 
households, part of whom were informed by email or cell phone texts that they had used 
an exceptionally high amount of electricity in a certain period. Informed consumers 
reduced their energy use by 3% on average, although this value was not significant for 
all the model specifications, which could be due to the small size of the treatment 
groups. Also, in other field trial carried out in Linz (Austria) with more than 1.500 
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households Schleich et al. (2013) sent feedback through a web portal or post with 
detailed information on electricity consumption and found a 4.5% average decline of 
annual electricity consumption in the treatment group. However, with a quantile 
regression model they found that this effect was not statistically significant for 
households above and below the 30th and 70th quantiles of electricity consumption.  
Since the most frequent channels used to convey this feedback have been smart meters 
and energy bills, we next now look at them in detail. 
2.3.2.1 Smart meters 
As aforementioned, the effectiveness of feedback increases as the frequency in which it 
is received increases (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2010) and so smart meters may increase 
the savings achieved11. These meters also allow for more rigorous experiments, as 
compared to the small-size, not-always-random studies carried out in the first years. Of 
course, the information compiled by smart meters must be conveyed to the customer, 
which can be done with an in-house display or through other channels such as web-
based services or bills.  
There are already some estimates about the effect of smart meters on energy savings. 
Faruqui et al. (2010) concluded that the average reduction in energy use was 7%, 
without accounting for the impact of time-dependent tariffs. Similarly, Gans et al. 
(2013) found that energy use in Ireland dropped between 11% and 17% when smart 
meters replaced old meters in a natural experiment. Houde et al. (2013) collaborated 
with Google in an experiment in which over 1.500 employees participated voluntarily. 
Households were randomly assigned to the treatment group, which received a device 
that metered energy use every 10 minutes and made this and other information public 
on a webpage. The experiment led to a 5.7% reduction of energy use, although 
reductions ceased to be significant after four weeks. 
2.3.2.2 Energy bills with comparative information 
Another way of giving feedback is through bills that provide information on household 
energy use and how it compares to others. This option has been considered since the 
1980s (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2010), but only recently has been proposed as an 
effective feedback to promote energy efficient behavior (Croson and Treich 2014). This 
type of information uses social pressure to attempt to “nudge” consumers into adopting 
more energy-efficient decisions (DellaVigna 2009). The most studied case consists in 
including information about the energy use of similar homes on the energy bill, so that 
                                                 
11
 Smart meters are being rolled out differently in different regions, with some technical and data privacy 
problems. For instance, the 2012/27/UE Directive requires all member states to ensure that all customers 
have real-time meters. However, the cost effectiveness of meters for energy savings is not clear, as shown 
by Conchado and Linares (2012), who review the economic impacts of these programs. 
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consumers with a higher consumption may be inclined to reduce their consumption
12
. 
Thus, this informational instrument attempts to reduce incomplete information but also 
other behavioral failures such as limited attention (see Section 2.2). In the EU, for 
instance, this information is regulated by the Directive 2012/27/EU and must be 
included in the bill whenever possible. As compared to smart meters, bills offer a much 
more inexpensive way to provide feedback to achieve energy savings. 
Table 3: Empirical Evidence from Studies of Comparative Energy Bills 
Study  Sample Results 
Nola et al. (2008) 810 households, 
California 
Consumption decreases 
Schultz et al. ( 2007) 290 households, 
California 
-1.22 kWh/day for households above the 
average using descriptive information  
-1.72 kWh/day for households above the 
average using descriptive and injunctive 
information  
Allcott (2011) 600.000 households, 
U.S.  
-2% average, significant heterogeneity 
Ayres et al. (2012) 84.000 households,  
U.S. 
-1.2% gas  
-2.1% electricity 
 
Costa and Kahn (2013) 
Treatment group of 
approximately 35.000 
households. 
A control group of 
roughly 49.000 
households that have 
never received a 
Home Electricity 
Report in the U.S. 
-3.1% consumption for: registered 
liberal who pays for electricity from 
renewable sources, who donates to 
environmental groups, and who lives in 
a liberal neighborhood reduces 
consumption 
+0.7% for: registered as conservative do 
not pay for electricity from renewable 
sources, do not donate to environmental 
groups, and live in the bottom quartile 
liberal neighborhood 
Allcott and Rogers 
(2014) 
The initial experiment 
population was 
234.000 households in 
the U.S. 
Consumption decreases immediately but 
decays after less than two weeks. 
Source: The authors. 
A growing number of empirical studies have looked at this matter, and are summarized 
in Table 3 with their technical characteristics and results. The first review, carried out 
by Fischer (2008) for 12 empirical studies that used some type of comparative 
information, did not find impacts on energy use. Fischer argued that this might be 
explained by the increase in consumption of lower-than-average households that cancels 
                                                 
12
 Schultz et al. (2007) warn that, in order to avoid a negative effect in households with lower-than-
average consumption, it is also recommendable to include information on the historic consumption of the 
household.  
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out the reduction. According to Schultz et al. (2007) this may be due to the lack of 
historical information on their own consumption (injunctive messages) which creates a 
potential rebound effect on their own consumption (boomerang effect) as they found for 
California. 
Nola et al. (2008) ran a first experiment in California in which they found that, although 
households do not consider this comparative information relevant for making decisions, 
those that received this information in a second experiment reduced their energy use. 
However, the results from these two studies are limited by the small size of the samples 
used. More recently, the U.S. utility OPower carried out a large-scale random 
experiment, the Home Energy Report
13
. Its goal was to assess the effect of including 
comparative information about the energy use of a similar home in the gas or electricity 
bill and, following Schultz et al. (2007), it also incorporated historical information about 
the own consumption of the home. Several studies have been produced from this 
experiment: Allcott (2011) found that, for a sample of 600.000 households distributed 
across the U.S., this information reduced energy use by 2% on average. Ayres et al. 
(2012) used two sub-samples, one for electricity-only use and the other for gas and 
electricity, showing a reduction in energy use of between 1.2% and 2.1%, although the 
effects were limited in time (7 months for gas and 12 months for electricity). The issue 
of persistency of effects after the end of the intervention was specifically addressed by a 
recent paper by Allcott and Rogers (2014) with the use of a longer sample of the 
OPower experiment. The results from this paper suggest that the effect decays two 
weeks after the intervention ends
14
, although the persistency is higher if the intervention 
is longer. This could be explained by a gradual change in both the habits and the 
technology of consumers. 
Even though these studies use very large databases that ensure robust results, it is worth 
noting that there is a large heterogeneity in the residential sector difficult to capture in 
the models (Costa and Kahn 2013). Therefore, savings may vary substantially 
depending on the typology of the households and their political or environmental 
orientation. Moreover, the counterfactuals used for each study are different and thus it is 
not possible to make direct comparisons among the results. 
2.3.3 Energy audits 
Energy audits are another way to convey information about EE to consumers. With 
personalized audits, consumers may be aware of the potential for reducing energy use in 
their homes. Therefore, their major advantage is that they offer tailored information. 
This policy instrument attempts to reduce several types of informational failures: 
                                                 
13
 Accessible at http://opower.com/.  
14 
In a field experiment carried out in Japan in 2012 and 2013, Ito et al. (2015) also found that the effect of 
suasion information sent to households to voluntarily implement energy conservation measures during 
peak demand quickly diminished after repeated interventions. However, their results were based on a 
non-random sample. 
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incomplete and asymmetric information, transaction costs, uncertainty, and some 
behavioral failures. However, the cost is high, and it often requires support from public 
administrations or energy companies. In the EU Directive 2012/27/EU requires member 
states to promote and facilitate energy audits among final consumers, as long as they are 
cost-efficient, carried out by certified agents, and supervised by national authorities. 
In a recent field experiment Alberini and Towe (2015) estimate the energy savings 
generated by two EE programs, one of which consists of a free of charge energy audit 
carried out in Maryland. They used a “triple difference” approach together with 
different matching techniques that allow them to find similar control households, and 
found a treatment effect of a 5% decline in energy usage. Yet researchers agree that the 
major difficulty in assessing this informational instrument is the self-selection bias due 
to the voluntary nature of audits. The above-mentioned review of Abrahamse et al. 
(2005) compiles the results of five studies of energy audits, carried out before 2004. 
Results are heterogeneous: while some papers find a significant reduction in electricity 
and gas use, others do not find any evidence of this reduction. Once again, the disparity 
of results may be explained by the heterogeneity of the samples. Frondel and Vance 
(2012) reach a similar conclusion, finding very diverse outcomes for energy audits in 
Germany that depend on the households studied. They even encounter cases in which 
the information provided through the audit renders negative effects for EE investments. 
These problems led Palmer et al. (2011), in a survey of almost 500 energy service 
companies, to inquire on the difficulties encountered by this instrument. The major 
problems they pointed out were difficulties in understanding the results of the audits, 
their direct cost, and the cost of the recommended improvements. 
2.4 Policy implications 
In sum, although informational instruments seem to be very promising, they also 
present clear shortcomings. Despite clearly adding very relevant channels to those 
already covered by conventional instruments, some factors explaining the Energy 
Efficiency Paradox in the residential sector still need to be addressed and researched. 
One is the large transaction cost for households when considering investments in EE, 
and which is partly addressed by certificates, feedbacks and audits, by reducing the cost 
of information. But even when investments are completely funded by the government, 
there may be significant transaction costs that could discourage consumers from 
investing even if they have been provided with the information to reduce energy 
consumption (Fowlie et al. 2015). Reducing transaction costs for households is a 
difficult issue, similar to the one presented by bounded rationality (or limited attention) 
inherent to many of these decisions. Innovative approaches are clearly required here. 
Another very relevant problem requiring novel institutional arrangements is the 
principal-agent problem, pervasive in this sector, which is neither directly addressed by 
conventional nor informational instruments. Although it can be reduced by some 
information instruments, such as energy certificates, or by imposing minimum EE 
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standards for rental properties, the misalignment of incentives cannot be corrected 
completely by these policies. In addition, the use of standards is only reasonable for 
new rental buildings, but not for existing ones. 
One way to move forward may be to combine instruments and promote new designs for 
conventional instruments. The Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) of the U.K., a 
complement to the EU Emissions Trading System for the commercial sector that 
addresses low-energy-intensive activities in high demand is a good example. Another 
interesting instrument is the one recently proposed by Rodríguez et al. (2012) and Gago 
et al. (2013): a new tax on energy inefficiency. This tax would be based on the energy 
certificate system, and would employ a fixed charge per area unit, depending on the 
type of certificate. Another option, mentioned above, would be the combination of 
minimum EE standards with price signals, as in the two-part instrument proposed for 
vehicles by Eskeland and Devarajan (1996). 
Of course, more research is needed to study the applicability and effectiveness of these 
new designs. New information and communication technologies also open up new 
possibilities to design instruments, even though this may also involve high costs. This 
takes us to our final point, which is the need to study all these instruments not only from 
the point of view of effectiveness but also from the perspective of welfare. Little 
research is available on this, but some authors already indicate possible situations in 
which the welfare effect is not clear. Mahenc (2007), for example, studies the possible 
overpricing of green products, whereas Houde (2014b) and Cohen et al. (2014) argue 
that manufacturers of household appliances may respond to energy certificates and 
standards with price discrimination and other strategies that result in welfare losses for 
consumers. However, no studies have been carried in the residential building market as 
of yet. The cost-benefit analysis for the deployment of smart meters, for instance, is not 
clear either: given the still pre-commercial status of many of the technologies 
associated, the cost of deploying the smart meters and the communication infrastructure 
required outweighs the benefits they can provide in terms of energy savings (see e.g. 
Conchado and Linares 2010). 
2.5 Conclusions and future research 
Conventional EE policies such as building codes or standards, or pricing systems, have 
not been effective in the residential sector, which is actually increasing its energy use 
(and carbon emissions) in most countries. Part of the reason for this may lie in the 
complexity of this sector, with its many dualities (renters vs. owners; commercial vs. 
residential, etc.) that complicate institutional arrangements and the use of traditional 
instruments. However, another very powerful explanation is that the assumption of 
perfect information and rational decision-making is less valid in this sector than it is in 
others. Indeed, many researchers have identified the significant contribution of 
information and behavioral problems to the Energy Efficiency Paradox in this sector.  
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Therefore, it is necessary to consider other tools that directly address these problems, 
and to do that not only on effectiveness but also on efficiency terms. Implementing 
some of these alternative instruments may be substantially less costly than 
implementing the traditional ones and thus could bring about a simultaneous 
improvement in the efficiency of public policies. A relevant question then is how 
effective are these information-based instruments. In this paper we have reviewed the 
evidence on the effectiveness of energy certificates and labels, feedback programs, and 
energy audits. Our results reveal that there are clear advantages for some yet not for 
others as we summarize next. 
Energy certificates and labels show great potential. Most of the available studies 
indicate a positive WTP by consumers for them (up to 20% in some cases), which is 
consistent with the reductions observed in energy use. This result has not only been 
obtained for buildings but also for appliances and vehicles. Yet some of this information 
must be taken with care as, first, results are less positive for residential buildings than 
they are for commercial buildings. This signals lower value of the information in the 
former, which in turn may be related to a less-rational decision-making process. Clearly, 
there is a need to address more factors in play in the residential sector.  
Second, there are cases in which WTP is non-significant or even negative. This may be 
owed to different reasons such as the way certificates are designed. The studies 
reviewed show that the way the information is framed determines the results: it is more 
powerful to show energy savings or economic losses than it is to present potential 
benefits. Government backing is also much valued, giving credibility and stability to the 
certificates. These features probably explain why informal or private information 
procedures show a limited effect, a much lower one than certificates do. Finally, 
consumers may be deterred by higher maintenance costs, or potential rebound effects of 
more efficient equipment even if the certificates show energy savings.  
In turn, feedback programs are shown to achieve moderate energy savings, of around 2-
3%. These programs can be very inexpensive, though, as is the case when the feedback 
is given through energy bills, and they can also use social pressure (through 
comparative information) as a driver for EE. Therefore, in these low-cost 
implementations they can be preferable to other policy alternatives. 
However, research has shown that the frequency with which the feedback is given 
matters a great deal, and energy bills are not that frequent. Here smart meters may play 
a much bigger part, in fact frequent feedback information provided by these devices has 
shown to achieve reductions of up to 15% in energy use. Unfortunately they are more 
expensive, as mentioned earlier, not only because of the cost of the smart meters but 
also due to the very high cost of the communication infrastructure required. Two more 
important problems must also be noted. The first is the fact that feedback might result in 
increases in energy use in the case of consumers that are already efficient. Some authors 
suggest including historic information to control for this. The second and most relevant 
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problem is the persistency of the savings, usually quite low, which indicates that habit-
formation and technological changes seem to require longer and more frequent 
interventions. 
Finally, many governments have promoted a very popular instrument: energy audits. 
These audits are personalized, therefore able to address heterogeneity, and have many 
political economy advantages because they are typically associated to subsidies (easier 
to accept than additional charges for a certificate, for example), and because they 
generate a significant level of activity for the ESCO (energy-service company) sector, 
which will therefore back them strongly compared to other instruments that generate 
less revenue. However, the results of the reviewed studies have rendered mixed, i.e. not 
clearly positive, effects. Combined with its high cost and its complex implementation, 
the preceding conforms audits as the least interesting of all the instruments reviewed in 
this paper. 
In this article, as in many review papers, we end up with a picture of informational 
instruments that is not as clear as a one-handed policy maker would like. We point to 
the many advantages of some well-designed informational instruments, such as energy 
certificates or feedback programs, and the limitations of energy audits. However we also 
observe that much more work is required to explore the potential of alternative 
instruments and assess their cost-efficiency. This is undoubtedly an area full of potential 
for energy economics researchers. 
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Annex A 
Table A1: Summary of the major behavioral failures 
Type  Behavioral failure Explanation 
Deviations from 
rational theory 
of choice 
Framing The way a problem is framed impacts the final 
decision 
Preference reversal There may be differences between values and 
choices which result in reversal of preferences 
Preference intransitivity Preferences may not be consistent, and may form 
on the spot, resulting in intransitive cycles 
Independence of irrelevant 
alternatives 
Alternatives that should be irrelevant become 
very important for the final decision 
Endowment or “status-quo” 
effect 
Tendency to value more what we have, or the 
starting situation 
Gambling and insurance Partly based on the latter (the starting or reference 
point), people will have different attitudes 
towards risk depending on its magnitude and 
starting point 
Sunk cost fallacy People consider sunk costs in their decisions, 
although they should not, based sometimes on 
self-discipline or stability of decisions 
Mental accounting People allocate different expenses to different 
categories, as a way to deal with complexity in 
budgeting 
Dynamic inconsistency Preferences change when decisions come closer.  
Bounded rationality or 
limited attention 
People are not able to use all the available 
information due to time or effort constraints 
The paradox of choice More options result in less utility (maybe because 
of larger regret) 
Emotions Emotions, altruism, social norms, may have a 
significant effect on decisions 
Biases when 
dealing with 
uncertainty 
Representativeness/ 
Conjunction fallacy 
People look for internally-consistent stories, even 
if they go against probabilities. It is also used 
when people extrapolate small samples to large 
ones. 
Availability People make judgments about the probability of 
events by how easy it is to think of examples 
Anchoring Estimations are biased by the number initially 
provided 
Gambler’s fallacy Based on misconceptions of randomness, people 
are not able to estimate the likelihood of random 
sequences 
Selection bias When the sample selected is not random, results 
will be biased 
Aversion to uncertainty People assign lower utility to results for which 
probabilities are not known 
Source: The authors. 
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Chapter 3: 
Pro-Environmental Households and Energy Efficiency in 
Spain
*
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Buildings have become a centerpiece for energy and environmental policies due to their 
large impacts on energy demand and related emissions. Indeed, residential and 
commercial buildings account for approximately 40% of final energy consumption in 
industrialized countries. Unlike other sectors, the stock or inertia effect of buildings is 
of particular concern given that many units were built under old (or without) codes and 
thus often without significant attention to energy efficiency (EE) or environmental 
issues. Buildings are long-term durable goods; hence, their contributions to future 
energy consumption and emissions are likely to be large unless specific actions and 
policies are introduced (Gago et al. 2013).  
EE offers an opportunity to change this trend by applying cost-effective measures to 
reduce energy consumption (Levine et al. 2007). In the last few years international 
institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) have emphasized the 
potential energy savings achievable from building design and retrofitting, and have 
urged governments to introduce policies to promote EE in this sector (IEA 2013) such 
as codes and standards, taxes and subsidies and other non-price instruments (see 
Markandya et al. 2015). Some of these measures consist of improving the technical 
conditions of buildings so that they need less energy to provide the same service, e.g. 
through insulation, more efficient heating systems or the use of highly energy-efficient 
appliances Moreover, consumers can reduce their daily energy consumption by 
adopting energy-saving habits such as switching off lights or targeting lower (upper) 
interior temperatures in winter (summer).  
Yet widespread EE adoption has hardly been observed in this sector given strong factors 
that prevent agents from taking advantage of EE potentials (see e.g. Levine et al. 2007, 
European Commission 2011). Some of the most important barriers are informational 
imperfections and behavioral failures, as this is a complex sector with a multitude of 
agents and high costs, along with limited access to capital (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). Yet, 
these effects might be less pronounced for households that show environmental 
concerns, even in the case of incomplete information, principal-agent problems, 
                                                 
*
 A previous version of this chapter was accepted in Environ. Resource Econ., and published online as: 
Ramos, A., Labandeira, X., Löschel, A. (2015). Pro-environmental households and energy efficiency in 
Spain. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9899-8. 
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bounded rationality or long payback periods. Pro-environmental households might 
value not only the monetary savings derived from reducing their energy use, but also the 
environmental improvement associated with energy savings; hence they may favor EE 
more than the rest of the households. This could lead, for instance, to a more exhaustive 
search for information when buying new appliances, to shorter payback periods, or to 
more attention to energy performance attributes (given by energy performance 
certificates or labeling systems). In the same way, if the members of a household are 
concerned with environmental protection they might (contrary to principal-agent 
hypothesis) save energy at home by adopting eco-friendly habits, such as turning down 
the heating thermostat even if they do not pay the bill directly (IEA 2007). Finally, pro-
environmental households might be less prone to traditional or cultural aspects as well 
as behavioral failures that prevent consumers from taking optimal decisions.  
This paper attempts to empirically determine the factors that drive Spanish household 
decisions in EE investments and the adoption of daily energy-saving habits, using the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) 2008 survey, Encuesta Social: Hogares y 
Medio Ambiente (ESHMA, Social Survey: Households and the Environment), a single-
year representative survey containing micro data on Spanish households. Similar 
analyses previously performed for other developed countries have mostly considered 
dwelling structural and socio-economic variables. However, the importance of 
environmental issues in understanding household decision-making processes with 
respect to EE and energy consumption has been recently emphasized by different 
authors (e.g. Loureiro et al. 2013; Vassileva et al. 2012; Ek and Söderholm 2010), as 
well as the need for further empirical evidence regarding these hypotheses (Van den 
Bergh 2008).  
Our study provides new evidence on the role of environmental issues for EE adoption in 
a well-differentiated set of measures determined by their monetary costs, from costless 
measures, such as the adoption of daily energy-saving habits, to low and high-cost 
investments, such as the acquisition of low consumption bulbs, major EE appliances 
(those with A or A+ label), and double glazing. Additionally, we include questions 
related to both environmentally-friendly attitudes and behaviors. Previous findings 
(Lange et al. 2014) showed that questions related to current behavior are expected to be 
better indicators of future actions than questions based on attitudes, as indicated by 
psychologists (Frederiks et al. 2015; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). In the 
environmental valuation literature it is well-known that social pressure can lead 
respondents to report socially acceptable answers that might bias the effect of stated 
preferences (Green and Tunstall 1999; Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). We found that 
environmentally-friendly behaviors have positive effects on EE investments and steer 
habits towards energy savings, contrary to responses related to environmental attitudes. 
Moreover, we found that environmentally-friendly behaviors are less important in high-
cost investments. This result might suggest the existence of a trade-off between 
household environmental concerns and monetary costs. Additionally, high-cost 
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investments can suffer from principal/agent problems, financial constraints or low 
replacement rates that could prevent consumers to act according to their environmental 
concerns. Besides, households belonging to higher income groups were found to be 
more likely to invest in EE, but less likely to adjust daily energy-saving habits, while 
households with older members were less likely to invest in EE and showed less eco-
friendly EE habits. 
Although the results of this paper are obviously of particular relevance for Spain, they 
may also be useful for countries and regions that share some of its characteristics. For 
instance, over 50% of existing buildings in Spain were constructed before 1980, a time 
when building codes had no EE requirements. Moreover, between 1998-2008 Spain saw 
a construction boom that considerably expanded the stock of residential buildings and 
created a significant inertia that calls for a detailed analysis of EE options and responses 
in this sector. However, both in Spain and elsewhere, policy-makers should have a deep 
understanding about the factors driving EE-related decisions before designing and/or 
implementing corrective strategies in different sectors and/or specific groups.  
The paper is organized in five sections and two annexes (summary statistics and 
estimation results), including this introduction. Section 3.2 reviews the existing 
literature in the field, whereas Section 3.3 describes the source of data used in our 
analysis and the main variables. Section 3.4 presents the results of the empirical model 
and discusses some implications. Finally, Section 3.5 deals with the main conclusions. 
3.2 Related literature 
Constraints and barriers to a successful adoption of EE in residential buildings explain 
the proliferation of public policies encouraging EE over the last years, particularly 
intensive in the EU, with the introduction of several EE instruments and packages such 
as codes and standards, labeling systems, information programs, subsidies or taxes, etc. 
(see e.g. Gillingham et al. 2006, 2009; Levine et al. 2007; Linares and Labandeira 2010; 
Ryan et al. 2011; Gago et al. 2013). However, these policies are unlikely to be 
successful unless they are designed with good knowledge of the residential market. That 
is why several empirical studies have attempted to identify not only the socio-economic 
characteristics that determine household adoption of EE but also other features and 
constraints that prevent the implementation of cost-effective EE measures.  
In this context, most academic research has focused on principal-agent problems in both 
EE investment and energy-saving habits
15
. One of the first contributions in this area was 
Brechling and Smith (1994) who used micro-data from the 1986 “English House 
Condition Survey” to explain the probability to have wall and loft insulation and double 
glazing in U.K. households. The paper showed small income-related effects suggesting 
no barriers to capital access, whereas home ownership was the only socio-economic 
                                                 
15
 A handful of studies have recently studied the effects of households’ risk and time preferences on the 
adoption of EE technological measures (Qiu et al. 2014; Greene 2011; Erdem et al. 2010; and Farsi 2010). 
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characteristic that influenced EE investment decisions. Levinson and Niemann (2004) 
used U.S. data from the “Residential Energy Consumption Survey” (RECS) and the 
“American Housing Survey” to analyze principal-agent problems in household winter 
indoor temperatures. Comparing results from OLS and selection probit models, they 
showed negative EE effects of contracts which included energy costs in rental 
payments. Mills and Schleich (2010) jointly estimate the determinants of consumer 
knowledge of the energy labels for household appliances and the choice of class-A 
energy efficient appliance in Germany. Their results suggest that socio-economic 
characteristics have little impact on appliance household decisions. Davis (2012) 
employed data from the 2005 RECS and a linear probability model to study the 
importance of principal-agent problems in EE appliances and lighting and demonstrated 
the effectiveness of command-and-control approaches. Maruejols and Young (2011) 
used data from the 2003 Canadian “Survey of Household Energy Use” to study energy-
related behavior in multi-family dwellings. Their results indicate that households not 
paying heating bills directly chose higher temperature settings. While income effects 
were small for temperatures, income was an important determinant of household eco-
friendly habits. Gillingham et al. (2012) employed the 2003 “California Statewide 
Residential Appliance Saturation Study” to find the effects of certain variables on 
morning heating temperatures, changes of heating system or insulation level. Using 
probit models they identified principal-agent problems both in heating or cooling and 
insulation. They attributed lower heating temperatures in colder regions and larger 
houses to economic incentives from more substantial energy-saving opportunities. Mills 
and Schleich (2014) used a survey carried out in Germany in 2012 to document what 
factors are associated with the swich from incandescent lamps (ILs) to energy efficient 
lamps, after the implementation of the EU legislation on bulls. With a multivariate 
model corrected for sample selection bias, they found education is not a major factor in 
bulb choice. Finally, Miller et al. (2014) estimate the likelihood of adoption of EE 
measures in the residential sector in the US, with the focus on the principal-agent 
problem. To do so, they also used data from the RECS 2009 and an EE index 
constructed by their own which contains information about the updated appliances, 
windows replacement, added insulation, and the use of programmable thermostat 
among others. Their results show that households from urban areas, married, belonging 
to high income class or high educational levels are more likely to adopt EE measures. 
They also found that rental units with heat-inclusive rents are less likely to adopt EE 
measures, confirming the existence of split incentives.   
Although environmental concerns could be a crucial determinant in the decision-making 
processes of households and could explain differences in the level of energy 
consumption of households with similar characteristics (Vassileva et al. 2012; Ek and 
Söderholm 2010), none of the above-mentioned papers included such variables. Indeed, 
Van den Bergh (2008) stressed the small number of empirical studies that combine 
socio-economic and psychological determinants of environmentally-friendly behavior. 
As of yet only a few papers have introduced different variables to measure possible 
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effects on general energy-related decisions, such as Kahn (2007), who studied the 
relationship between a green political ideology and private consumer choices, or 
Kotchen and Moore (2007) who use household environmental attitudes as one of the 
explanatory variables which determine the participation in green-electricity programs.  
Table 4: Environmental Questions in EE Studies on Buildings 
Paper Environmental attitude variable 
 Di Maria et al. (2008) -Respondent’s support of the Kyoto Protocol 
-Importance given to the protection of the environment 
-Whether the respondent has heard of global warming and the 
greenhouse effect 
Kahn and Vaughn (2009) -Neighborhood’s Green Party’s share of registered voters 
-Share of voters who voted in favor of Proposition 12 on March 7, 
2000. 
-Share of voters who voted in favor of Proposition 13 in the year 
2000.  
Costa and Kahn (2010) -Whether the household has donated money to environmental 
groups 
-Whether the household has signed up for the renewable energy 
program of the utility 
Lange et al. (2014) -Whether the respondents believe that their country will be 
affected by climate change in the future 
-If households consider that their actions are influenced by carbon 
dioxide emissions 
-If the respondents agreed with the statement that the environment 
was a low priority compared to many other things in their lives. 
-Whether the respondent believes that it takes too much time and 
effort to do things that are environmentally friendly 
-If respondents are environmentally friendly in most things they 
do 
-How often the respondents dress warmer when they feel cold 
rather than turning the heating on or turning it up 
Brounen et al. (2013) -Efficient drivers 
OECD (2013) -Green Growthers 
-Altruist 
-Skeptics 
-NGO 
-Environmental NGO 
-Environment as top concern 
-Economy as the top concern 
-Understand Climate Change 
-Cost bias 
Source: The authors 
Studies on the effects of pro-environmental households on EE decisions have focused 
on different areas showing mixed evidence. This fact could be partially due to the way 
environmental concerns are measured. Table 4 displays the specific questions different 
studies have used to estimate the effect of environmental concerns on EE investment 
and energy-saving habits. Di Maria et al. (2008) used 2001 data from a representative 
survey of Irish households to find positive effects of environmental attitudes (measured 
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as indicated in the table) on the adoption decision of compact fluorescent light bulbs. 
They also identified education as the most important determining factor, with income 
and rural being important as well. However, variables associated with the household’s 
life-cycle (age, gender, marital status and number of dependent children) were not found 
to be statistically significant. Similarly, Costa and Kahn (2010) included information on 
donations and support for environmental protection to estimate the effect on 
California’s residential electricity consumption. They suggested that green voters and 
those enrolled in the renewable energy program of their utility used less energy. In a 
subsequent paper, Kahn and Vaughn (2009) showed that the share of green voters 
explained the aggregate share of hybrid cars and LEED
16
 certified buildings in 
communities. Lange et al. (2014) employed a cross section of the “British Household 
Panel Survey” to test the “green hypocrisy” hypothesis on the U.K.. They tested the 
effect of environmental attitudes, beliefs and behaviors on residential space heating 
expenditures with an OLS model, showing that environmental attitudes do not 
necessarily lead to lower heating expenditures. Their results point out that indeed only 
those households that actively put their beliefs into practice in daily life had lower 
heating expenditures. With respect to income, they found a positive and statistical 
relationship with heating temperature, while the effect of education depended on the 
chosen model specification. Brounen et al. (2013) used data from the 2011 “Dutch 
National Bank Household Survey”, and found that consumer attitudes towards energy 
conservation and demographics had a direct effect on the heating and cooling behavior 
of residential households, while energy literacy (i.e. whether households are able to 
make EE trade-offs) and awareness of their energy consumption had no effect. 
Households that declared to have driven efficiently to save petrol were more likely to 
know their energy bills and use green power, although this did not have any effect on 
indoor heating temperature. Additionally, they found no effect in green party voters. 
Finally, the OECD Survey on Household Environmental Behavior and Attitudes carried 
out in 2011 across 11 OECD countries, including Spain, introduced seven questions 
connected to household environmental attitudes such as participating in a NGO or 
considering the environment as the most pressing concern (OECD 2013). In a recent 
paper, Ameli and Brandt (2014) found that on average some of the cited variables 
increase the likelihood of energy efficient investment adoption.   
3.3 Data 
This paper uses micro-data from the INE's ESHMA, a single-year representative survey 
with almost 27,000 household principal dwellings that was carried out between April 
and December 2008 through internet, telephone and face-to-face interviews. The survey 
intended to gather comprehensive information on Spanish household consumption and 
environmental habits (energy conservation, water saving, recycling, etc.), even though 
data do not allow any dynamic analysis. The survey consists of nine blocks: i) 
information about household characteristics (income, education, number of members, 
                                                 
16 
This is a certification system for high-EE products from the U.S. Green Building Council.  
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etc.); ii) water supply and adoption of water saving measures; iii) energy sources of the 
house and installed heating, air conditioning and lighting systems (type of energy they 
use, type of heating fuel, thermostat temperature settings chosen by the members, 
proportion of rooms with air conditioning, low-consumption bulbs, etc.); iv) recycling 
practices; v) equipment and appliances; vi) noises and bad smells; vii) transport 
(number and type of vehicles); viii) general issues on lifestyle and consumption and ix) 
specific questions for the respondent. 
The strength of this database is the vast number of questions related to household 
environmental attitudes and habits. This allows us to study the extent to which 
households reporting to be environmentally concerned or showing eco-friendly 
practices are more likely to invest in EE in their dwellings and the extent to which their 
environmental attitudes and behaviors are translated into daily energy-saving habits.  
Using the questions related to household environmental concerns in the ESHMA, 
proxies of environmental attitudes and behavior can be defined. Green and Tunstall 
(1999) indicate that reports regarding hypothetical situations do not coincide with those 
in which the situations are real. This statement falls in line with the results reported by 
Lange et al. (2014), who found that environmental attitudes and environmental 
behaviors yield to different results. Frederiks et al. (2015) refer to the knowledge-action 
gap, the value-action gap, the attitude-action gap and the intention-action gap to explain 
that people’s knowledge, values attitudes and intentions might not translate into real 
actions. We thus create two dummy variables to measure environmental attitudes, 
“RENEWABLE” and “TAX”, which take value one when respondents answer yes and 
zero otherwise, respectively, to the following survey questions: i) Are you willing to 
pay more to use renewable energies?; ii) Would you agree on establishing a new 
environmental tax on the most pollutant fuels? Both questions report stated willingness 
to pay (WTP) to protect the environment.  
Regarding environmental behavior, we create two indexes that measure the degree of 
household environmental activities. As in Knack and Keefer (1997) or Owen and 
Videras (2006) we first construct an index that measures household environmental 
policy activism. This “ACTIVISM” index takes values from 0 to 5, by adding 1 each 
time the individual has answered “yes” to the following five questions: i) collaborated 
with any environmental protection organization, ii) participated in any voluntary work 
to protect the environment, iii) signed a petition related with environmental protection, 
iv) attended any demonstration in defense of environment, and v) reported some 
environmental problem individually identified. Following the same methodology, we 
construct a second index, “RECYCLING”, that measures the number of types of 
products the household recycles. The variable “RECYCLING” goes from 0, if the 
household does not recycle, to 4 if the household recycles organic, paper, glass and 
plastic and can waste.  
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Finally we use a well-differentiated set of proxies that allows us to check the robustness 
of our results. The two attitudinal variables are based on a single question with only two 
possible answers (yes/no), while behavioral variables are based on indexes. As Torgler 
and García-Valiñas (2007) noted, indexes allow us to use more complete information by 
considering middle positions, while single questions avoid problems associated to the 
construction of indexes.  
To estimate the effects of household characteristics on EE decisions we use the standard 
socio-economic variables: income, employment situation of the main preceptor 
(unemployed, employed, retired), educational level, number of members (#members), 
children (#members<16) and elderly (#members>65) and nationality. Based on 
economic rationality and previous findings, we can formulate different hypotheses: We 
expect EE products and services to be normal goods and hence, expect the income to 
have a positive effect on the probability to invest in EE and to set higher heating 
temperatures. The effect of employment is expected to be similar to the effect of 
income. Education is expected to have a positive effect on investment, although how it 
affects habits is unclear. Di Maria et al. (2008) argue that respondents with a higher 
level of education might be better able to predict future operational costs. The number 
of members, the number of children under 12 years and the number of elderly might 
reflect the life-cycle effect. A household with children might have a more intensive use 
of electric equipment and thus could be more interested in purchasing EE products. On 
the contrary, elderly households are expected to be less likely to purchase EE 
investments since the return period will be shorter. At the same time, both children and 
elderly might have higher comfort necessities, so we expect a positive effect on the 
probability to set higher temperatures. 
Additionally, we include some control variables for geographic localization: a variable 
that classifies municipalities by size (municipality size); dummies for climatic zones
17
, 
and a dummy for each Autonomous Community (administrative region). The size of the 
municipality is important since it can determine the degree of access to certain devices 
or information, whereas Autonomous Community dummies control for different 
subsidy programs that regional governments have voluntarily implemented in order to 
promote EE (for example, the Renove programs for the substitution of all appliances or 
the installation of double glazing). These dummies collect the divergence in the 
magnitude, the time of implementation and other important characteristics of these 
subsidies. Galarraga et al. (2011a) and (2011b) found that these subsidies have 
increased the share of appliances with label A+. However, according to the IDAE 
                                                 
17
 For the climatic zones, we follow the specification used by IDAE (Spanish Institute for Diversification 
and Energy Saving) in the SECH-SPAHOUSEC project (IDAE 2011). This classifies the country into 3 
areas based on maximum, medium and minimum average temperatures along the period 1997-2007. 
Hence the variable takes values equal to one for North Atlantic, two for Continental and three for 
Mediterranean areas. 
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(Spanish Institute for Diversification and Energy Saving) only 23% of households have 
received subsidies for appliances, 4% for heating systems and 3% for insulation (IDAE 
2011). Table 5 summarizes the statistics of these main variables, while the others are 
fully depicted in the two annexes of the paper. 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
Variable Measurement Total 
Obs. 
Mean/% 
Nationality  Dummy 26034 0.94 
Professional 
situation 
 
Employed (reference) 
Unemployed 
Retired  
26034  
52.39% 
16.80% 
30.81% 
Educational level  
Basic (reference) 
Primary school 
Secondary school 1
st
 stage 
Secondary school 2
nd
 stage 
Vocational school 
University  
26030  
15.71% 
32.01% 
12.11% 
12.68% 
12.18% 
15.30% 
#members Number 26034 2.67 
#members<16 Number 26034 0.38 
#members>65 Number 26034 0.47 
Income  
<1.100 
€/month(reference) 
1.101-1.800 €/month  
1.801-2.700 €/month  
>2.700 €/month  
20530  
26.64% 
27.43% 
15.38% 
9.41% 
Municipality size  
<10.000 inhab.(reference) 
10.000-20.000 inhab. 
20.000-50.000 inhab. 
50.000-100.000 inhab. 
>100.000 inhab. 
26034  
25.24% 
12.32% 
15.61% 
8.34% 
38.50% 
Climatic zone   
North Atlantic (reference)  
Continental  
Mediterranean  
24423  
27.54% 
18.81% 
47.45% 
ACTIVISM Index 23979 0.29 
RECYCLING  Index 26034 2.85 
RENEWABLE Dummy 23977 0.23 
TAX Dummy 23979 0.63 
It is important, however, to note that the ESHMA also has important weaknesses. First 
of all, there is no information on structure, age or size of dwellings. Research in the 
field has usually found these factors to be relevant in explaining the likelihood of 
adoption of EE measures (e.g. Brechling and Smith 1994), so this absence should be 
taken into account when interpreting the results of this paper. In addition, the survey 
lacks two other important variables: energy consumption and ownership status. The 
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former is unlikely to be available in large national surveys since, as of yet, there are no 
official databases combining information on both energy consumption and EE 
decisions. This gap, which has only been covered for household heating expenditures, 
makes it impossible to gain insights on the potentially reciprocal effects between energy 
consumption and the decision to invest or adopt EE measures. Regarding ownership 
status, this dataset does not allow for the analysis of the principal-agent effect, another 
important factor explaining EE investment and energy consumption (see Section 3.2). 
Nevertheless, in Spain the magnitude of the principal-agent effect may not be as 
important as it is in other countries due to the high rate of owner-occupied dwellings 
(82% in 2008).  
3.4 Models and results 
Following the usual distinction between EE investment decisions and daily energy-
saving habits in the literature (see Section 3.2), we also deal with these issues 
individually in our empirical application. To study the determinants of EE investments 
we employ the ESHMA questions regarding high EE labels for major appliances, the 
use of low consumption bulbs, and the existence of double glazing. Regarding the 
determinants of EE consumption habits we use the heating temperature chosen by 
households for daytime consumption. 
Figure 2. Spanish and EU Residential Energy Breakdown in 2010 
 
Source: Odyssee (2014) 
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3.4.1 EE investment 
To validate results, we study EE investments across well-differentiated sections of the 
house. We present a baseline regression model that will be used to estimate the effect of 
socio-economic and environmental factors on the probability of having invested on each 
one of the preceding measures (A or A+ fridge, washing machine, dishwasher, oven, 
double glazing and low consumption bulbs), being high rated appliances the first model 
specification. This selection is based on the fact that appliances and equipment represent 
the third largest portion of household energy consumption in industrialized countries 
(Laustsen 2008; Levine et al. 2007; European Commission 2011). Figure 2 shows the 
residential breakdown of energy consumption for Spain and the EU in 2010. It explains 
why the substitution of major energy-inefficient appliances has been the target of many 
public EE policies. In particular, our survey asks respondents whether their fridge, 
washing machine, dishwasher and oven have an A or A+ label. We follow Gillingham 
et al. (2012) and restrict the sample to households that have bought their major 
appliances over the last five years. Therefore, we exclude situations where labels had 
not been implemented yet, and also reduce possible effects of changing trends on the 
supply side.  
Following the standard procedure to estimate models where the dependent variable 
takes binary values, we define a standard discrete choice probit model
18
 for each one of 
the appliances. The dependent variable is the probability of having an A or A+ label on 
the corresponding appliance. The probit model can be derived from an underlying latent 
variable model that satisfies the classical linear assumptions (Wooldridge 2001). All we 
observe is whether the household has adopted a certain EE measure or not. However, 
we can assume that there is an unobserved or latent variable,   
 , that establishes a linear 
relation between our variables of interest as follows: 
  
                                    (1) 
where     is a vector with household i socio-economic characteristics and    is a vector 
to control the geographic variables previously described. Vector    contains dummies 
for the type of fuel used and vector    collects specific variables related to appliances, 
e.g. the age of the corresponding appliance. We further assume a normal distribution of 
the disturbances. Tables B1.1 and B1.2 (Annex B1) describe all the additional variables 
and gives the associated statistics. Finally,    represents the environmental measures of 
the household (see above). 
Then, an indicator function can be defined so that   , our observable variable, equals 
one if   
    and zero otherwise: 
                                                 
18
 An alternative would be to use a logit model, even though, probit models are generally employed in this 
type of econometric analysis. The results of both models are very similar, theoretically as well as in our 
application.  
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     (2) 
By substituting Equation (1) into (2), we can describe the probability of investment by 
household i as follows: 
    (    )      (  
   )      (     
   )  (3) 
Given the standard normal cumulative distribution function Φ(.) of   , Equation (3) is 
rewritten as:  
    (    )   ( 
   )   (                        )  (4) 
Equation (4) gives us the empirical magnitude of the effects of our explanatory 
variables on the probability of investing in a certain EE measure. This equation is 
repeated for each of the four appliances. 
After looking at major appliances, we study the determinants of double-glazing EE 
investment. Despite being one of the measures with the highest energy-saving 
potentials, improving the insulation level of an existing building is one of the most 
difficult and costly measures (see Ürge-Vorsatz and Novika 2008). However, installing 
double glazing does not require structural changes in buildings and therefore it could be 
one of the cheapest and easiest ways to improve the building envelope. In order to 
analyze the installation of double glazing, we now replace the dependent variable of 
Equation (4) by whether or not the household has installed double glazing. In addition, 
the specific vector for appliances characteristics,   , is replaced by another vector that is 
related to the acquisition of double glazing (  ). In particular,    contains indicators for 
the availability of heating and air conditioning system. More information on these issues 
can be retrieved from Table B1.3 in Annex B1.  
The probability of having low consumption bulbs installed is the last dependent variable 
used to study EE investments. Unlike the preceding EE investment options, bulbs do not 
have high acquisition costs and long lifecycles. Yet, technical studies point out the high 
percentage of energy that can be saved in lighting through low-cost EE measures (see 
e.g. Levine et al. 2007) and this makes it an attractive area to foster EE improvements. 
As in previous models, we replace the dependent variable in Equation (4) by the 
probability of using low-consumption bulbs and eliminate the specific vector   . The 
rest of variables (socio-economic and environmental attitudes, geographic 
characteristics and type of fuel) are kept constant. More information on these questions 
can be obtained from Table B1.4 in Annex B1.  
3.4.1.1 Results on EE Investment 
Due to the non-linearity properties of these models, the interpretation of the coefficients 
in discrete choice frameworks is not straightforward. The complete regression output is 
65 
 
provided in Annex B2, together with the most used measures of goodness of fit: 
percentage of correctly predicted and pseudo R-squared (Wooldridge 2001; Greene 
2008). For simplicity and easy interpretation, Table 6 only displays the signs of the 
coefficients in the EE investment models. The sign “+” means that the variable has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of having invested in the 
corresponding EE measure, while “-” refers to negative statistical significant effects on 
the same probability.  
Table 6: EE Investment Decisions of Spanish Households (probit model) 
Dependent 
variable 
A or A+ Appliances  
(purchased over the last 5 years) Double 
glazing 
Low- 
consumption 
bulbs  Fridge 
Washing 
machine 
Dishwasher  Oven 
TAX . - . . . + 
RENEWABLE . . . . . + 
RECYCLING + . . . + + 
POLITICAL . + . + + + 
Continental  
(North Atlantic as 
reference) 
    -  
Mediterranean 
(North Atlantic as 
reference) 
    -  
Spanish + + + + + + 
Unemployed . . . . - - 
Retired  - . . . - . 
Educational level + + + + + + 
#members . . . . . + 
#members <16 . . . . + . 
#member>65 . - . - - - 
Income + + + + + + 
Age of the 
corresponding 
appliance 
- - - -   
Availability of 
heating system 
    +  
Availability of air 
conditioning 
system 
    +  
Note: +(-) positive (negative) statistically significant effect of the explanatory variable on the probability 
of investment; shadow areas are variables that were not included in the regression. All regression contains 
dummy variables for regional areas, size of the municipality and type of energy used in the household. All 
regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.   
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Income, Spanish nationality, education, and the presence of elderly people in the 
household are the socio-economic variables with the most remarkable effects on the 
analyzed EE measures. All regressions show that households with higher income, 
Spanish nationality or higher educational levels are more likely to invest in EE, whereas 
four out of the five models indicate that the number of household members over 65 has 
a negative effect on EE investments. These income and age effects are expected, given 
the high costs and future paybacks associated with most EE investments, and they 
coincide with previous findings. With respect to Spanish nationality, the positive effect 
might be explained by different factors: the percentage of owner-occupied households is 
82% for Spanish households, 43% for European citizens and less than 30% for non-
European citizens. Since our data does not contain information on the ownership status, 
the positive effect of Spanish nationality could partially be due to the principal agent 
problem in rented-occupied households. Some other unobservable circumstances 
associated with foreign households, such as a higher difficulty to access information, 
might explain this effect. Results for other variables are inconclusive: employment 
status was not found to be statistically significant in all models, although it had the 
expected sign (unemployed or retired household’s reference member show negative 
effects on the probability of EE investment). 
Regarding environmental measures, not all selected variables are statistically significant 
for all types of EE investments. The results from attitudinal and behavioral measures 
seems to diverge: while households that stated to be currently involved in 
environmental activities or practices are more likely to invest in EE in four out of six 
models, households who reported to be willing to pay to protect the environment have 
significantly higher probabilities in two regressions: for the acquisition of A or A+ 
washing machine (negative effect) and for low-consumption bulbs (positive effect). At 
first, one might expect that households willing to pay to protect the environment have 
stronger attitudes than those that only report participation in environmentally-friendly 
activities that do not necessarily imply a monetary cost. However, these activities might 
also be time intensive and thus related to non-negligible opportunity costs. Moreover, 
the stated WTP refers to hypothetical situations and could lead to wrong results (see e.g. 
Löschel et al. 2013). An explanation could be the so-called “compliance bias” which 
makes respondents state a socially accepted WTP due to the influence of social norms 
(Frederiks et al. 2015; Green and Tunstall 1999). This divergence runs in parallel with 
the results found by Lange et al. (2014) (see Section 3.2). 
Regarding the lack of significance for some measures, there are two more important 
factors: Appliances and windows are costly and replaced less frequently. Although eco-
friendly consumers may be willing to substitute their inefficient appliances and 
windows, they may wait for the completion of their lifespan or may be subject to budget 
constraints, which may cause the lack of significance in some appliances. The second 
factor is related to the previously mentioned lack of data on ownership, which may lead 
to an underestimation if pro-environmental consumers are tenants because they would 
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be less interested in major investments that would be lost when moving to another 
dwelling. When considering low-cost investment or absence of split incentives, as is the 
case with low-consumption bulbs, there is a clear positive effect even for the 
households with stated WTP measures. Yet, household environmental concerns seem to 
be less relevant for high-cost EE investments, suggesting the existence of a trade-off 
between environmental concerns and cost.   
Finally, with respect to the characteristics of specific appliances, age is a major 
determining factor because appliances purchased over the last 5 years are less likely to 
have A or A+ labels as compared to those purchased over the last year. Similarly, 
households that have heating or air conditioning systems in most of the rooms are more 
likely to have double glazing, contrary to households in warmer areas (Continental and 
Mediterranean).  
Robustness checks: multivariate probit regression  
Table 7: EE Investment Decisions of Spanish Households (multivariate probit 
model) 
 
A or A+ 
Fridge 
Double 
glazing 
Low- 
consumption 
bulbs 
TAX . . . 
RENEWABLE . - + 
RECYCLING + + + 
POLITICAL + + + 
Continental  (North Atlantic as 
reference) 
 . . 
Mediterranean (North Atlantic 
as reference) 
 - + 
Spanish + + + 
Unemployed - . . 
 Retired  - . . 
Educational level + + + 
#members . - + 
#members <16 . + . 
#member>65 . . - 
Income + + + 
Age of the corresponding 
appliance 
-   
Availability of heating system  +  
Availability of air conditioning 
system 
 +  
Notes: +(-) positive (negative) statistical significant effect of the explanatory variable on the probability 
of investment; shadow areas are variables that were not included in the regression. All regression contains 
dummy variables for regional areas, size of the municipality and type of energy used in the household. All 
regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.   
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The preceding results were based on baseline models that clearly display the drivers of 
EE investment, a major objective of the paper. Yet we are aware that household 
investment decisions among the evaluated measures could respond to common factors. 
Therefore, we next provide the results from the estimation of a multivariate probit 
model (similar to the seemingly unrelated model) to analyze possible correlations 
among the disturbances (Greene 2008). In particular, this model is appropriate to 
estimate the probability of an individual purchasing several durables at the same 
moment of time. In our case, we could expect that the same factors moving a household 
to invest in EE appliances, could have led to the installation of double glazing and/or to 
the purchase of low-consumption bulbs too. To test the robustness of our results we 
estimate a system of equations where the disturbances follow a multivariate standard 
normal distribution. We use the previous equations for appliances, low consumption 
bulbs and double windows, to construct a system with three equations where the first 
equation refers to the probability of purchasing an A or A+ fridge
19
, and the subsequent 
two equations deal with the probability of purchasing double glazing and low-
consumption bulbs respectively. Table 7 shows the directions of the effects (the results 
are displayed in Table B2.2, Annex B2).  
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation (see Annex B2), which confirms 
the overall significance of the trivariate probit model. However, the significance and the 
sign of the effects of each variable remain mostly constant with respect to the baseline 
results
20
 (in particular the relationship between environmental attitudes and behaviors, 
and the probability of investing in EE). 
3.4.2 Daily energy-saving habits 
We use winter indoor-heating temperature chosen by a household as a measure of its 
daily energy-saving habits, and expect pro-environmental households to set lower 
temperatures. This is an indication of household eco-friendly behavior that has been 
commonly employed by the literature (see e.g. Levinson and Niemann 2004; Maruejols 
et al. 2011; and Gillingham et al. 2012). Moreover, as Figure 2 indicates, space heating 
is the largest component of residential energy consumption in industrialized (as well as 
developing) countries and therefore a potentially important source of energy savings 
(Laustsen 2008; European Commission 2011).  
In the ESHMA respondents are asked to report the Celsius degrees set in the heating 
thermostat on a normal day when at home. Following Gillingham et al. (2012) we 
construct a discrete variable that takes value 1 if the temperature stated by the 
respondent is less than or equal to 15ºC; value 2 if it falls between the interval 16-18ºC; 
                                                 
19
 The database indicates that washing machines and fridges exist in most Spanish households. Therefore, 
computation was facilitated by the use of a trivariate probit model where fridge represented the purchase 
of appliance.  
20
 We have rejected the inclusion of heteroskedasticity in our probit model as an additional robustness 
check, since a wrong functional form of the variances could lead to worse results. 
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value 3 for the interval between 19-21ºC; value 4 for the interval between 22-24ºC; 
value 5 for the interval between 25-27ºC; and value 6 for those temperatures equal or 
above 28ºC. Then we use an ordered probit model similar to Equation (4) to explain the 
effects of household socio-economic and environmental characteristics on the winter 
indoor-heating temperature while controlling for the rest of relevant factors. Table B1.5 
(Annex B1) contains a description of specific variables used in the regression
21
. 
However, Spain has large climatic differences across regions and our climatic zones 
might be too wide to collect all of these temperature differences. Since this may affect 
the intensity and frequency of residential heating use, we compare the results from the 
full sample with the results from a reduced sample. This reduced sample, as in 
Gillingham et al. (2012), considers only colder regions
22
. 
4.2.2.1 Results on daily energy-saving habits 
Following the same procedure as in the last section, Table 8 summarizes the main 
results for household winter indoor-heating temperature (full estimation results are 
again available in Annex B2). Now sign “+” (“-”) means that a variable has a positive 
(negative) statistically significant effect on the probability of increasing indoor 
temperature, thus being associated to less (more) energy-responsible habits. The two 
columns in Table 8 incorporate the two sample specifications: the full sample and a 
sample restricted to regions with average monthly temperatures below 19ºC. As 
indicated before, with this approach it is possible to test the significance of our results 
under different climatic conditions.  
With regard to socio-economic characteristics, income and age are again two important 
determinants of indoor temperature. Households belonging to higher income levels are 
more likely to choose higher winter indoor temperature, as do households with members 
who are over 65 years of age. These results coincide with the findings in the literature; 
although contrary to other analyses, we have not found any significant effects of the 
number of children in the household. In addition, the educational levels show poor 
effects on heating temperature decisions. In the full sample specification, households 
where the reference member has primary education set lower temperature than those 
who are illiterate or did not finish primary education. However, in the reduced sample 
this coefficient loses their significance (see Annex B2). The results suggest now that, 
contrary to EE investment, the level of education does not have an important effect on 
household energy-saving habits. This means that households belonging to higher 
income levels or those with more education pay more attention to the EE attributes of 
products when taking investment decisions, although they do not follow the same 
considerations in their daily energy consumption habits.  
                                                 
21
 For the estimation of indoor heating temperatures we exclude the Autonomous Communities of Ceuta, 
Melilla and the Canary Islands given the important climatic differences with respect to the Iberian 
Peninsula. 
22 
We construct the reduced sample with those Autonomous Communities with monthly average 
temperatures below 19 in year 2008, which leads to the exclusion of Andalusia.  
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Table 8: Energy-saving Habits: Targeted Heating Temperature 
Variable Full sample Only <19 
º
C 
TAX . . 
RENEWABLE . . 
RECYCLING - - 
POLITICAL - - 
Continental  (North Atlantic as 
reference) 
+ + 
Mediterranean (North Atlantic as 
reference) 
+ + 
Spanish . . 
Unemployed . . 
Retired  . . 
Educational level -* . 
#members . . 
#members<16 . . 
#member>65 +  + 
Income + + 
Heating in most of the rooms - - 
Notes: +(-) positive (negative) statistical significant effect of the explanatory variable on the probability 
of increasing the temperature. All regression contains dummy variables for regional areas, size of the 
municipality, type of energy used in the household and by the heating device. * Means not significant for 
all variable levels. All regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Regarding environmental concerns, once again the effects from environmental attitudes 
diverge from that of environmentally-friendly behaviors. Households who would agree 
on imposing a penalty to the most pollutant fuels and those who reported a positive 
WTP for renewable energy do not exhibit differences in heating temperatures. The 
indexes measuring political activism in environmentally-related activities and recycling 
practices, however, have a negative effect on heating temperatures. That is, an increase 
of those two indexes is associated with lower heating temperatures. These results 
support our previous findings: environmental attitudes given by stated WTP do not 
translate into changes in daily energy consumption or high-cost EE investments. 
Environmentally-friendly behaviors, however, have a significant impact on EE habits 
and EE investments. Therefore, conclusions from environmental attitudes should be 
drawn very cautiously.  
Even though geographic characteristics are not the focus of this paper, an analysis of the 
effects of climatic zones is especially interesting as existing evidence on temperature 
impacts is mixed. On the one hand, some authors have suggested that colder regions 
choose higher temperatures regardless of the associated higher costs (Friedman 1987). 
On the other hand, other papers found the opposite (Dewees and Wilson 1990; 
Gillingham et al. 2012). Our results coincide with the latter, indicating that the climatic 
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zone variable has positive effects on indoor temperatures: households in warmer regions 
of the Continental and Mediterranean zones set higher heating temperatures as 
compared to households in the Atlantic area. This might be related to the fact that colder 
regions have higher marginal costs of heating. Given that housing size may matter (see, 
e.g. Gillingham et al. 2012), and although the ESHMA does not provide data on 
dwelling sizes, the dummy variable heating in most of the rooms (equaling one when 
households have heating systems installed in most of the rooms) might be used as a 
proxy to study such effects. Again, our results indicate negative impacts for households 
with heating in most of the rooms. This reinforces the idea that colder regions and larger 
houses set lower temperatures due to higher marginal costs.  
3.5 Conclusions 
Buildings are a major source of energy consumption in both emerging and developed 
economies and thus a cause for public environmental and energy-dependence concerns. 
Contrary to other sectors, buildings are usually associated to a stock of future energy 
consumption that is mainly related to their design and structural characteristics and to 
behavioral decisions by the agents who use them. By acting in both areas, societies may 
achieve a sizable and cost-effective reduction of energy consumption in buildings. 
Proper building design and construction, retrofitting processes, replacement of old 
equipment by new EE appliances, and fostering energy conservation habits, are all 
essential for the success of EE strategies and plans. However, the progress of EE in the 
building sector has been rather limited due to the existence of numerous market barriers, 
such as imperfect information, split incentives or uncertainty, that result in a sub-
optimal level of EE action. EE benefits, the importance of buildings in EE strategies, 
and market failures and barriers against EE, justify public intervention. However, public 
policies to promote EE should be defined and implemented with proper information on 
the agents’ stances in this domain. 
Consequently, prior to any policy initiative to incentivize consumers concerning certain 
products with desirable characteristics, policy-makers should carefully analyze what 
factors affect consumers EE-related decisions. In the special case of investing in EE or 
widespread adoption of daily energy-saving habits, policy-makers should identify the 
determinants that drive household decisions regarding these issues. With that objective 
in mind, using a Spanish representative household survey with detailed micro-data on 
environmental attitudes and behaviors, this paper empirically estimates the effects of 
certain socio-economic variables on the probability of investing in EE measures and 
adopting energy-saving habits. In particular, we study the effects of household 
environmental attitudes and behaviors on the probability of having installed double 
glazing, EE major appliances and low-consumption bulbs. Moreover, winter indoor 
temperature is used as a measure of daily energy-saving habits.  
The paper showed that households with older members are less likely to invest in EE 
and show less eco-friendly habits. Moreover, household decisions on EE investments 
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and energy-saving habits are driven by income levels in Spain: households with high 
income levels are more likely to invest in EE, although they are less likely to sacrifice 
comfort to save energy by setting lower heating temperatures. The same is true for 
higher education levels: households with more education pay more attention to the EE 
attributes of products when taking investment decisions, but they do not follow the 
same considerations in their daily energy consumption habits. Additionally, elderly 
households in Spain are less likely to invest in EE but have larger energy necessities for 
heating. This situation makes them more prone to the risk of suffering from fuel 
poverty, if they additionally belong to low-income groups. Our results also reveal an 
important time dimension of EE implementation: rising income and education levels 
might translate into energy savings through EE investments in the long run, but their 
more immediate effects might be rather small. Better information might stir EE 
investments, but will not necessarily lead to more energy-responsible habits.  
Additionally, environmental concerns are generally less important for high-cost 
investments with less frequent replacement and economic considerations seem to be 
predominant here. Also, reporting environmental attitudes does not show any effect on 
EE investment or energy-saving daily habits. However, households who currently 
develop eco-friendly practices, such as daily recycling or participating in environmental 
policy activism, are more likely to invest in EE and adopt daily energy-saving habits at 
home. This divergence might be explained, for instance, by “compliance bias” produced 
when respondents report socially-desirable answers about some hypothetical situations. 
This indicates that environmental attitudes are not necessary translated into real actions. 
In view of the increasing relevance of EE objectives and policies, the results of the 
paper have obvious implications that may be of interest beyond the Spanish case. 
Policies should first acknowledge that the factors that affect investment decisions in EE 
do not necessary influence the adoption of energy-saving habits in the same way. In this 
sense, our results show that, although public intervention aimed at reducing financial 
barriers seems to be key to promote EE investments by households with low income 
and/or with old members, other specific measures may be needed to foster their daily 
energy-saving habits. Moreover, the results of the paper suggest that EE-driven public 
campaigns may increase their effectiveness if they focus on the adoption of pro-
environmental behaviors rather than on trying to raise environmental attitudes.   
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ANNEX B1 
Table B1.1: Summary Statistics for Household Type of Fuel (  ) 
Variable Measurement  Observations Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min.  Max.  
Electricity Dummy 26034 0.999 0.01 0 1 
Solar Dummy 26034 0.009 0.09 0 1 
Natural 
Gas 
Dummy 26034 0.379 0.48 0 1 
LPG Dummy 26034 0.437 0.49 0 1 
Wood Dummy  26034 0.074 0.26 0 1 
Liquid 
fuels 
Dummy 26034 0.137 0.34 0 1 
Other Dummy  26034 0.064 0.24 0 1 
 
Table B1.2: Summary Statistics for Specific Appliances Characteristics (  ) 
Variable Measurement  Observations Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min.  Max.  
Availability of 
A or A* fridge 
Dummy  17574 0.55 0.49 0 1 
Availability of 
A or A* fridge 
Dummy 17330 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Availability of 
A or A* fridge 
Dummy 8089 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Availability of 
A or A* fridge 
Dummy 14535 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Age of Fridge Four-
ascending 
point-scale 
25999 2.71 0.90 1 4 
Age of 
Washing 
machine 
Four-
ascending 
point-scale 
25809 2.57 0.89 1 4 
Age of 
Dishwasher 
Four-
ascending 
point-scale 
11319 2.47 0.82 1 4 
Age of Oven Four-
ascending 
point-scale 
23010 2.80 0.91 1 4 
Table B1.3: Summary Statistics for Specific Double-glazing Characteristics (  ) 
Variable Measurement  Observations Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min.  Max.  
Availability of 
double glazing 
Dummy  26034 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Availability of 
heating system 
Dummy  26034 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Availability of 
air conditioning 
system 
Dummy  26034 0.30 0.46 0 1 
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Table B1.4: Summary Statistics for Low-consumption Bulbs (LCB) 
Variable Measurement  Observations Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min.  Max.  
Availability 
of LCB 
Dummy  26034 0.65 0.48 0 1 
 
Table B1.5: Summary Statistics for Specific Heating Variables 
Variable Measurement  Observations Mean  Standard 
deviation 
 Min.  Max.  
Individual 
electric 
boiler 
Dummy  18911 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Electric 
radiator 
Dummy 18911 0.212 0.410 0 1 
Underfloor 
heating 
Dummy 18911 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Central gas 
heating 
Dummy 18911 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Individual 
gas heating 
Dummy  18911 0.325 0.488 0 1 
Non-piped 
gas 
Dummy 18911 0.040 0.197 0 1 
Piped heat 
pump 
Dummy 18911 0.026 0.157 0 1 
Non-piped 
heat pump 
Dummy
 
18911 0.048 0.215 0 1 
Individual oil 
heating 
Dummy
 
18911 0.105 0.307 0 1 
Central oil 
heating 
Dummy
 
18911 0.075 0.264 0 1 
Central coal 
heating 
Dummy
 
18911 0.004 0.066 0 1 
Wood  Dummy
 
18911 0.045 0.208 0 1 
Other  Dummy
 
18911 0.053 0.229 0 1 
Most rooms 
with heating 
Dummy 18911 0.708 0.454 0 1 
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ANNEX B2 
Table B2.1: Results for EE Investment (probit model) 
VARIABLES Fridge  Washing 
Machine 
Dishwasher Oven Double 
glazing 
Low-
consumption 
bulbs 
Spanish  0.291*** 0.288*** 0.267* 0.340*** 0.520*** 0.443*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0818) (0.159) (0.0913) (0.0499) (0.0438) 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
Unemployed -0.0722 
(0.0628) 
-0.0390 
(0.0576) 
-0.00459 
(0.0919) 
-0.103 
(0.0649) 
-0.0776** 
(0.0326) 
-0.0705** 
(0.0317) 
Retired  -0.205*** -0.0295 -0.0798 -0.0450 -0.0884*** -0.0630** 
 (0.0613) (0.0580) (0.0904) (0.0634) (0.0323) (0.0317) 
Education (reference: illiterate) 
Primary school 0.00806 0.203*** 0.225* 0.227*** 0.256*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0727) (0.0666) (0.122) (0.0769) (0.0343) (0.0312) 
Secondary school 1st 
stage 
-0.124 0.0589 0.188 0.152 0.305*** 0.360*** 
 (0.0897) (0.0808) (0.141) (0.0945) (0.0452) (0.0421) 
Secondary school 2nd 
stage 
0.0157 0.219*** 0.147 0.341*** 0.346*** 0.466*** 
 (0.0883) (0.0805) (0.136) (0.0915) (0.0445) (0.0427) 
Vocational school 0.128 0.350*** 0.320** 0.377*** 0.431*** 0.525*** 
 (0.0912) (0.0828) (0.135) (0.0917) (0.0450) (0.0434) 
University 0.146 0.298*** 0.321** 0.251*** 0.422*** 0.623*** 
 (0.0922) (0.0833) (0.134) (0.0914) (0.0454) (0.0443) 
#MEMBERS -0.0349 -0.0143 -0.0464 0.0171 -0.00709 0.0686*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0212) (0.0323) (0.0234) (0.0120) (0.0121) 
#MEMBER<16 0.0320 0.0409 0.0364 0.0170 0.0905*** 0.00782 
 (0.0361) (0.0333) (0.0457) (0.0362) (0.0189) (0.0196) 
#MEMBER>65 -0.00238 -0.108*** -0.0252 -0.113*** -0.0590*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0349) (0.0577) (0.0395) (0.0189) (0.0182) 
Income (reference: <1000) 
1.101-1.800€/month  0.182*** 0.0976* 0.172** 0.143** 0.230*** 0.198*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0510) (0.0873) (0.0582) (0.0283) (0.0271) 
1.801-2.700€/month  0.389*** 0.321*** 0.248** 0.294*** 0.346*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0685) (0.0645) (0.0978) (0.0691) (0.0356) (0.0356) 
>2.700€/month 0.361*** 0.341*** 0.264** 0.314*** 0.401*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0825) (0.0779) (0.108) (0.0817) (0.0440) (0.0445) 
Municipality size (reference: <10.000 inhab.) 
10.000-20.000 inhab. 0.0142 0.0272 0.143 -0.107 -0.0258 0.0213 
 (0.0702) (0.0648) (0.103) (0.0709) (0.0360) (0.0350) 
20.000-50.000 inhab. 0.122* 0.0993 0.0223 -0.110 -0.104*** 0.0587* 
 (0.0686) (0.0632) (0.0939) (0.0680) (0.0340) (0.0331) 
50.000-100.000 inhab. -0.186** -0.148** -0.190* -0.167** -0.250*** 0.0795* 
 (0.0760) (0.0720) (0.107) (0.0811) (0.0436) (0.0413) 
>100.000 inhab. -0.0835 0.0128 0.0149 -0.191*** -0.199*** 0.0816*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0543) (0.0805) (0.0589) (0.0298) (0.0288) 
Climatic area (reference: Atlantic) 
Continental     -0.359***  
     (0.0658)  
Mediterranean     -0.769***  
     (0.0428)  
Appliance age -0.661*** -0.683*** -0.745*** -0.513***   
 (0.0642) (0.0581) (0.0984) (0.0573)   
Heating      0.351***  
     (0.0290)  
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
c 
p<0.11 
 
Table B2.2: Results for EE Investment (multivariate probit model) 
 
VARIABLES Rho  A or A+ Fridge Double glazing Low-consumption 
bulb 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Spanish    0.374*** (0.100) 0.369*** (0.0914) 0.319*** (0.0902) 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
Unemployed   -0.145* (0.0835) 0.0743 (0.0707) -0.0122 (0.0741) 
Retired    -0.221*** (0.0835) -0.115 (0.0754) 0.00869 (0.0784) 
Education (reference: illiterate) 
Primary school   0.0689 (0.105) 0.300*** (0.0925) 0.364*** (0.0911) 
Secondary school 
1st stage 
  -0.0414 (0.122) 0.233** (0.109) 0.380*** (0.108) 
Secondary school 
2nd stage 
  0.00831 (0.120) 0.414*** (0.105) 0.369*** (0.106) 
Vocational school   0.212* (0.126) 0.365*** (0.106) 0.471*** (0.107) 
University   0.172 (0.127) 0.375*** (0.107) 0.603*** (0.109) 
#MEMBERS   -0.0483 (0.0303) -0.0689*** (0.0261) 0.0866*** (0.0276) 
#MEMBERS<16   0.0704 (0.0490) 0.0959** (0.0402) -0.0296 (0.0437) 
#MEMBERS>65   0.0718 (0.0546) -0.0713 (0.0478) -0.130*** (0.0485) 
Income (reference: <1000) 
1.101-1.800€/month   0.170** (0.0738) 0.204*** (0.0652) 0.223*** (0.0646) 
1.801-2.700€/month    0.414*** (0.0925) 0.516*** (0.0768) 0.423*** (0.0790) 
>2.700€/month   0.403*** (0.111) 0.466*** (0.0917) 0.364*** (0.0943) 
Air conditioning     0.249***  
     (0.0286)  
TAX 0.0575 -0.0689* -0.0338 -0.0225 -0.000197 0.104*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0407) (0.0607) (0.0439) (0.0221) (0.0214) 
RENEWABLE -0.0434 0.0344 0.00223 0.0279 -0.0180 0.0620** 
 (0.0476) (0.0446) (0.0641) (0.0476) (0.0249) (0.0250) 
RECYCLING 0.0495*** 0.0249 0.0192 0.0196 0.0536*** 0.0857*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0152) (0.0233) (0.0169) (0.00812) (0.00762) 
ACTIVISM 0.0342 0.0750*** 0.0208 0.0418
c
 0.0714*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0353) (0.0268) (0.0145) (0.0165) 
Solar  -0.245 0.225 -0.0675 0.285 0.427*** 0.349** 
 (0.182) (0.206) (0.217) (0.218) (0.123) (0.137) 
Piped gas -0.0516 -0.00210 -0.0118 -0.0971 0.0993*** 0.0362 
 (0.0631) (0.0587) (0.0880) (0.0609) (0.0315) (0.0316) 
LPG -0.174*** -0.0230 -0.0300 -0.213*** -0.369*** -0.149*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0583) (0.0948) (0.0634) (0.0308) (0.0307) 
Wood  -0.0232 0.0476 0.224* -0.0293 0.0516 0.0364 
 (0.0880) (0.0813) (0.135) (0.0950) (0.0423) (0.0404) 
Liquid fuels 0.0771 0.152** 0.212** 0.0672 0.173*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0727) (0.0687) (0.101) (0.0733) (0.0352) (0.0349) 
Other  0.0276 0.00972 0.0988 0.0218 0.0784* 0.103** 
 (0.0923) (0.0857) (0.137) (0.0954) (0.0446) (0.0444) 
Constant 1.080*** 0.867*** 1.023*** 0.409** -0.988*** -0.920*** 
 (0.164) (0.149) (0.262) (0.167) (0.0795) (0.0739) 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.079 0.082 0.077 0.076 0.178 0.103 
% of correct prediction 84.8% 84.2% 86.9% 72.4% 70.7% 70.5% 
Overall significant test:        
p-value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 6,459 7,225 3,617 4,761 18,015 18,015 
81 
 
Municipality size (reference: <10.000 inhab.) 
10.000-20.000 inhab.   -0.00564 (0.0935) -0.0144 (0.0784) -0.0617 (0.0799) 
20.000-50.000 inhab.   0.0282 (0.0901) -0.204*** (0.0737) -0.0842 (0.0761) 
50.000-100.000 
inhab. 
  -0.266*** (0.102) -0.309*** (0.0908) -0.0157 (0.0940) 
>100.000 inhab.   -0.176** (0.0757) -0.278*** (0.0653) -0.0243 (0.0669) 
Climatic area (reference: Atlantic) 
Continental     -0.160 (0.315) 0.366 (0.322) 
Mediterranean     -0.763*** (0.247) 0.490** (0.248) 
TAX   0.0432 (0.0572) 0.00780 (0.0487) 0.0515 (0.0501) 
WTP   -0.0337 (0.0631) -0.101* (0.0518) 0.131** (0.0557) 
RECICLA   0.0375* (0.0205) 0.0471*** (0.0177) 0.0515*** (0.0188) 
POLITICAL   0.0581* (0.0344) 0.0611** (0.0271) 0.106*** (0.0325) 
Solar   -0.403* (0.235) -0.0960 (0.216) -0.0848 (0.241) 
Piped gas   -0.0333 (0.0842) 0.0581 (0.0672) 0.0140 (0.0701) 
LPG   -0.246*** (0.0849) -0.320*** (0.0673) -0.179** (0.0724) 
Wood   -0.0991 (0.119) 0.0361 (0.101) 0.113 (0.108) 
Liquid fuels   0.0740 (0.0998) 0.0348 (0.0830) 0.0611 (0.0873) 
Other    -0.0410 (0.123) 0.0632 (0.0970) 0.191* (0.109) 
Heating     0.323*** (0.0655)   
Air conditioning     0.176*** (0.0620)   
Age of the fridge   -0.688*** (0.0960)     
Constant   1.248*** (0.217) -0.354 (0.288) -0.947*** (0.288) 
Rho21 0.0681** (0.0311)       
Rho31 0.162*** (0.0315)       
Rho32 0.137*** (0.0288)       
Observations   3,754  3,754  3,754  
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table B2.3: Results for Winter Indoor-heating Temperatures  
 FULL SAMPLE REDUCED SAMPLE 
 Coeff.  S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Spanish 0.0233 (0.0750) 0.0114 (0.0786) 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
Unemployed 0.00766 (0.0401) 0.00485 (0.0428) 
Retired -0.0230 (0.0383) -0.0169 (0.0397) 
Education (reference: illiterate) 
Primary school -0.0826* (0.0460) -0.0659 (0.0477) 
Secondary school 1st stage -0.0299 (0.0608) -0.0227 (0.0657) 
Secondary school 2nd 
stage 
-0.0307 (0.0557) -0.00575 (0.0583) 
Vocational school -0.0567 (0.0548) -0.0534 (0.0572) 
University -0.0741 (0.0548) -0.0290 (0.0572) 
#MEMBERS 0.00525 (0.0146) -0.00444 (0.0151) 
#MEMBER<16 -0.00967 (0.0204) -0.0106 (0.0214) 
#MEMBER>65 0.0535** (0.0230) 0.0566** (0.0240) 
Income (reference: <1.000) 
1.101-1.800€/month 0.0561 (0.0360) 0.0678* (0.0375) 
1.801-2.700€/month 0.133*** (0.0426) 0.162*** (0.0444) 
>2.700€/month 0.0886* (0.0487) 0.101** (0.0512) 
Municipality size (reference: <10.000 inhab.) 
10.000-20.000 inhab. 0.0531 (0.0427) 0.0418 (0.0442) 
20.000-50.000 inhab. 0.0581 (0.0399) 0.0689* (0.0417) 
50.000-100.000 inhab. 0.237*** (0.0495) 0.234*** (0.0521) 
>100.000hab. 0.320*** (0.0348) 0.308*** (0.0360) 
Climatic area (reference: Atlantic) 
Continental 0.354*** (0.0749) 0.475*** (0.0669) 
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Mediterranean 1.349*** (0.0636) 1.500*** (0.0618) 
Most rooms with heating -0.157*** (0.0401) -0.104** (0.0441) 
TAX 0.0280 (0.0252) 0.0431 (0.0263) 
WTP -0.0258 (0.0274) -0.0297 (0.0287) 
RECICLA -0.0397*** (0.0104) -0.0432*** (0.0110) 
POLITICAL -0.0412*** (0.0154) -0.0373** (0.0158) 
Piped gas -0.00912 (0.0487) -0.00835 (0.0522) 
LPG 0.0721* (0.0401) 0.0533 (0.0425) 
Wood -0.280*** (0.0929) -0.240** (0.103) 
Liquid fuels -0.226* (0.133) -0.142 (0.145) 
Other -0.0501 (0.0596) 0.0154 (0.0650) 
Individual electric boiler -0.0572 (0.0568) -0.0822 (0.0621) 
Electric radiator -0.140*** (0.0481) -0.150*** (0.0517) 
Underfloor heating -0.0928 (0.105) -0.0846 (0.109) 
Central gas heating -0.0742 (0.0637) -0.0754 (0.0672) 
Individual gas heating -0.169*** (0.0561) -0.168*** (0.0598) 
Non-piped gas -0.375*** (0.0948) -0.341*** (0.101) 
Pipe heat pump 0.307*** (0.0691) 0.308*** (0.0757) 
Non-piped heat pump 0.284*** (0.0644) 0.241*** (0.0702) 
Individual oil heating -0.0904 (0.140) -0.118 (0.151) 
Central oil heating 0.320** (0.144) 0.258* (0.155) 
Central coal heating -0.555 (0.411) -0.622 (0.413) 
Wood 0.0766 (0.121) 0.0223 (0.131) 
Other 0.0823 (0.0814) -0.234** (0.112) 
cut1     
Constant -2.491*** (0.125) -2.466*** (0.131) 
cut2     
Constant -1.231*** (0.116) -1.200*** (0.122) 
cut3     
Constant 0.737*** (0.116) 0.788*** (0.122) 
cut4     
Constant 2.098*** (0.119) 2.191*** (0.126) 
cut5     
Constant 3.008*** (0.125) 3.055*** (0.134) 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.132  0.112  
% of correct prediction 62.7%  64.2%  
Overall significant test: 
p-value 
0.000  0.000  
Observations 9,485  8,819  
 Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho32 = 0: 
chi2(3) =  51.1687   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 4: 
The Price of Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Car Market* 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The transport sector is responsible for more than 20 percent of the total greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in the European Union, with roughly two thirds of that amount being 
caused by road transport (IPCC 2007; EU 2011). Transport also has significant local 
environmental impacts, with millions of citizens severely affected by air and noise 
pollution brought about by cars in both developed and emerging countries. Furthermore, 
the fact that this sector is a major consumer of energy and mostly relies on oil-related 
products (for instance, in 2007 97 percent of the final energy consumption of the 
Spanish transport sector was oil-related (Pérez and Monzón 2008)) has turned it into a 
preferential target for environmental and energy-security policies.  
With the aim of reducing energy consumption in this sector, governments have 
approved a large number of different policies during the past few decades, such as taxes, 
subsidies and standards. However, despite this significant policy effort and the gains 
achieved by these measures, such as progress in reducing fuel consumption due to 
standards, there has been an increase in both the stock of vehicles and the distance 
travelled by each one in most developed and emerging countries, and consequently an 
increase in total energy consumption in the transport sector. This apparent contradiction 
is due to various factors, including increases in the purchasing power of consumers that 
have led to increases in the weight and power of cars everywhere except in Japan. These 
increases are large enough to offset the effect of improved energy efficiency (EE) in the 
U.S., but not so large as to wipe out the improvements achieved in Europe (Schipper 
2011). In the case of Spain, the motorisation rate (number of vehicles per capita) grew 
from 0.32 to 0.48 in only twenty years (EU 2011), and passenger cars continue to be the 
dominant option for land transport. Moreover, rebound effects generated by fuel 
efficiency improvements might also prevent policies from achieving the expected 
energy savings (Frondel et al. 2008). It therefore seems that conventional policy 
instruments, (i.e. mandatory design standards, taxes on fuel and on car purchases or 
ownership), which have been implemented in both the EU and the U.S., have been 
unable to cope with the increase in energy consumption and with its ubiquitous energy 
and environmental problems (see e.g. Prost and Van Dender 2012). Thus, there is 
                                                 
*
 A previous version of this chapter was published as: Galarraga, I., Ramos, A., Lucas, J., Labandeira, X. 
(2014), in Transport Policy, 36, 272-282. 
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growing interest among policymakers and other agents in the design and effects of 
alternative ways of tackling this problem.  
In this context, there has been increasing calls for information programmes in recent 
years. In particular, the EU and U.S. have implemented labelling or certification 
systems that seek to reduce such market barriers as incomplete information and 
bounded rationality, which prevent consumers from taking optimal decisions regarding 
EE. This is generally known as the Energy Efficiency Paradox (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). 
In particular, most labeling systems for light-duty vehicles are intended to provide clear 
accessible information to enable consumers to compare the fuel performances of similar 
vehicles s. This is the case of the European labeling scheme as implemented in Spain. In 
the European Union (EU) this scheme is regulated by European Directive 1999/94/CE 
(European Commission 2000), which requires Member States to impose a labelling 
system for light-duty vehicles that shows the absolute level of CO2 (carbon dioxide) 
emissions and the fuel consumption of each new car when it is sold. This Directive also 
recommends the use e of a voluntary label with differentiated energy-efficiency classes 
(from A as the most energy efficient to G as the least) to facilitate comparisons between 
vehicles of the same size. The Spanish government transposed this mandate via a Royal 
Decree 837/2002, which establishes an EE classification based on the difference 
between the b fuel consumption of a particular vehicle and the average consumption
23
 
of vehicles of the e same size.  
In this context of policy revision, it seems essential to determine what value consumers 
place on EE attributes when acquiring a new vehicle. The hypothesis that consumers 
undervalue the energy performance of vehicles continues to be the focus of a debate that 
has gone on for a long time, and is used as an argument for implementing standards 
(Allcott and Wozny 2013). In this sense, the hedonic price method has traditionally 
been a preferred approach for studying willingness to pay (WTP) for certain attributes 
of products, such a as fuel consumption in the case of vehicles (Liu and Helfand 2012). 
However, the interpretation of the regression coefficients of this model is problematic 
due the existence of multicollinearity, which is caused by the high degree of correlation 
that usually exists between the attributes of a product. As described in the next section, 
some authors have developed alternative specifications to avoid this problem. We 
propose EE labels as an innovative instrument suitable for estimating the implicit price 
of fuel consumption while avoiding the multicollinearity problem.  
Additionally, there is evidence that some labelled products, such as buildings or 
appliances, could be sold with a price premium (Eichholtz et al. 2010; Galarraga et al. 
                                                 
23
 Average consumption is actually computed as follows:                        (   ) where a 
and b are parameters that must be reviewed and updated every year, and differ for petrol and diesel-
fuelled cars. S is vehicle size, measured as length by width. Appendix C1 shows the current Spanish 
labeling format.  
 
85 
 
2011b). Thus, the u use of EE labels as an indicator of EE also enables some insights to 
be gained into whether or not there is a price premium associated with EE in vehicles. A 
comparison of WTP for EE in cars as shown by labels with expected car fuel savings 
provides evidence on this hypothesis.  
Finally, the paper further contributes to the literature in this area via its use of retail 
prices as a better approximation to actual transaction prices. To the best of our 
knowledge, previous research papers that have opted for the hedonic approach for new 
vehicles have all used “official” prices (i.e. those advertised by manufacturers though 
catalogues, official magazines or websites) as those that lead to equilibrium in the 
market. However, there is casual evidence that, at least in the Spanish car market, 
retailers apply significant discounts on their own list prices and thus the final price 
could be very different from the official one. To take this into account, we use a 
database comprising a sample of around 3,000 vehicle observations that provide 
detailed information on the characteristics, and both the “official” and “real” prices of 
cars.  
With this novel, unique database we provide not only the first analysis for Spain of the 
price effects of vehicles rated highly in EE terms, but also results based on a new 
approach to transaction prices. This is important as it adds extra accuracy to the 
estimation of the WTP and enables us to better understand the relationship between list 
and market prices. Of course, the higher the correlation between both sales and list 
prices the lower the benefits of applying this approach will be. Moreover, the use of EE 
labels as an instrument for gauging fuel consumption enables us to contribute to the 
growing interest in informational instruments as alternative policy measures. We hope 
that our results can help to elucidate the potential and limitations of this approach and 
thus overcome the regulatory limitations of the past. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature to date in this field, and then Section 4.3 
briefly describes the hedonic pricing method and the data used. Section 4.4 presents and 
discusses the main results arising from the estimation of the model, and Section 4.5 
compares the WTP of consumers with the present value of fuel savings and thus deals 
with the rationality of agents when purchasing energy-efficient vehicles. Finally, 
Section 4.6 outlines the main conclusions and implications of the paper.  
4.2 Related literature  
Several papers have assessed the preferences of consumers regarding “cleaner” cars 
through stated preferences. For instance Achtnicht (2012) estimates the WTP for cars 
with lower CO2 emissions per km, and finds that this is considered an important 
attribute by German car buyers, especially by women, older people and those with 
higher levels of education. Caulfield et al. (2010) focus on the car purchase decision to 
determine whether fuel costs and existing taxes influence the choices of Irish 
consumers. Ewing and Sarigöllü (2000) report a positive attitude towards clean cars 
among Canadian consumers due to their environmental benefits, though those 
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consumers are unwilling to give up the customary levels of car performance. Baltas and 
Saridakis (2013) use compensatory choice modelling to show that “variables such as 
purpose of car use, pre-purchase information source used, consumer´s proneness 
towards buying an ecological car, consumer´s involvement with cars, and consumer´s 
attachment to cars, significantly affect car type choice”.  
Given the different characteristics or attributes of automobiles, consumers’ preferences 
for cleaner cars could also be evaluated through revealed preferences, and particularly 
through the hedonic pricing method. The first hedonic pricing studies for vehicles set 
out to establish a new method for computing price indices: the so-called “quality-
adjusted price index”. Given the technological advances in the vehicle market, it was 
deemed necessary to differentiate price changes associated with changes in the quality 
of attributes from those made when all characteristics remained the same. Court (1939) 
and Griliches (1961, 1964) first deal with this issue by presenting different models for 
computing adjusted-price indices for a period of time. More recently, the method has 
been used with the same purposes but with new model specifications by, among others, 
Matas and Raymond (2009), Reis and Santos Silva (2002) and Izquierdo et al. (2001). 
Other authors employ the hedonic price method to estimate the implicit price of each car 
attribute, for instance EE or fuel economy (generally measured in miles per gallon). In 
particular, there is an initial group of papers that study the effects of petrol price 
increases on the preferences of consumers for more energy-efficient cars after the oil 
crisis. In this context, Kahn (1986), Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), Ohta and Griliches 
(1983) and Goodman (1983), and more recently Allcott and Wozny (2013) focus mainly 
on used cars in the US, and find mixed results. This is the same conclusion stated by 
Greene (2010) after a review of 25 studies in this field carried out mainly in the US, and 
based on different methodologies.  
As observed in the introduction, interest in EE has undergone a revival in practical and 
academic terms in the last few years, largely due to energy dependency and 
environmental and climate change concerns. In this context, Chugh et al. (2011) use the 
hedonic pricing method to test the hypothesis that Indian consumers rationally value 
fuel economy by comparing the marginal price of fuel economy with the present value 
of fuel savings. To avoid correlation with unobservable variables, they use ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) with average fuel economy (in 
miles per gallon) of the same car brand as the instrument for fuel economy. Their results 
from IV show an implicit price of fuel economy that ranges from 1 to 10 percent of the 
total price in the period from 2002 to 2006 which, compared to the present value of 
energy savings, does not support undervaluation of the fuel economy of cars. Kiso 
(2010), on the other hand, applies an alternative hedonic model to 2001 U.S. data on 
new vehicles to avoid omitted variable bias. Using data on petrol prices and the 
estimated miles travelled per year, the paper constructs a proxy for the marginal price of 
fuel economy, which is shown to be between 5 and 10 percent of the retail price. 
Moreover, as expected, the paper reports a higher cost of fuel economy in larger 
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vehicles. Also using data from the U.S. new vehicle market in the same year, Espey and 
Nair (2005) estimate four models with OLS using different specifications of fuel 
economy. Their results coincide with Chugh et al. (2011) in that WTP for more fuel-
efficient vehicles exceeds energy savings, but they suggest that buyers behave rationally 
because the difference is explained by the environmental and energy concerns of 
consumers. Yet, in contrast with the aforementioned papers, Arguea and Hsiao (1993) 
find mixed evidence of car price increases associated with more mileage per gallon in 
1969-1986.  
In short, when a positive WTP is found by researchers it ranges between 1-10% of the 
price. In this paper we follow a similar hedonic approach to estimate the implicit price 
of fuel consumption or EE; however, we use the EU labelling system as an indicator for 
fuel economy that avoids problems associated with multicollinearity and omitted 
variables. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that evaluates the WTP for 
energy-efficient vehicles through labelling is that of Alberini et al. (2013), which 
considers the Swiss car rating system. Using different methodologies, they find that the 
effect on the price of a car with label A goes from 5-11%.  
As mentioned above, to the best of our knowledge our paper is also the first that uses a 
closer approximation to the real transaction prices.  
4.3 Estimation  
4.3.1 Hedonic price model  
The hedonic price method is based on the assumption that a product can be represented 
d as a vector containing its characteristics o or attributes. By extension, the price of that 
product can be expressed as a function of the attributes  
 
  ( )    (          ) (5) 
where    represent each of the e attributes of the good. In equilibrium, the price of each 
attribute is equal to the cost for the manufacturer of producing that characteristic (Court 
1939; Griliches 1961; Rosen 1974). Therefore, in a competitive equilibrium the hedonic 
price m method enables the implicit price of each characteristic of a vehicle to be 
estimated. It is given by the partial derivative of the vehicle price function with respect 
to each attribute. Thus, 
   ( )
    
 reports consumers’ WTP for an extra unit off the attribute 
or, similarly, the manufacturer’s marginal cost of producing such an additional unit. 
Although this approach bases its conclusions on real transaction prices, given the 
difficulties of using those prices researchers have tended to use manufacturers’ official 
prices as an approximation of transaction prices. As indicated above, however, the two 
prices do not necessarily coincide. Therefore, we propose the use of commercial retail 
prices as a more suitable approximation of transaction prices.  
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4.3.2 Data  
We employ a database developed especially for this study with micro-information on 
more e than 3,000 observations of vehicles on sale in Spain, covering all market 
segments. Each vehicle is identified by a unique model description in the database, 
which enables us to match different data sources to collect a detailed set of information. 
For instance, we have information on the type of car fuel, size, horsepower, extra 
equipment, brand, number of seats, fuel consumption, etc. (see Appendix B for a full list 
of the characteristics contained in the database). The main advantage of this database 
over those used in previous research efforts in this area is the inclusion of data on both 
the manufacturer’s official prices s and actual retail prices. This means that when the 
hedonic price method is applied two sources of prices can be used that should be very 
close to equilibrium prices. Data on official prices and on vehicle characteristics are 
taken from specialist car magazines and official car makers’ websites, while a 
subsample of retailer prices, containing 372 observations, was gathered by survey 
company CPS, Estudios de Mercado y Opinión S.L., using the so-called “mystery 
shopping” approach24. Retail prices were surveyed for the 15 most representative brands 
at different authorised dealers throughout Spanish territory
25
. Moreover, to avoid market 
changes, all price data were gathered between September and November 2012.  
The official prices obtained include value added tax (VAT) and vehicle registration 
taxes, while the retail prices additionally include retailers’ management costs, so price 
homogenisation was required. To that end we subtracted the corresponding registration 
tax from both prices and the average retailers’ management costs from the retail prices. 
As a final step, each observation was matched with its corresponding energy-efficiency 
label using information provided by IDAE (Spanish Institute for Energy Diversification 
and Savings). In fact, IDAE has developed a database with data on CO2 emissions, 
consumption and the corresponding energy-efficiency label for each model of vehicle 
sold in Spain
26
. Energy labels classify each vehicle based on the difference between its 
fuel consumption and the average consumption by cars of a similar size. This has 
enabled us to match each vehicle with its corresponding label to obtain a database with 
all the relevant characteristics needed to estimate the price function.  
                                                 
24 
This method can obtain reliable information on a specific service or product, gathered by an agent who 
pretends to be an ordinary consumer. 
25
 Surveys were carried out in a selection of the most representative Spanish mainland regions: Andalusia, 
Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Madrid. 
26 
This database is available online at http://www.idae.es/coches/ 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics  
 Full sample Subsample with retail prices 
Observations 3078 372 
Number of 
brands 
32, representing 100% of the market 15, representing 71,55 % of the market 
Distribution 
by market 
segments 
Big sedan (big saloon)             17.81% 
Small sedan (small saloon)      24.89% 
Sport                                           9.43% 
Luxury                                        5.45% 
Mini                                            3.16% 
Big mini-van                               3.00% 
Medium mini-van                       5.58% 
Small (Reference)                     16.28% 
Big Four-wheel-drive                  7.50% 
Medium Four-wheel-drive          1.40% 
Small Four-wheel-drive               5.87% 
Big sedan                              13.24% 
Small sedan                           19.46% 
Sport                                      14.05% 
Luxury                                     3.24% 
Mini                                         1.89% 
Big mini-van                            8.65% 
Medium mini-van                    3.51% 
Small (Reference)                 14.05% 
Big Four-wheel-drive              2.00% 
Medium Four-wheel-drive       0.00% 
Small Four-wheel-drive           1.89% 
Distribution 
by type of fuel 
Petrol                                          44.41% 
Diesel                                         52.83% 
Bioethanol (Petrol/Ethanol)         0.88% 
Petrol-hybrid                                1.27% 
Diesel-hybrid                                0.23% 
Electric                                         0.26% 
LPG                                              0.03% 
Natural gas                                   0.10% 
Petrol                                     34.40% 
Diesel                                    60.21% 
Bioethanol (Petrol/Ethanol)     4.03% 
Petrol-hybrid                            0.54% 
Diesel-hybrid                           0.27% 
Electric                                     0.54% 
LPG                                         0.00% 
Natural gas                              0.00% 
Distribution 
by EE labels 
A                                              26.38% 
B                                              36.00% 
C                                              16.05% 
D                                                9.42% 
E                                                 5.62% 
F                                                 2.89% 
G                                                 3.25% 
A                                           22.31% 
B                                           36.56% 
C                                           13.98% 
D                                           10.48% 
E                                            11.29% 
F                                              2.96% 
G                                             1.88% 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Price (€) 34225.32 26295.7 33168.95 20219.89 
Mixed 
consumption 
(l/100km) 
6.29 2.00 6.45 1.92 
CO2 emissions  
(g CO2/ km) 
152.5 45.55 158.87 46.07 
CC (cm
3
) 167.89 93.44 175.12 88.92 
Weight (kg.) 1484.07 312.07 1555.77 364.39 
Maximum 
speed (km/h) 
203.56 29.92 204.87 26.74 
Source: The authors.  
Table 9 shows the most relevant variables of the database built for this study. First of 
all, the survey to collect the retail prices deals with 71.5 percentage of the car models on 
sale and shows no major differences from the full sample, thus demonstrating that the 
reduced sample represents the entire market quite well. Both samples suggest that most 
vehicles on sale in Spain are small and medium sized, and that petrol and diesel engines 
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account for more than the 90 percentage of the fleet. The supply of vehicles also shows 
a high level of EE, with 36 percentage of vehicles labelled as B and also a fairly large 
number with A and C labels. Thus, if label D is set as the benchmark for average EE, 
more than 60 percentage of the vehicles on sale in Spain are energy-efficient. Finally, 
the bottom lines of Table 9 report some statistics on the main variables contained in the 
database. Importantly, and as expected, average retail prices are lower than average 
official prices by around 1,000 Euros
27
, which suggests that retailers adapt official 
prices to suit their own commercial strategies. The correlation between official and 
retail prices is relatively high in our database, ranging from 90 to 99% depending on the 
market segment. Of course, it should be noted that this reduces the benefits of using 
retail prices for the particular case of the Spanish car market. In any case, the approach 
may be more useful in other markets.  
4.3.3 The regression model  
Since the number of non-petrol/diesel cars in our database is almost negligible and EE 
labels do not have any effect on alternatives such as gas-fuelled or electric vehicles, we 
restrict our estimation to petrol and diesel cars. As customary in this field we use a 
semi-log model for the price function of vehicles (Equation 6), which is estimated 
using the official and retail price samples separately.  
 
  (  )                                                        
                      ∑         
  
    ∑    
  
         ∑           
 
   
∑          
 
   ∑          ∑          ∑    
 
   
 
   
 
                 (6) 
The dependent variable in Equation (6) is the logarithm of the price for observation i, 
with α as the constant of the model. To estimate the price effects of labelling we first 
attempted to use a discrete variable for the levels of each label. However, with the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) statistic, which measures the correlation between 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009), we found high levels of multicollinearity 
which affected the coefficients of the label variables. Therefore we created a dummy 
variable (AB), valued at one if the car had a class A or B label and zero otherwise, 
which does not suffer from multicollinearity. Hence, the coefficient of interest in 
Equation (6) is β, which measures the marginal price of EE (defined as having A or B 
labels). Even though labels are a function of size, their effect would be overestimated if 
we did not control for the increase in price due to larger vehicles. Thus, we use weight 
(in tonnes) as a proxy for the length and width of cars. Moreover, in Spain the 
registration tax is based on vehicle’s CO2 emissions; those vehicles with high levels of 
                                                 
27
 This difference is considerably greater for luxury and sports cars, and slightly smaller for small 
vehicles.  
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CO2 emissions pay higher taxes
28
. Then, it is expected that the level of CO2 has negative 
effects on vehicle prices. Since this fact could affect the effect of EE, we also introduce 
a categorical variable, ecotax, taking values from 0 to 3 according to the current 
registration tax, which isolates both effects. We also include the variables CC, RPS, 
maxspeed, acel and cap for cubic centimetres (measuring engine size), revolutions per 
second, maximum speed, acceleration and boot capacity (in 100l) respectively. Finally, 
Equation (6) contains dummies for the type of fuel (D1), commercial vehicle segment 
(D2), market brands (D3), number of seats (D4), number of airbags (D5), number of 
gears in manual gearboxes, including automatic transmission (D6), type of drive system 
(D7) and six dummies for extra equipment (D8), all described in full in Annex C1. We 
believe that this extensive set of characteristics and the use of labels as an indicator of 
EE enable the coefficient for EE to be interpreted correctly.  
Two additional model specifications are implemented to check the results: the first 
replaces the variable AB by fuel consumption (in l/km), and the second uses a new 
dummy variable instead of AB, called A, which takes a value of 1 if the vehicle has a 
class A label and 0 otherwise. Although the first of these alternatives might result in 
multicollinearity, the objective is to use two similar indicators of EE to validate our 
results. We would expect the coefficient for fuel consumption to be similar in size but 
opposite in sign to the coefficient for AB, while the coefficient for A should have the 
same sign but be bigger than AB due to the exclusion of the effect of label B from the 
combined effect. Finally, we regress the original model separately for each market 
segment so that we can identify differences in WTP depending on the type of vehicle. 
Since each market segment is determined by its own characteristics, we expect different 
implicit prices for EE.  
4.4 Results  
Table 10 displays the results for the estimation of Equation (6). Column 2 depicts the 
results using official prices, whereas column 6 shows the results with retail prices 
(columns 3 and 7 are the corresponding standard deviations. Most coefficients are 
significant and have the expected sign in both models. The R-squared, moreover, 
suggests that most price variability is explained by the model.  
The main objective of this research is to estimate the marginal effect of high-rated 
vehicles, which is explained by the coefficient of variable AB. In fact, both models 
suggest that energy-efficient vehicles (those with class A and B labels) are more 
expensive than the rest. In particular, all other variables being equal, the implicit price 
associated with energy-efficiency is 2.27 and 5.95 percentage of the vehicle’s price for 
                                                 
28
 The Spanish registration tax has four brackets: 0% for vehicles with CO2 emissions lower or equal than 
120g/km; 4.75% for vehicles with emissions between 120g/km and 160g/km; 9.75% for vehicles with 
emissions between 160g/km and 200g/km; and 14.75% for vehicles with emissions larger than 200g/km.  
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official and retail prices, respectively. Moreover, our results indicate that consumers 
value energy efficient vehicles, i.e. they are willing to pay more for vehicles with A or 
B labels.  
Table 10: Estimated results for vehicles labelled as A or B 
 
 
Official prices  Official 
prices 
 Retail prices   
 Full sample  Reduced 
sample 
   
 Coefficient S.D Coefficient  S.D Coefficient S.D 
Petrol -0.0666*** (0.0102) -0.0695*** (0.0111) -0.0790* (0.0428) 
CC 0.00257*** ( 0.0000929) 0.00252*** ( 0.000091) 0.00295*** (0.000252) 
RPS -0.000750** (0.00031) -0.000466 (0.000338) -0.00300** (0.00123) 
Maxspeed 0.00113*** (0.000326) 0.000724** (0.000284) 0.00138 (0.000892) 
Acel 0.000743 (0.00165) -0.000410 (0.00164) 0.0134 (0.00930) 
AB 0.0227*** (0.00635) 0.0304*** (0.00725) 0.0595* (0.0341) 
Weight 0.343*** (0.0246) 0.423*** (0.0282) 0.258*** (0.0944) 
cap 0.00250 (0.00275) -0.00522** (0.00255) -0.0227** (0.00923) 
Ecotax1 -0.0309*** (0.00587) -0.0335*** (0.00662) -0.0907*** (0.0283) 
Ecotax2 -0.0408*** (0.0101) -0.0406*** (0.0109) -0.0863 (0.0546) 
Ecotax3 -0.0474*** (0.0170) -0.0512*** (0.0185) -0.116 (0.0734) 
Automatic 0.0609*** (0.00898) 0.0729*** (0.0102) 0.131*** (0.0450) 
A/C 0.0405*** (0.00815) 0.0359*** (0.0104) 0.0928*** (0.0302) 
Constant 8.848*** (0.0785) 8.856*** (0.0762) 8.937*** (0.220) 
Dummy for 
brand 
Y  Y  Y  
Dummy for 
commercial 
segment 
Y  Y  Y  
Dummy for 
extra equipment 
Y  Y  Y  
Dummy for 
#seats 
Y  Y  Y  
Dummy for 
#airbags 
Y  Y  Y  
Dummy for 
traction type 
Y  Y  Y  
Dummy for 
#speeds 
Y  Y  Y  
Observations 2,961  2,124  352  
R-squared 0.962  0.968  0.979  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1  
However, there is a substantial difference between the figures in the two results. This 
might be partially explained by the type of observations included in each sample: the 
sample with retail prices contains only observations for the 15 best-selling brands on the 
Spanish market, while the official price sample contains all the models available on that 
market, and thus includes several luxury brands that provide vehicles with clearly 
distinctive characteristics that could be biasing the results if the dummy for luxury is 
unable to control their full effect. This led us to re-estimate the model using official 
prices but considering only the 15 best-selling brands in Spain (this is denoted as the 
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Reduced Sample in Table 10). Column 4 in Table 10 reports the corresponding results: 
basically the coefficient of interest for official prices, β, increases to 3.04 percentage. 
The remaining difference could be due to the origin of the prices: official prices are 
supply-side prices, while retail prices are closer to being demand-side prices (i.e. they 
are prices at equilibrium and thus better incorporate demand factors). This could 
indicate that consumers value EE more highly than producers.  
In short, our results not only provide the first empirical evidence of the WTP for 
energy-efficient vehicles among Spanish consumers but also contribute to general body 
of literature in this area, yielding figures that fall within the usual range found in 
evidence to date. The results for the rest of the variables are as expected and are very 
similar for the two price specifications: petrol-driven vehicles are 6.9 to 7.9 percent 
cheaper than diesel, engine size (measured in cubic centimetres (CC)), weight and 
maximum speed (maxspeed) increase prices in the regression of official prices, and the 
level of CO2 emissions has a negative effect on prices, all else equal. Table 10 also 
displays the marginal cost of some of the dummies included in the model, such as air 
conditioning and automatic transmission relative to conventional five-speed gearboxes.  
Table 11: Estimated results for vehicle fuel consumption (in l/100km.)  
 Official prices 
reduced sample 
 Retail prices  
     
 Coefficient  S.D Coefficient S.D 
Petrol -0.0849*** (0.0138) -0.0510 (0.0518) 
CC 0.00247*** (8.05e-05) 0.00312*** (0.000280) 
RPS -0.000331 (0.000340) -0.00228 (0.00140) 
Maxspeed 0.000540** (0.000237) 0.000106 (0.000779) 
Acel -0.000253 (0.00155) 0.00238 (0.00842) 
Consumption -0.000399 (0.00420) -0.0307** (0.0146) 
Weight 0.385*** (0.0279) 0.285*** (0.0995) 
cap -0.00422* (0.00252) -0.0195** (0.00884) 
aut 0.0658*** (0.0104) 0.118** (0.0462) 
A/C 0.0404*** (0.0105) 0.101*** (0.0290) 
Constant 9.189*** (0.0712) 9.511*** (0.226) 
Dummy for brand Y  Y  
Dummy for commercial 
segment 
Y  Y  
Dummy for extra equipment Y  Y  
Dummy for #seats Y  Y  
Dummy for #airbags Y  Y  
Dummy for traction type Y  Y  
Dummy for #speeds     
Observations 2,122  352  
R-squared 0.967  0.978  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 11 shows results for the first alternative model, which uses fuel consumption as 
an indicator of energy-efficiency
29
. Most of the coefficients remain unchanged in the 
two samples when variable AB is replaced by fuel consumption in the reduced official-
price sample. The coefficient for fuel economy has the expected sign in both samples, 
although it is not statistically significant for the official price sample. However, in the 
retail price sample, the value assigned to fuel consumption not only has a negative sign 
but is on the same order of magnitude as in previous results. Again, this difference 
could be explained by the source of the prices: an increase in fuel consumption in l/km 
is an undesirable characteristic for consumers, but it might not be so for producers. The 
fact that the implicit price of fuel consumption is lower than the price for high-rated 
vehicles could indicate that there is a price premium associated with labels, as 
mentioned above. Finally, the VIF shows a higher level of multicollinearity for the 
coefficient for fuel consumption than the AB coefficient.  
Table 12: Estimated results for vehicles labelled as A 
 Official prices 
reduced sample 
 Retail 
prices 
 
     
 Coefficient  S.D Coefficient S.D 
Petrol -0.0819*** (0.0112) -0.148*** (0.0477) 
CC 0.00254*** (8.82e-05) 0.00277*** (0.000232) 
RPS -0.000303 (0.000334) -0.000172 (0.00139) 
Maxspeed 0.000639** (0.000259) 0.00154* (0.000810) 
Acel -0.00117 (0.00153) 0.0112 (0.00901) 
A 0.0592*** (0.00626) 0.134*** (0.0307) 
Weight 0.408*** (0.0276) 0.259*** (0.0926) 
cap -0.00616** (0.00252) -0.0184** (0.00865) 
Ecotax1 -0.0123 (0.00754) -0.0473* (0.0268) 
Ecotax2 -0.0198* (0.0112) -0.0914** (0.0405) 
Ecotax3 -0.0334* (0.0186) -0.163** (0.0666) 
Aut 0.0685*** (0.0101) 0.176*** (0.0482) 
A/C 0.0338*** (0.0103) 0.0452 (0.0335) 
Constant 8.895*** (0.0711) 9.078*** (0.240) 
Dummy for brand Y  Y  
Dummy for commercial segment Y  Y  
Dummy for extra equipment Y  Y  
Dummy for #seats Y  Y  
Dummy for #airbags Y  Y  
Dummy for traction type Y  Y  
Dummy for #speeds Y  Y  
Observations 2,124  352  
R-squared 0.971  0.980  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: own work. 
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 Note that the dummies for ecotax were excluded from this estimation as do not contribute explaining 
car consumption that mainly depends on characteristics of the car.  
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Table 12 displays the results for the second alternative specification, which replaces the 
variable AB by the variable A (for vehicles labelled as A). In this case, as expected, the 
coefficient for A is higher than the coefficient for AB in both models. This regression 
shows the robustness of our results to alternative model specifications: The WTP of 
consumers for vehicles labelled A is again higher than for those labelled A or B.  
Finally, using the full official-price sample, Table 13 reports WTP results for A-
labelled vehicles in each commercial segment. A priori, one would expect bigger 
vehicles with higher fuel consumption to have the highest energy-efficiency implicit 
price, as the expected fuel savings are larger. However, our results do not support this 
hypothesis: the sports and luxury segments show the largest WTP for vehicles labelled 
as A, but the coefficient for EE is not statistically significant for SUVs (four wheel or 
4x4), the other segment with expected high consumption. Cars in the small category 
show the second highest WTP for EE, followed by sedans (or saloon cars). Hence, our 
estimates do not indicate a clear link between the market segment of vehicles and WTP 
for EE.  
Table 13: Estimated results in each market segment (using vehicles labelled A) 
 Sedan Sport & 
Luxury 
Mini Small Minivan  Four-wheel-
drive (SUV) 
Coef. (A) 0.0154** 0.0756*** 0.0288 0.0444*** 0.0262 0.0491 
S.D. (0.00632) (0.0199) (0.0177) (0.0127) (0.0172) (0.0319) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
4.5 WTP for EE and present value of fuel savings  
Once the WTP for energy-efficient vehicles is known, it can be compared with the 
present value of fuel savings associated with such vehicles. Indeed, it can be argued that 
if consumers behave rationally, and no other distortion exists
30
, their WTP for energy-
efficient vehicles should be close to the discounted energy savings attainable over the 
lifetime of the vehicle. A detailed analysis of this issue, incorporating expected fuel 
prices, goes beyond the scope of this research, but a rough calculation could provide 
another robustness check for our results and could also provide some insights into the 
behaviour of Spanish consumers in this area. Such a comparison is depicted in Table 
14.  
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 Other distortions such as information barriers (not overcome by the labels), lack of liquidity (and/or 
credit) as well as uncertainty about future fuel prices.  
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Table 14: WTP for and savings from energy-efficient vehicles 
Discounted fuel savings  
 
WTP for a vehicle labelled 
A, using the average price 
for the official-price 
subsample  
WTP for a vehicle labelled 
A, using the average price 
for the retail-price sample 
r= 5%              2606.2 Euros 
 1997.92  4860,6 r= 10%            2073.9 Euros 
r=15%             1693.9 Euros 
Source: The authors.  
In Table 14 we use data on annual household expenditures on fuel and lubricants from 
the Spanish Institute for Statistics (INE). The figure for 2013 is 1350.80 Euros. Given 
that vehicles with class A labels consume 25 percentage less than those with class D, 
which is taken as a reference, the expected energy savings over a vehicle lifetime of 10 
years
31
 are observed to range from 2606.2 to 1693.9 Euros, using discount rates from 5 
to 15 percentage respectively. These expected energy savings are checked against the 
WTP obtained from our alternative regressions using the dummy for vehicles labelled 
as A (Table 12), the average price of the reduced official-price sample and the retail-
price sample
32
.  
By employing two price approximations as boundaries, we obtain several interesting 
results. For the retail price sample, the WTP exceeds the present value of fuel savings, 
independently of the discount rate. Although this finding coincides with the results of 
Chugh et al. (2011) and Espey and Nair (2005), given the size of the gap between the 
two values it could be reflecting an overestimation of the WTP when retail prices are 
used. Other explanations might be worth considering to clarify this issue in future work. 
The impact of the commercial strategies of dealers might be playing a significant role in 
the car market in Spain, so that supply side factors prevail when retail prices are 
considered. Van der Vooren et al (2013) offer some insights regarding supply side 
effects of energy labels for the Dutch market, showing how the product portfolio of 
firms has changed.  
On the other hand, when the official-price subsample is used the values are considerably 
closer to the WTP. While using a discount rate ranging from 5 to 10 percentage, the 
expected energy savings are greater than the WTP, which could indicate that consumers 
undervalue EE and that the so-called Energy Efficiency Paradox arises
33
 
34
; using a 
                                                 
31
 10 years is the vehicle lifetime usually considered by the Spanish Institute for the Diversification and 
Energy Saving (IDAE). 
32
 The average price of the reduced official sample is 33.863,03 and the average price of the retail sample 
is 33.291,73.  
33 
That is, even when investments in EE seem economically rational some consumers chose not to 
undertake them.  
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discount rate of 15 percentage the WTP is very close and slightly greater than the 
present value of fuel savings.  
This analysis, however, does not enable us to draw any single conclusion regarding the 
existence of an Energy Efficiency Paradox among Spanish consumers for the vehicle 
market as a whole. Given the results provided in Table 13, there is great variability in 
the WTP for energy efficient vehicles across market segments, so the comparison 
between WTP and discounted fuel savings displayed in Table 14 might vary 
accordingly. Unfortunately, the lack of data on annual fuel expenditures for each market 
segment in Spain prevents us from adjusting the discount fuel savings for each type of 
vehicles and from performing an individual analysis. For instance, the WTP for high-
end vehicles labelled as A far exceeds the expected energy savings displayed in Table 
14. This seems to indicate a major overvaluation of EE for this market segment. 
However, higher annual fuel expenditures are expected for such vehicles, which would 
reduce this magnitude. The opposite seems to be true for small vehicles and sedans, for 
which constant annual fuel expenditures show an undervaluation of EE.  
Interestingly, independently of the values of the discount rate, the expected energy 
savings are relatively close to the WTP results obtained for cars using official prices. 
This can be interpreted as proof of the accuracy of the WTP estimated for energy-
efficient vehicles using official prices and the economic rationality of Spanish 
consumers when purchasing energy-efficient vehicles, that is, on average, the Energy 
Efficiency Paradox is present to a small extent (see Section 4.1). Further research could 
also take into account resale prices, which should be added to the expected energy 
savings to calculate the WTP for energy-efficient cars in the case of people who decide 
to sell their cars after some years of use. Gilmore and Lave (2013) show that the price 
premium can be partially recovered through fuel savings and through the higher resale 
value of alternative vehicles. The difference between the WTP and the present value of 
energy savings is significantly lower in the case of cars than in the case of refrigerators. 
This is probably due to the fact that the extent to which cars can influence future energy 
consumption is much higher, and thus the potential of future savings is valued more 
highly.  
4.6 Conclusions  
Governments face growing pressure to limit energy-related emissions and consumption 
from an ever larger number of vehicles and from increasing car use. A mix of various 
policy instruments has been implemented to attain this general objective, such as taxes 
on fuel and car purchases, design standards and subsidies. These measures may be 
expanded and intensified given the major part played by transport in global energy 
consumption, and to tackle severe environmental problems. However, given the taste of 
                                                                                                                                               
34 
Galarraga et al. (2011b) also find some evidence of the Energy Efficiency Paradox for the case of 
refrigerators in Spain. Their paper estimates that the WTP is about one third of the energy savings that a 
consumer obtains during the lifetime of a refrigerator with the highest energy-efficiency label.  
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consumers for more, larger and more powerful cars and the potential limitations 
associated with some of the conventional regulatory instruments in this area, new 
approaches may be needed. In this sense, information programmes such as EE labels 
may play an important role in both developed and emerging countries. Among other 
things, they may address the apparent lack of perception among consumers of the 
benefits of improved EE in cars. It is against this background that an EU energy-
efficiency rating system for cars has been implemented, with labels ranging from A 
(most energy efficient) to G (least energy efficient).  
In this paper we use this labelling system to estimate the value that Spanish consumers 
place on energy-efficient cars. To estimate the implicit price of a car rated highly in 
terms of EE, i.e. the WTP of consumers for a car labelled A or B, we employ a database 
developed especially for this study with more than 3000 observations containing a rich 
set of characteristics of vehicles on the Spanish market. Besides official prices, the 
database incorporates a subsample of retail prices for cars obtained in situ through 
“mystery shopping”. All this information is matched with information from the IDAE’s 
official database on vehicle energy-efficiency labels.  
That database is used with a hedonic price approach to estimate a model of car prices 
that are set as function of different attributes of cars. Among other results, the paper 
reports a statistically significant coefficient of the variable that measures the effect of 
(very high) energy-efficiency labels: A and B labelled cars are found to be supplied at a 
price between 3 and 5.9 percentage higher than that of similar but less energy-efficient 
cars, using two different price approximations (official listing and “mystery shopping”). 
These results are first contrasted with alternative model specifications using fuel 
consumption and A-labelled vehicles. Subsequently, to evaluate the rationality of 
consumers, the results are compared with an approximation of the present value of 
energy savings. When official prices are used, the WTP for vehicles labelled as A is 
very close to the expected energy savings, which suggests that, on average, Spanish 
consumers rationally value EE in cars. When retail prices are used instead the difference 
is quite substantial, which might indicate either an overestimation of the WTP in this 
case or a supply side distortion in the market due to aggressive commercial strategies on 
the part of Spanish dealers. This question remains to be answered by future research. 
Additionally, the use of both official and retail prices seems to be an interesting area for 
further analysis as it adds accuracy to the calculations. The caveat is that the higher the 
correlation between the two prices the lower the benefits of the method are. The 
analysis, however, seems worth trying.  
Before concluding the paper, we believe that it is important to set our results in the 
context of the recent literature on EE labelling in other goods. EE certification systems 
are becoming a widespread tool for incentivising the purchase of products other than 
vehicles, including buildings and household appliances. Indeed, applying the hedonic 
price method to these other products provides similar results: products with high 
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energy-efficiency labels are sold (or rented) at higher prices. For instance, Eichholtz et 
al. (2010) analyse the case of commercial buildings in the US, and find that rental 
(selling) rates associated with certified office buildings are 3 (16) percentage higher per 
square foot than for similar but uncertified ones. These results are similar to those of 
Fuerst and McAllister (2011), who find that the price of commercial buildings in the 
U.S. is 25 and 26 percentage higher respectively for buildings with LEED and Energy 
Star certificates, while for rent the differences are +5 and +4 percentage respectively. 
Again using the hedonic price method, Galarraga et al. (2011a) estimate the marginal 
price of energy-efficient dishwashers in Spain (those labelled A or A+), and find that 
the label explains as much as 15.6 percentage of the price. Galarraga et al. (2011b) also 
find that the figure is 8.9 percentage for the case of the refrigerator market in the Basque 
Autonomous Community (Spain).  
To sum up, we believe that this paper provides support for the use of information-based 
approaches in the area of energy and the environmental regulation of transport, where 
measures are greatly needed. However, given that there are several significant policy 
instruments available to promote EE, it is very important to introduce such approaches 
with proper consideration for the synergies and negative interactions that they might 
bring about in such a context. Energy labels or certificates, on the other hand, could be 
used as the basis for designing other policy initiatives in this area, such as taxes levied 
on the energy inefficiency of stocks (Hanemann et al. 2012) or emission based car 
taxation (Rogan et al. 2011). The results of this article, and their possible derivations, 
may be particularly useful for an informed discussion of these and other policy issues in 
this important area.  
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Annex C1 
 Mandatory label  
Description of fuel consumption and CO2 emissions labels 
 
1. In the Spanish territory, fuel consumption and CO2 emissions labels 
must have the following format: 
A guide containing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions together with a 
detailed description of all new vehicles models’ characteristics can be 
obtained at all points of sale by free.    
Commercial brand/model: 
Fuel type: 
Official consumption 
(ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE DIRECTIVE 80/1268/CEE) 
Kind of driving L/100Km. 
In the city  
On the road  
Weighted average  
OFFICIAL SPECIFIC CO2 EMISSIONS 
(ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE DIRECTIVE 80/1268/CEE) 
g/Km. 
 
Fuel consumption and CO2 emissions depend not only on vehicles’ 
performance; driving behavior as well as other no technical factors also 
influence them. CO2 is the main component of the greenhouse gases, 
which are responsible for the global warming.   
Source: Royal Decree 837/2002  
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Voluntary label  
Energy Efficiency 
Commercial brand Hummer 
Vehicle model H2 6.2 V8 AUT. 
Fuel type Gasoline 
Transmission A 
Fuel consumption 
(liters per 100 kilometers) 
 
 
17,4 liters/100Km 
Equivalence 
(Kilometers per liter) 
 
 
5,75 km/liter 
CO2 emissions 
(grams per kilometer) 
 
412g/km 
Consumption comparative 
(with respect to the average of 
vehicles with the same size, for 
sale in Spain) 
Low consumption 
 
High consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Valid until 02/12/2010 
> A guide containing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions together with a 
detailed description of all new vehicles models’ characteristics can be 
obtained at all points of sale by free.    
> Fuel consumption and CO2 emissions depend not only on vehicles’ 
performance; driving behavior as well as other no technical factors also 
influence them. CO2 is the main component of the greenhouse gases, 
which are responsible for the global warming.   
 
Source: Royal Decree 837/2002 
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Annex C2 
Characteristic  Description  
D1. Type of fuel  1 dummy =1 if Gasoline 
                  =0 if Diesel  
D2. Commercial segment 11 dummies for commercial segment  Big sedan 
Small sedan 
Sport 
Luxury 
Mini 
Big minivan 
Medium minivan 
Small (Reference) 
Big Four-wheel-drive 
Medium Four-wheel-drive 
Small Four-wheel-drive 
D3. Brand 32 dummies for the 32 most representative brands on the Spanish market for 
light-duty vehicles  
D4. Number of seats 7 dummies for:      2 seats 
4 seats 
5 seats (Reference) 
6 seats 
7 seats 
5 seats convertible in 7 
2+2 seats 
D5. Number of Airbags 5 dummies for:       2 airbags (Reference) 
                               4 airbags 
                               5 airbags 
                               6 airbags 
                               7 airbags 
D6. Number of gears 4 dummies for:       5-speed gearbox (Reference) 
                               6-speed 
                               7-speed 
                               Automatic  
D7. Drive system 3 dummies for :      Front-wheel drive (Reference) 
                               Rear-wheel drive 
                               4x4 
D8. Extra equipment 
Air Conditioner (A/C) 1=yes /0=no 
Electronic stability control 1=yes /0=no 
Rim 1=yes /0=no 
Navigation system 1=yes /0=no 
Xenon arc lamps 1=yes /0=no 
Parktronic 1=yes /0=no 
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Chapter 5:  
Valuing energy performance certificates in the Portuguese 
residential sector* 
5.1 Introduction 
Climate change and energy dependence have raised increasing attention towards the 
need to decrease energy consumption and its associated CO2 emissions. The building 
sector represents a great opportunity to reduce energy demand since an important part of 
the current energy consumption comes from buildings; in industrialized countries, 
residential and commercial sectors account for approximately 40% of the final energy 
consumption (European Commission 2011). More importantly, technical studies have 
identified a large potential for cost-efficient energy savings in buildings through the 
adoption of energy efficiency (EE) measures (IPCC 2007). 
Despite the fact that EE could provide many benefits to the society, the rate at which 
agents adopt EE is slower than the expected by economic models. This situation is well 
known as the Energy Efficiency Paradox (Jaffe and Stavins 1994) and it is generally 
explained as the result of the multitude of market barriers that exist in this market. 
During several decades governments have made a great effort to change this situation 
by approving numerous policies to promote EE. However, the results were not as 
expected and the potential for energy savings in the residential sector remains 
unexploited (European Parliament 2014).  
Researchers have pointed out that the assumptions of perfect information and consumer 
rationality that conventional policies assume could partially explain this situation. In the 
last years, the theories proposed by behavioral economists (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) about consumers’ systematic deviations from the rationality have gained much 
attention in the field of EE. The fact that energy consumption is an intangible attribute 
of energy services and products is the origin of several informational problems, such as 
incomplete and asymmetric information, that lead agents to not include EE among their 
preferences. In addition, agents are subjected to cognitive limitations and other 
behavioral failures that might induce them to take inefficient decisions regarding EE. 
For instance, agents do not have the ability to correctly predict the future energy 
consumption of a dwelling, and to solve this complex task they could use heuristic rules 
in their decision-making process such as valuing only the most salient characteristics of 
the products (DellaVigna 2009).   
*
A previous version of this chapter was published as Perez-Alonso, A., Ramos, A., Silva, S. in Economics 
for Energy, WP 02/2015. 
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As a consequence, many governments have rapidly adopted informational instruments 
to target informational and behavioral failures in the residential sector. Informational 
instruments represent both a low cost alternative and a complement to conventional 
policies (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). Their goal is to help consumers to take 
efficient decisions regarding EE by providing them with clear and direct information 
about the energy performance of the products. At the same time, it is expected that 
buildings with a higher level of EE are transacted at a higher price. Besides 
environmental concerns, the reduction of energy consumption leads to lower energy 
bills, so one would expect that effect to be reflected into the market price. This 
hypothesis represents an incentive for agents to increase the level of EE of their 
properties. Hence, labels would also create indirect incentives for owners to invest in 
EE. 
Labeling systems have been previously used for other energy products such as 
appliances or vehicles, and nowadays are present in the building sector of many 
countries
35
. The European Union introduced in 2002 the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive, EPBD (Directive 2002/91/CE, then recasted into the Directive 
2010/31/EU). The EPBD requires Member States to develop a national Energy 
Performance Certificates (EPCs) system for buildings, which must be made available to 
buyers or tenants in the moment the building (or building unit) is sold or rented out. 
Based on structural characteristics, buildings or building units must be classified 
according to an index from A (the higher level) to G (the lowest). With this information, 
agents have not only fast, reliable and costless information, but they can also compare 
different buildings in terms of EE.  
Despite the widespread diffusion of this measure, little is known about its effectiveness, 
in particular in the residential sector. Although there is not yet available data to estimate 
the effects of labeling on energy consumption or on the probability to purchase 
buildings with a higher level of EE, we can evaluate how this information affects 
consumers’ preferences for EPCs. Many of studies have been conducted in the last 
decade to estimate the market value of EPC or other labeling systems, mostly in the 
commercial sector in the U.S. Almost all of them point out that certified office buildings 
are sold or rented out at a higher price. However, we focus on consumers’ valuation for 
EPC in the residential sector since more policy intervention is required in this sector. 
First, households do not always follow the minimization cost principle when making 
decisions, and hence they are more likely to make inefficient ones. Second, they have 
fewer incentives for EE adoption given that their individual energy savings are smaller. 
The evidence for the European residential sector is rather scarce, although the results go 
in the same direction of the commercial sector. 
                                                 
35
 In the U.S. there are two voluntary labeling systems for buildings and other energy products: the 
Energy Star program, which belongs to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the LEED 
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) rating system. Similar systems are in place in many 
other countries, such as Canada, Australia or China. 
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All these studies use the hedonic price model to estimate the implicit price of the 
attributes of the building. However, the number of attributes they include is rather small 
because detailed information on dwelling attributes is generally not available. This fact 
could make the model suffer from omitted variables bias, and if this is the case, the 
estimates for the EPC might be overestimated. In particular, given that most of these 
models do not include information on energy attributes, they cannot identify whether 
that estimated “price premium” is associated with the EPC itself or with other EE 
building attributes not included in the model
36
.  
We use as data source the website of one of the largest real estate companies in Portugal 
with more than 21.000 dwellings advertised for sale on it. After gathering data we have 
constructed a database that includes a complete set of dwelling characteristics, such as 
the asking price, dwelling size, structural characteristics, an extended number of 
geographic location measures, and the EPC score. Following the previous methodology 
we define a hedonic price function to estimate the price of each dwelling attribute. 
However, our price function additionally includes information on EE attributes which, if 
omitted, could lead to an overestimation of the EPC effect. In particular, we include 
information on certain EE measures installed in the dwelling, such as availability of 
heating or air conditioning systems, gas or solar energy sources.  
Thus, we contribute to previous literature by providing the first evidence on consumers’ 
valuation for EPC in a Southern European country: Portugal. The group of Southern 
European Countries has important economic, climatic and cultural particularities, which 
could potentially lead to different policy implementation results when compared to 
Northern countries. As well as in other Southern European countries, per capita final 
energy consumption in the Portuguese residential sector is lower than the European 
average. This situation, which could be partially explained by warmer temperatures, is 
likely to affect consumer’s willingness to pay for building’s EE attributes and EPCs. 
Besides, Portugal is an interesting case study because it was one of the early adopters of 
the EPBD, and hence, the implementation of this legislation has been fully completed 
and the level of consumers’ awareness is high.   
The paper is organized in six sections and 4 annexes that contain additional information 
about variables’ description, representativeness of the sample, and results of alternative 
model specifications. Section 5.2 reviews the related literature in the field, Section 5.3 
describes our sample and tests whether it is representative of the Portuguese real estate 
market. Section 5.4 presents the methodology followed in this analysis and Section 5.5 
shows the results. Finally, Section 5.6 discusses the main conclusions. 
                                                 
36
 In their pioneer paper, Eichholtz et al. (2010), stated that “the rent premium associated with the label on 
any building represents the joint effects of the energy efficiency of the building together with other 
unmeasured, but presumably important attributes of the building”. 
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5.2 Related literature 
Given the recent introduction of EPCs systems in the building sector, the research in 
this field is constrained by an important lack of detailed data. The current inability of 
national databases to combine information about the number of EPC available in the 
country with relevant household and dwelling characteristics does not allow us to infer 
the effects on final energy consumption. However, it is possible to study the direct 
effect that the EPC has on consumer’s decisions by analyzing how they respond to the 
information provided in the certificates.  
During the last decade, some studies have carried out estimations to determine the 
capitalization of building labeling systems, particularly in the U.S. office market. The 
preferred technique to conduct this analysis has been the hedonic pricing method 
(Rosen 1974). This is the case of the pioneer study by Eichholtz et al. (2010), who used 
information from CoStar (a large database for the U.S.) and found that office buildings 
certified with Energy Star or LEED label were rented at a 3% higher price per square 
foot than non-certified buildings, and were sold out at a 16% higher price. Under the 
same umbrella of hedonic pricing, similar results are obtained by Fuerst and McAllister 
(2011a) (4-5% increase in certified rented buildings and 25% in sold buildings) and 
Wiley et al. (2010) (7-9% associated with Energy Star labels and 15-18% for LEED). 
For European countries, on the one hand, Kok and Jennen (2012) confirmed these 
results for the office market of the Netherlands. They found that inefficient offices 
(those labeled with D or lower) had realized rents approximately 6% lower than the rest 
of offices. On the other hand, Fuerst and McAllister (2011b) have not found any 
connection between EPC and the asset value for commercial buildings in the U.K.
37
 
Only a few of the above mentioned studies include detailed information on building’s 
characteristics and attributes related with EE. Eichholtz et al. (2010) (updated in 
Eichholtz et al. 2013) is one of them. These authors used a reduced sample to determine 
which part of the estimated price premium corresponds to the building’s level of EE. In 
particular, they use energy consumption as a control variable in a second regression to 
determine which part of the price premium is generated by EE attributes per se. Their 
aim is to distinguish the intangible effects of the label itself from the effects of EE 
attributes. Although they found that an important part of the price premium is due to 
other intangible effects such as reputation, they did not reach a general conclusion. 
We next summarize the results of the most relevant studies on the European residential 
sector. First, Brounen and Kok (2011) performed the first analysis regarding the 
European residential sector. They study the determinants of the adoption of EPCs and 
their economic implications in the Netherlands. Based on postal address, they match 
information from several sources, including transaction data from the Dutch Association 
                                                 
37
 Some other authors found similar results (Das et al. 2011; Bloom et al. 2011; Reichardt et al. 2012 or 
Chegut et al. 2013). 
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of Realtors. They have information on building type, year of construction, and certain 
thermal and quality characteristics such as central heating or insulation quality. They 
also have information on neighborhood characteristics at the zip level (housing density, 
average time a house is in the market, average monthly household income and the share 
of green voters). At the time the research was performed the EPBD was voluntary. 
Hence, their sample potentially suffered from sample selection bias. Using the Heckman 
two-step method and a “news index”38 variable as the exclusion variable that determines 
EPC adoption, they showed that there is a positive relation between the EPC of a 
dwelling and its market price. Concretely, a "green" certified dwelling (those rated as A, 
B or C) had a 3.7% price premium over a "non-green" one.  
Second, Höberg (2013) uses information on standard energy consumption disclosed in 
the EPC to determine whether the energy performance of a dwelling is capitalized into 
the transaction selling price for single-family dwellings in a municipality of Stockholm. 
She classifies a detailed set of attributes into two categories: property specific attributes 
and neighborhood specific attributes. The first category includes a “quality index” used 
in Sweden. This index is the result of a large number of quite standard dwelling items, 
and although some of the scores are associated with high EE, the correlation between 
this variable and the EPC is weak. The second category includes dummy variables (87) 
for each “value area” as categorized by the Swedish Tax Agency. These values take into 
account views, noises or distance from the city center. Additionally, she introduces the 
EE potential of each dwelling, which is given by the energy-saving recommendations 
that a specialized technician reports in the EPC. Based on a sample of more than 1000 
transactions and using OLS regressions, her results show that the estimated energy 
consumption reported in the EPC
39
 has positive effects on house selling prices. 
Hyland et al. (2013) gathered the advertisements on the web page of one of the largest 
real estate companies in Ireland during 2008-2012 to build a panel with 15.000 
dwellings for sale and 21.000 for rent. The authors used asking prices given the lack of 
transaction data for Ireland. There are two main limitations in this study: the only 
information about dwellings’ location is at county level, and the set of attributes 
included in the sale sample is considerably small (they only include dwelling type, 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms and whether it is a new development). Sample 
selection bias comes from those advertisements with no EPC information. They create a 
dummy variable that takes value 0 before the recast of the EPBD, and 1 afterwards, as 
the exclusion variable that determines the probability of advertising the EPC. Results 
from the Heckman two-step model show that dwellings for sale with an EPC of A 
receive a price premium of 9.3% with respect to dwellings with an EPC of D; and this 
                                                 
38
 The “news index” is a quantitative measure constructed by the authors based on counts of negative or 
positive reporting on the energy label in the popular press. “Positive news receives a score of 1, whereas 
negative news receives a score of –1. Front page news presumably has more impact and receives a score 
of 2 or –2, respectively.” 
39
 The authors had information on the estimated energy consumption displayed in the EPC and they used 
this information as the measure for EE, contrary to the EE levels used by Brounen and Kok (2011).  
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percentage decreases to 1.8% for the rent sample. They find that sample selection bias is 
not present in their data.  
Finally, Cajias and Piazolo (2013) analyze the German residential sector during the 
period 2008-2010. Their results are considerably higher if compared with previous 
findings for other countries. They obtain that the market value is above 60% for 
dwellings with the highest EPC (B, C and D), ceteris paribus; and the corresponding 
rents are approximately 13% higher for these dwellings than for energy inefficient ones.  
We conclude this section analyzing the main contributions on the Asian residential 
market. With a two-stage estimation that carefully controlled for locational effects, 
Deng et al. (2012) found that condominiums and apartments certified with the Green 
Mark (the energy efficient labeling system used in Singapore) were sold with a 4% 
premium. Zheng et al. (2012) studied the case of Beijing where energy rating standards 
had not formally been adopted at that time. Hence, the authors created an artificial 
"green" index using a Google search to identify the houses advertised as "green". They 
found that "green" houses were initially sold with a price premium, at the presale stage, 
but were subsequently resold or rented with a price discount. This could be due to the 
fact that sellers would lie about the true energy performance of the house in the presale 
stage. For Japan, Yoshida and Sugiura (2011) suggested that the willingness to pay for 
buildings labeled with the Tokyo Green Labeling System for Condominiums was due to 
building´s age and quality, since once they controlled for these two variables, labels 
became not statistically significant. However, the Tokyo labeling system consists of 
eight itemized green scores, which may not be as easy to understand by consumers as 
the EPC.  
5.3 Data 
The residential sector is responsible for 17.7% of the Portuguese energy consumption. 
This percentage rises to 30% when it comes to electricity consumption (ADENE, 
2012a). In 2006, the Portuguese government partially transposed the EPBD into the 
national legislation by the Decreto de Lei 78/2006, which creates the national energy 
certification system _Sistema Nacional de Certificação Energética e da Qualidade do 
Ar Interior nos Edifícios (SCE), and the Decreto de Lei 79/2006 and 80/2006.  Annex 
D1 shows an example of the first page of the EPC used in Portugal. Although the 
official start of the EPC scheme in Portugal took place in 2006, it was not until July 
2007 that the practical implementation started (see Figure 3). The transposition of the 
EPBD recast gave origin to a new regulation (Decreto de Lei 118/2013), which imposed 
more restrictive rules for the classification of the buildings since the 1
st
 of December of 
2013. Besides extending the number of EPC categories into 9, ranging from "A+" to 
"G"; article 14 of the aforementioned decree also states that the corresponding EPC 
classification has to be displayed in any sale/rent advertisement. 
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Figure 3: EPC implementation in Portugal 
Source: www2.adene.pt 
Whereas the degree of implementation of the EPBD is still low in some member states, 
Portugal represents a good case study because it has made great efforts to implement it. 
In fact, ADENE (Portuguese Agency for Energy) has supported several promotional 
activities towards municipalities, stakeholders and key market players to promote EPC 
dissemination. According to this Agency, an EPC is issued in around 90% of the 
buildings transacted (ADENE, 2012b). Since the implementation of the legislation until 
August 2014, a total of 755.000 certificates have been issued. Figure 4 shows the 
evolution of EPCs registered in Portugal. After a strong boom, the number of new 
certificates has decreased considerably during the economic crisis, although it has come 
back to the initial trend in 2014.  
Figure 4: Annual evolution of EPC registered in Portugal. 
 
Source: ADENE/APEMIP. *August 2014 
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Our database contains information on all dwellings advertised for sale at the website of 
one of the largest real estate companies in Portugal
40
. For each dwelling we have 
detailed information on a number of structural characteristics, its exact geographic 
location, asking price and the EPC. There is also a brief description containing 
additional details about the dwelling that we have used to complete missing data 
(Annex D2 shows the description of all variables in the database). All this information 
is filled by a real estate agent from the company, who ultimately decides which 
information is displayed in the online advertisement.   
Unfinished dwellings, ruins, farms, rural-tourism and any other type of dwellings 
working as a business were deleted from the sample. Additionally, in order to avoid 
differences in how prices are set, we have only considered houses in Continental 
Portugal. The final sample consists of 21.230 dwellings. Figure 5 shows their 
geographic distribution.  
Figure 5: Geographic distribution of our sample. 
 
Source: The authors. 
                                                 
40
 The data was extracted from www.remax.pt. The download was in March 2015 using the Python 
software. Neither Remax nor any other agency provided the data directly to us despite our efforts in that 
sense. 
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According to Census 2011 (INE, 2012), the total number of existing houses in 2011 was 
5.878.756 (around 5.600.000 in the Continental part of the country)
41
. In order to 
determine the representativeness of our sample in relation to the residential real estate 
market of Portugal, we have compared it with all the relevant indicators available at 
official statistics.  
If we focus on EPCs, according to ADENE, “C” and “B” energy classes are 
predominant in the Portuguese stock of certified buildings
42
 (see Figure 6a) from June 
2007 until August 2014. Figure 6b shows how EPC categories are represented in our 
sample. We observe that center labels and lower tail categories, despite of G, are 
overrepresented, whereas upper tail categories are underrepresented. However, these 
differences were expected since we are comparing the total amount of certificates issued 
in Portugal during 7 years with a sample of residential dwellings on sale in March 2015. 
We emphasize that 26% of the dwellings in our sample did not display the EPC in the 
advertisement despite being compulsory by Decreto de Lei 118/2013.   
                                                 
41
 The size of our sample represents the 0.38% of this amount. There is no official data available about the 
percentage of houses on sale. 
42
 Stock refers to comercial and residentail buildinga unless specieified otherwise.  
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Attending to the geographic distribution of these EPCs, Lisboa, Porto, Faro and Setúbal 
are the districts with the largest number of registered certificates (see Figure 7a). The 
largest shares of certified dwellings in our sample also correspond to these districts (see 
Figure 7b). However, Braga, Aveiro and Leiria are slightly underrepresented (<5%) 
compared to the national stock of certified building (5-10%). Annex D3 shows in more 
detail the energy structure of the certificates by districts for Portugal (Table D3.1) and 
for our sample (Table D3.2).  
Finally, we analyze if our sample is representative in terms of price and structural 
characteristics of dwellings. Table 15 summarizes the results for the Portuguese stock 
of residential buildings and for our sample. The third column restricts the sample to 
certified dwellings. We observe that the average price per square meter is higher in our 
sample than in the Portuguese real estate sector according to average bank evaluation 
for the first three months of 2015. A priori, we would expect the opposite given the 
tendency to give high mortgage valuations. It could be the case that these valuations are 
more accurate after the crisis. Also, we are comparing asking prices with average bank 
evaluations. Additionally, the percentages of old houses are smaller in our sample in 
general. Two reasons could justify this. First, our sample includes houses constructed 
until 2015 while the housing stock only includes houses constructed until 2010 (from 
Census 2010). Second, houses for sale tend to be recent/new while the housing stock 
includes older houses were the families have lived for a long time. Furthermore, it is 
noticeable that houses are bigger in our sample compared to the housing stock. The type 
of dwellings is similar among the samples and the state of the dwellings is better (do not 
need work) in our sample, as it is expected.  
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Table 15: Characteristics of the Portuguese housing stock versus our sample 
  Housing stock Complete  
sample 
Sample of certified 
dwellings 
Price Price per square 
meter 
1011€/m2   * 1366.29€/m2  1455.48€/m2     
Construction 
year 
Until 1945 10.6% 3.6% 2.7% 
1946-1960 9.2% 5.0% 4.9% 
1961-1970 11.2% 3.51% 3.5% 
1971-1980 17% 6.9% 7.2% 
1981-1990 17.3% 13.1% 13.1% 
1991-2000 18.7% 18.6% 17.9% 
2001-2005 9.8% 14.9% 14.3% 
From 2006** 6.2% 34.3% 36.4% 
Average age  33,95 years 22 years 21 years 
Area (m
2
) Until 59  16.4% 1% 1.1% 
60-79 15% 10.9% 11.6% 
80-99 20% 25.2% 26.7% 
100-119 17.3% 4.4% 3.5% 
120-149 14.4% 23.2% 23.9% 
150-199 9.3% 18.4% 17.2% 
200 and more 7.6% 16.7% 16% 
Average area 109.9m
2
 148.4 m
2
 144.9m
2
 
Construction 
type 
Apartments 66.2% 67.1% 70% 
General 
condition 
Needs work 27% 2.4% 2.3% 
Source: INE (Portuguese National Institute of Statistics) and the authors. *Average bank evaluation for 
the first three months of 2015. **Note that the Census only includes houses constructed until 2010.  
Overall, we can conclude that our sample is suitable for analyzing the Portuguese 
residential sector in terms of composition and geographic distribution of EPCs, and 
structural characteristics of dwellings.  
We next analyze the rest of the large set of variables available in our database (see 
Table D3.1 in Annex D3). Location is generally considered as the most important item 
when purchasing a dwelling. We have information about the exact geographic 
coordinates for most dwellings. For those observations for which geographic location 
was not available, an imputation process was followed to recover coordinates from two 
sources. The first source was the name of the building or building complex. Second, we 
used QGis geocoding and Google information to convert addresses into geographic 
coordinates. 
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Table 16: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price/m
2
 21230 1366.58 1209.96 40.1907 20802.21 
Log(price/m
2
) 21230 6.9695 0.6843 3.6936 9.9428 
Certificate 
ABC 
D 
EFG 
15656  
63.32% 
22.28% 
14.40% 
   
EPC  21230 0.7374123 0.4400319 0 1 
Apartment 21230 0.6704192 0.470072 0 1 
Log(size)
2
 21230 24.15239 4.487058 11.56814 53.09856 
Bedrooms 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 or more 
21179  
0.90% 
10.88% 
29.79% 
35.89% 
15.69% 
4.57% 
2.27% 
   
Construction year 
1300-1970 
1971-1985 
1986-1993 
1994-1999 
2000-2003 
2004-2007 
2008-2011 
2011-2015 
21224  
12.09% 
12.23% 
11.87% 
11.68% 
12.78% 
11.84% 
12.55% 
14.96% 
   
New 21230 0.1916627 0.3936184 0 1 
Needs work 21230 0.0244454 0.154431 0 1 
Renovated 21230 0.1016909 0.3022485 0 1 
Garage 21230 0.5419434 0.4982494 0 1 
Pool 21230 0.1634403 0.3697756 0 1 
Garden 21230 0.3873581 0.4871581 0 1 
Terrace 21230 0.1849183 0.3882404 0 1 
Balcony 21230 0.3387499 0.4732959 0 1 
Elevator  21230 0.3223269 0.4673784 0 1 
Security  21230 0.1398964 0.3468877 0 1 
Heating 21230 0.2713956 0.4446902 0 1 
Air conditioning 21230 0.1818096 0.3856966 0 1 
Solar 21230 0.0747492 0.2629924 0 1 
Gas 21230 0.2605624 0.4389518 0 1 
Electric blinds 21230 0.0891621 0.2849843 0 1 
Double window 21230 0.0792709 0.2701674 0 1 
Rented 21230 0.0287316 0.167055 0 1 
Fireplace 21230 0.2428053 0.4287885 0 1 
District 21230 9.648109 3.381379 1 18 
Coastal municipalities 21230 0.5851154 0.4927137 0 1 
Distance to school 21230 0.0052445 0.0085521 5.91e-06 0.1237477 
Distance to city hall 21230 0.0508659 0.0349206 1.00e-06 0.2916289 
Distance to garden 21230 0.0729564 0.0833646 0.0008 0.8147576 
Distance to hospital 21230 0.0378919 0.0456491 0.0000801 0.5969091 
Distance to shopping 
center 
21230 0.0870929 0.0976062 0.0002845 0.7360709 
Distance to metro station 21230 0.5143609 0.6236164 0.0000485 2.261772 
Agency size 21230 197.5586 115.2879 2 520 
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The administrative division of Portugal consists of 18 districts, which are divided in 308 
municipalities. We use dummy variables to control for district and coastal 
municipalities. Besides that, individuals also consider accessibility to close amenities, 
such as public services, schools, sport facilities, green areas, etc. With each dwelling 
coordinates we were able to compute distances to the closest amenities in the city (see 
Table 16). For this task we used again the QGis program, which computes the distance 
to the closest target point. Amenities’ coordinates were found from different sources: 
hospitals, shopping centers and gardens locations were directly downloaded from 
OpenStreetMaps (OSM)
43
. The information about metro stations for the metropolitan 
areas of Lisbon and Porto was downloaded using Overpass API
44
. The location of 
schools, kindergarten, universities and city halls was downloaded from different web 
pages
45
. 
For each dwelling we also have information on some EE attributes such as the 
availability of heating system, gas, air conditioning system, double window, electric 
blinds, and whether the dwelling has thermal solar panels. Finally, we have information 
on which agent from the real estate company is in charge of each dwelling. In particular, 
we have information on the agent ID, address and the agency to which the agent 
belongs. Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. 
5.4 Model  
We use the hedonic approach to estimate the implicit price of each dwelling attribute 
described above. This method assumes that a product z can be decomposed into its 
attributes    (       ) and, by extension, the price of the product is a function of the 
attributes’ price (Rosen 1974). That is, 
 ( )    (          ). (7)  
In equilibrium, the price of producing each product’s attribute must equal its cost. Thus, 
in a competitive equilibrium, as it is the case of the real estate market, we can estimate 
the implicit price or willingness to pay (WTP) of each dwelling attribute. This WTP is 
given by the partial derivative of the dwelling price function with respect to each 
attribute. That is,  
   ( )
    
 gives consumers’ WTP for an extra unit of the attribute    or, 
similarly, the manufacturer marginal cost of producing such additional unit. 
                                                 
43
 OSM is a large and open access database containing information about points, paths and geometry 
areas for world maps. Exact information about shopping centers was not available and we used cinemas 
as a proxy instead. 
44
 Overpass API (Application Programming Interface) serves up custom selected parts of OSM data. 
Overpass turbo is a web implemented application of Overpass API that provides a way to access to its 
functionalities. We used http://overpass-turbo.eu/ to send a query on metro stops to the API and got back 
the corresponding dataset. 
45
 Schools, kindergarten and universities location were downloaded from 
https://www.portaldasescolas.pt/portal/server.pt/community/01_escolas/240. Information about city hall 
location was downloaded from http://www.anmp.pt/index.php/municipios.  
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This approach is based on real transaction prices. However, in Portugal, there is neither 
official nor private data available with such information that also combines information 
on dwelling attributes. Thus, we have used dwelling asking prices as an approximation 
to real market prices.  
For our analysis, we differentiate three groups of dwelling characteristics (see Table 
17). The first group gathers information on the main structural characteristics together 
with other minor attributes of the dwelling (S). The second group contains information 
on dwelling location (L). The third group puts together information on EE measures and 
renewable energy sources, i.e., solar panels (EE).  
We try to isolate the effect of the EPC by including this third group of variables in our 
model. These variables could have an effect on the price through consumer´s valuation 
for EE, but we can further control for a potential “signaling” effect that such attributes, 
in particular solar panels, generate. That is, the own existence of solar panels in a 
dwelling could be signaling those dwellings as “green” or “energy efficient”, and in 
those cases, the extra information provided by the EPC could be lower. In other words, 
the EPC might have a higher valuation in those cases where the EE attributes of a house 
are not clearly identified by consumers, while in those houses with easily identified EE 
attributes, such as solar panels or electric blinds, the informational effect of the EPC 
could decrease together with its valuation.  
Table 17: Explanatory variables  
Structural characteristics 
 (S) 
Location characteristics 
(L) 
EE characteristics  
 (EE) 
Apartment 
Construction year 
Size 
Bedrooms  
New  
Needs work 
Renovated 
Pool 
Garage 
Terrace 
Balcony 
Rented  
 
Coastal municipalities 
District 
Distance to the closest       
school, kindergarten or 
university 
Distance to the closest 
hospital 
Distance to the closest 
shopping center 
Distance to the closest city 
hall 
Distance to the closest garden 
Distance to the closest metro 
station (only for Porto and 
Lisbon sample) 
 
Heating system  
Air conditioner 
Solar panels  
Gas  
Double windows 
Electric blinds 
Fireplace 
 
Thus, the hedonic regression for Equation (7) takes de following form: 
   (        )                                      (8) 
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The dependent variable is the logarithm of the asking price per square meter 
   (        ) , for dwelling i.              is a categorical variable that takes value 
1 if dwelling i has certificate A, B or C; 2 if it has certificate D; and 3 if it has certificate 
E, F or G.   ,    and     are the explanatory variables displayed in Table 17, and    is 
the error term. We are interested in parameter  , which reports the WTP for each type of 
certificate.  
As it was explained in Section 5.3, the Portuguese legislation states that the EPC must 
be included in the advertisement of the dwelling since 2013. Some advertisements do 
not fulfill it despite of being mandatory. The fact that some advertisements do include 
the EPC and some others do not indicates that our sample could suffer from some sort 
of selection bias due to unobservable confounders. That is, there is an unobserved 
confounder (e.g., quality) that can affect both the decision of displaying the certificate 
and the price of the dwelling. It is reasonable to think that owners of high quality 
dwellings are more likely to display their certificate and also more likely to ask for a 
higher price. Hence, any inference based on estimated parameter from Equation (8) 
would lead us to wrong conclusions. We have used the Heckman two-step selection 
model to handle this problem
46
.  
The Heckman procedure establishes a two equation model. In a first stage we estimate 
the probability that an advertisement includes the EPC using a probit model:  
    (    )                      ̅     ̅      ̅̅ ̅̅      (9) 
The dependent variable,       in Equation (9) is a discrete variable that takes value 1 if 
advertisement of dwelling i includes information on the EPC, and 0 otherwise.   ̅  ̅  
and   ̅̅ ̅̅   are subsets of the corresponding groups of variables displayed in Table 17, and 
   is the error term. Agency_size measures the number of dwellings managed by each 
company’s office, and it is our exclusion variable. This variable has to be relevant for 
the decision to advert the EPC, but not highly correlated with the price. We have 
reasons to believe that the size of the office can influence the decision of including the 
EPC in the advertisement, but it has certainly no influence on the dwelling’s price47. 
In a second stage we construct a consistent estimate of the inverse Mills ratio,  ̂, based 
on the probit estimation of the first step. We include this selection variable as an 
instrument in the price equation (Equation 10) which becomes:  
   (        )                                     ̂     (10) 
To determine the existence of sample selection we either observe the statistical 
significance of the estimated parameter   or the correlation or the error terms from 
Equations (9) and (10). 
                                                 
46
 For a detailed explanation of the Heckman procedure see Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
47
 The correlation is 0.1773. 
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5.5 Results 
Table 18: Selection equation with model specification (1) and (2). 
 Model specification without 
EE variables 
Model specification with EE 
variables 
 Prob(EPC) Prob(EPC) 
VARIABLES Coeff.  S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Apartment 0.209*** (0.0511) 0.198*** (0.0513) 
Log (size) 
2
 -0.00893 (0.0125) -0.0115 (0.0125) 
Bedroom (reference: 0) 
1 -0.269** (0.131) -0.288** (0.131) 
2 -0.317** (0.146) -0.346** (0.146) 
3 -0.257 (0.172) -0.287* (0.172) 
4 -0.136 (0.203) -0.175 (0.203) 
5 -0.103 (0.229) -0.150 (0.229) 
6 or more -0.136 (0.252) -0.176 (0.253) 
Construction year (reference: 1300-1970) 
1971-1985 0.150*** (0.0404) 0.145*** (0.0405) 
1986-1993 0.102** (0.0410) 0.0854** (0.0412) 
1994-1999 0.129*** (0.0421) 0.0863** (0.0427) 
2000-2003 0.0900** (0.0417) 0.0308 (0.0427) 
2004-2007 0.170*** (0.0430) 0.118*** (0.0440) 
2008-2011 0.396*** (0.0458) 0.364*** (0.0466) 
2011-2015 0.240*** (0.0460) 0.146*** (0.0483) 
New 0.102*** (0.0333) 0.0715** (0.0336) 
Renovated 0.165*** (0.0358) 0.146*** (0.0359) 
Needs work -0.0156 (0.0644) -0.00445 (0.0646) 
Rented  0.141** (0.0618) 0.134** (0.0644) 
Pool 0.0971*** (0.0306) 0.0622** (0.0312) 
Terrace 0.0504* (0.0260) 0.0320 (0.0262) 
Balcony 0.0861*** (0.0218) 0.0513** (0.0223) 
Heating system   0.0823** (0.0264) 
Air conditioning   0.0530 (0.0290) 
Solar panels   0.175*** (0.0449) 
Gas   0.170*** (0.0258) 
Electric blinds   -0.0718* (0.0407) 
Double window   -0.0489 (0.0395) 
Fireplace    0.0755*** (0.0253) 
Dummies for district Yes   Yes   
Coastal municipalities 0.123*** (0.0251) 0.110*** (0.0253) 
Agency size -0.000977*** (9.19e-05) -0.000955*** (9.22e-05) 
Constant 0.827*** (0.260) 0.869*** (0.260) 
Observations 21,170  21,170  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 18 shows the results of the selection equation for two model specifications; one 
without the EE attributes and the other with them. In general, coefficients are 
statistically significant and have the expected sign for both specifications. Apartments 
are more likely to display the EPC in the advertisement, as well as recently constructed 
dwellings. The size of the dwellings does not affect the probability of including the 
EPC, although dwellings with 1 or 2 bedrooms are less likely to have the EPC with 
respect to studies (dwellings with zero bedrooms). As it would be expected, being 
renovated has a positive effect on the probability of having EPC, and the same effect is 
found for dwellings that are already rented. The effect of the extra equipment is not 
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unidirectional: while swimming pool, balcony and fireplace show a positive effect; 
terrace do not have any effect in the second model specification. 
Table 19: Output equation for model specification with and without EE variables. 
 Model specification without 
EE variables 
Model specification with EE 
variables 
Variables Log(price/m2) Log(price/m2) 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Certificate (reference: D)     
ABC 0.0661*** (0.00956) 0.0594*** (0.00944)  
EFG -0.0461*** (0.0122) -0.0403*** (0.0120)  
Apartment 0.0231 (0.0249) 0.0354 (0.0245) 
Log(size)
2
 -0.0350*** (0.00560) -0.0353*** (0.00552) 
Bedrooms (reference: 0)     
1 -0.155*** (0.0473) -0.152*** (0.0468) 
2 -0.165*** (0.0564) -0.164*** (0.0557) 
3 -0.101 (0.0686) -0.106 (0.0678) 
4 0.0837 (0.0834) 0.0632 (0.0823) 
5 0.213** (0.0959) 0.187** (0.0945) 
6 or more 0.398*** (0.107) 0.376*** (0.105) 
Construction year (reference:1300-1970) 
1971-1985 -0.0707*** (0.0182) -0.0694*** (0.0178) 
1986-1993 -0.0127 (0.0182) -0.0182 (0.0179) 
1994-1999 0.0932*** (0.0193) 0.0811*** (0.0187) 
2000-2003 0.189*** (0.0191) 0.153*** (0.0187) 
2004-2007 0.294*** (0.0202) 0.257*** (0.0196) 
2008-2011 0.546*** (0.0235) 0.513*** (0.0226) 
2011-2015 0.595*** (0.0218) 0.540*** (0.0212) 
New -0.0129 (0.0138) -0.0145 (0.0134) 
Renovated 0.144*** (0.0154) 0.136*** (0.0149) 
Needs work -0.192*** (0.0279) -0.176*** (0.0274) 
Rented  -0.0202 (0.0246) -0.0263 (0.0242) 
Garage 0.118*** (0.00889) 0.0947*** (0.00890) 
Pool 0.317*** (0.0131) 0.286*** (0.0128) 
Garden 0.0959*** (0.00864) 0.0922*** (0.00861) 
Terrace 0.104*** (0.0110) 0.0941*** (0.0108) 
Balcony 0.00729 (0.00958) -0.00419 (0.00924) 
Elevator 0.0607*** (0.00936) 0.0555*** (0.00954) 
Security  0.216*** (0.0112) 0.174*** (0.0117) 
Heating system   0.159*** (0.0113) 
Air conditioning   0.147*** (0.0116) 
Solar panels   0.0337* (0.0179) 
Gas   -0.0337 (0.0117) 
Electric blinds   -0.0330** (0.0162) 
Double window   -0.0684*** (0.0157) 
Fireplace   0.0164 (0.0110) 
Dummies for district Yes   Yes  
Coastal municipalities 0.206*** (0.0114) 0.199*** (0.0111) 
Distance to school 4.229*** (0.495) 3.705*** (0.489) 
Distance to city hall 0.254** (0.122) 0.279** (0.120) 
Distance to garden -1.236*** (0.0685) -1.212*** (0.0675) 
Distance to hospital -0.588*** (0.109) -0.576*** (0.107) 
Distance to shopping center -0.925*** (0.0590) -0.880*** (0.0582) 
Lambda 0.459*** (0.0808) 0.452*** (0.0793) 
Constant 7.015*** (0.118) 7.023*** (0.116) 
Observations 21,170  21,170  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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With respect to EE characteristics, dwellings with heating system, with solar panels or 
with gas are more likely to include the EPC in the advertisement. Unexpectedly, the 
coefficient for electric blinds shows the opposite sign, and air conditioning and double 
window are not significant. With respect to location, dwellings located in the coastal 
municipalities are more likely to include the EPC. 
Lastly, the coefficient of the exclusion variable, a          , is negative and 
statistically significant. According to this, dwellings managed by larger agencies are 
less likely to include the EPC. 
Table 19 shows the results of the price equation for the corresponding model 
specification
48
. For the model specification with EE variables, the coefficient for the 
category ABC of the variable Certificate is positive and statistically significant. In 
particular, the logarithm of the price of a dwelling with EPC A, B or C is 5.9% higher 
than the one of a dwelling with EPC equal to D, ceteris paribus. This means that agents 
are willing to pay more for dwellings with a high EPC. Also, the implicit price of 
dwellings certified as E, F or G is 4.0% lower. For the model specification without EE 
variables the results are slightly higher (6.6% for ABC, and -4.6% for EFG). These 
results go in line with previous findings. Despite the fact that we have controlled for EE 
variables in the second model specification, the magnitude of the effect is considerably 
higher than those found for north European countries (Netherlands and Sweden). These 
results could be due to different issues. First, it can be that consumers in Portugal 
simply have a higher valuation for EE in dwellings than citizens from north Europe. The 
economic crisis and the increase of electricity prices (according to Eurostat Portugal is 
one of the European countries with higher electricity prices after including taxes and 
levies) could explain that fact. Second, it can also be the case that, despite our model 
includes a large number of dwelling attributes and controls for location, there are some 
other unobservable factors that overestimate the effects of EPC. On the one hand, it 
could be the case that high certified dwellings are also dwellings that include the latest 
advances in the construction market, which are not controlled in our model. On the 
other hand, as it was stated by Eichholtz et al. 2010, high EPCs can be associated with 
some intangible characteristics, such as reputation or high construction quality, which 
lead consumers to show a higher valuation. To check the robustness of our results, we 
also consider each certificate label as a category. The results are even stronger for high 
rated dwellings (see Annex D4). 
Regarding the structural characteristics, once we control for most of the attributes, the 
logarithm of the price per square meter is not statistically different for apartments than 
for houses, and the coefficient of the squared logarithm of size shows a concave relation 
between the size and the price per square meter. This means that the price per square 
meter increases with the size of the dwellings until it reaches a point where increases of 
                                                 
48
 Columns 2 and 3 in table 5 correspond with columns 2 and 3 in table 6, and the same with columns 4 
and 5.  
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the size lead to decreases of the price per square meter. However, the price per square 
meter for studios (dwellings with zero bedrooms) is higher than for dwellings with one 
or two bedrooms, and lower for dwellings with 5 or more bedrooms. As it would be 
expected, recently constructed dwellings show higher prices, although dwellings 
building before 1300 and 1970 are more expensive than those built between 1971 and 
1985. This effect could be explained because dwellings in the first group can be 
considered as antiques. Then, renovated dwellings are sold at a higher price contrary to 
those that need any reparation. The last structural attributes (swimming pool, garage, 
garden, terrace, elevator and security) show the expected sign. They all show a positive 
effect on the price of the dwelling, except for balcony and fireplace, whose effect did 
not resulted to be significant, similarly to dwellings that are currently rented. 
With respect to EE characteristics, dwellings with heating and air conditioning system 
have a higher price per square meter, as well as those with solar panels. According to 
our results, the effect of gas is not significant and the effect of double window and 
electric blinds is low and negative. 
At the bottom of Table 19 the effects of location are showed (given the large number of 
dummy variables used for the districts, these effects are displayed in Annex D4 for the 
second model specification). As it is expected, dwellings located in coastal 
municipalities show a higher price, as well as those closer to shopping centers, hospitals 
and gardens. However, the direction of the effect of the distance to the closest school on 
the price is unexpected. This fact might be due to the fact that we are including all type 
of schools without controlling for their quality and age target.  
Finally, the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant suggesting that the errors from 
Equations (9) and (10) are correlated and hence, our sample suffers from sample 
selection bias.  
Furthermore, we have regressed Equations (9) and (10) for the two major Portuguese 
municipalities, Lisboa and Porto, using the second model specification. For these cities 
we also include the distance to the metro station as location variable. In addition, we 
transform the exclusion variable, agency size, into a 6-category variable, to better 
capture its capabilities in this subsample.  Results are displayed in Table 20 and do not 
show major changes. 
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Table 20: Heckman two-steep regression for Lisboa and Porto. 
 Output equation Selection equation 
Variables Log(price/m2) EPC 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Certificate (reference: D)     
ABC 0.106*** (0.0197)   
EFG -0.00629 (0.0269)   
Apartment 0.0919 (0.0599) 0.0268 (0.123) 
Log(size)
2
 -0.0379*** (0.0142) -0.0738** (0.0287) 
Bedrooms (reference: 0)     
1 -0.295*** (0.102) -0.187 (0.274) 
2 -0.291** (0.127) -0.0566 (0.317) 
3 -0.140 (0.158) 0.248 (0.372) 
4 0.0749 (0.197) 0.563 (0.445) 
5 0.147 (0.229) 0.610 (0.505) 
6 or more 0.376 (0.254) 0.922 (0.572) 
1971-1985 -0.310*** (0.0335) -0.0618 (0.0704) 
1986-1993 -0.241*** (0.0361) -0.164** (0.0722) 
1994-1999 -0.128*** (0.0377) -0.156** (0.0761) 
2000-2003 0.0537 (0.0390) -0.0478 (0.0817) 
2004-2007 0.227*** (0.0420) -0.0469 (0.0882) 
2008-2011 0.550*** (0.0426) 0.247*** (0.0947) 
2011-2015 0.533*** (0.0420) -0.0449 (0.0924) 
New -0.189*** (0.0315) -0.210*** (0.0716) 
Renovated 0.175*** (0.0268) 0.0415 (0.0580) 
Needs work -0.212*** (0.0517) -0.122 (0.105) 
Rented  -0.0886** (0.0401) 0.172* (0.0927) 
Garage 0.0809*** (0.0193)   
Pool 0.328*** (0.0319) 0.171** (0.0729) 
Garden 0.103*** (0.0178)   
Terrace 0.121*** (0.0244) -0.0181 (0.0541) 
Balcony -0.0256 (0.0197) -0.000112 (0.0436) 
Fireplace -0.00760 (0.0263) 0.113** (0.0567) 
Elevator 0.0622*** (0.0189)   
Security  0.169*** (0.0227)   
Heating system 0.132*** (0.0240) 0.0615 (0.0522) 
Air conditioning 0.256*** (0.0256) 0.0546 (0.0579) 
Solar panels 0.167*** (0.0450) 0.545*** (0.109) 
Gas -0.0990*** (0.0214) 0.0876* (0.0452) 
Electric blinds 0.00219 (0.0359) 0.311*** (0.0864) 
Double window -0.0216 (0.0323) -0.121* (0.0728) 
Coastal municipalities 0.390*** (0.0274) 0.0535 (0.0559) 
Distance to school 3.300 (3.510)   
Distance to city hall 1.993*** (0.518)   
Distance to garden -6.515*** (0.522)   
Distance to hospital 0.838 (0.670)   
Distance to shopping center -5.712*** (0.494)   
Distance metro 1.571*** (0.421)   
Agency size_1   -0.401*** (0.0705) 
Agency size_2   -0.0442 (0.0781) 
Agency size_3   -0.322*** (0.0700) 
Agency size_4   -0.0616 (0.0729) 
Agency size_5   -0.267*** (0.0815) 
Lambda 0.665*** (0.145)   
Constant 7.538*** (0.262) 2.596*** (0.577) 
Observations 6,500  6,500  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.6 Conclusions 
Informational instruments have been rapidly introduced by many governments around 
the world as an alternative tool to promote energy efficiency (EE). By providing 
consumers with simply information about the level of EE of each product, they expect 
to lead consumers to take efficient decisions regarding EE, at a low implementation 
cost. Despite U.S. and Europe have approved legislation on this matter at the beginning 
of this century, little is known about its effectiveness, in particular in the European 
residential sector.   
In 2002, the European Commission approved the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (EPBD), which establishes that owners of a building or a building unit must 
show an energy performance certificate (EPC) that classifies the building according to 
its level of EE, every time the building or building unit is sold or rented out. Portugal 
was one of the first adopters of this legislation and nowadays the EPBD is fully 
implemented with more than 750.000 building being certified since 2007. This fact 
allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy instrument. Besides that, Portugal 
belongs to the group of Southern European countries, which present important 
economic, cultural and geographic differences.  
We have constructed a unique database with information on more than 21.000 dwellings 
advertised for sale at the website of one of the biggest real estate companies in Portugal. 
Our database contains an extended number of variables with information on the main 
structural characteristics of the dwelling (type, size, number of bedrooms, construction 
year, whether it is new, has been renovated or needs any reparation), extra structural 
characteristics (garage, swimming pool, garden etc.), EE characteristics (availability of 
heating, air conditioning systems, solar panels and gas), the EPC and the exact 
geographic location. With the geographic coordinates and using specialized software 
(QGis) we were able to compute the distance from each dwelling to the closest 
amenities (school, town hall, shopping center, metro station, hospitals, and gardens). 
With all this information we defined a price function to model the price of each 
dwelling. However, for some dwellings the web page did not display the EPC, and 
hence our sample was likely to be affected by sample selection bias. In order to tackle 
this problem we followed the Heckman two-step method. We first defined a selection 
equation to model the probability that the EPC was displayed in the sale advertisement 
for a certain dwelling, and then, we estimated the price function including the lambda of 
Heckman.  
Our results go in line with previous findings. Dwellings with EPC equal to A, B or C 
are sold at a 5.9% higher price per square meter than those with an EPC equal to D. 
Contrary, dwellings with EPC equal to E, F or G are sold at a 4% less. Despite our 
sample controls for an important number of dwelling attributes, our values are higher 
than the ones found in the Netherlands and Sweden. This can be due to several reasons. 
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First, it can simply happen that Portuguese have a higher valuation for EE in dwellings. 
The increase of electricity prices and the economic crisis could have increased the 
awareness for EE. Also the divulgation campaigns carried out by the Portuguese energy 
agency (ADENE) could have increased the awareness for EPC. But it can also be that 
there are some unobservable factors associated with EPC that our model was not able to 
control. As Eichholtz et al. (2010) stated in their seminal paper, reputational effects 
could overestimate the effect of the EPC.  
Overall, our results confirm that consumers value the information provided by the EPC 
and hence, this informational instrument has been effective in Portugal. This also 
implies that dwelling owners have incentives to improve the level of EE of their 
properties. The policy implications of this result are important for neighbor countries 
such as Spain, where the implementation of the EPBD is still low. However, more 
policy evaluation is needed in this field; welfare analysis to determine the effects on 
consumers’ surplus and empirical analysis to test the effects on final energy 
consumption are essential. The biggest hurdle for these analyses is the lack of data.  
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Annex D1 
Figure D1: First page of the EPC used in Portugal 
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Annex D2 
Table D2.1: Variables description 
Variables: Name: Description: 
Dependent 
variable 
Log(price/m2) Asking price per square meter in logarithms (€/m2). 
EPC EPC Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling 
contains the EPC, 0 otherwise. 
 Certificate 3-level categorical variable. Takes value 1 if dwelling 
has EPC equal to A, B or C; 2 if dwelling has EPC 
equal to D; 3 if dwelling has EPC equal to E, F or G. 
Structural 
characteristics  
Apartment Dummy variable that takes value 1 for apartment, 0 for 
house. 
Log(size) Square meters of the dwelling in logarithm. 
Bedrooms Number of bedrooms. 7-level categorical variable. 
Construction year Year of construction. 8-level categorical variable. 
Rented Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling is 
rented, 0 otherwise. 
New  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling is 
new, 0 otherwise. 
Renovated  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
been renovated, 0 otherwise (only applicable to non-
new houses). 
Needs_work Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling 
needs work, 0 otherwise (only applicable to non-new 
houses). 
Garage Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
garage, 0 otherwise. 
Swimming pool Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
swimming pool, 0 otherwise. 
Terrace Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
terrace, 0 otherwise. 
Balcony  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
balcony, 0 otherwise. 
Elevator  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
elevator, 0 otherwise. 
Security  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
security, 0 otherwise. 
Heating system Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the house has 
heating system and 0 otherwise. 
Fireplace  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
fireplace, 0 otherwise. 
Heating system Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
heating system, 0 otherwise. 
Air conditioning 
system 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the dwelling 
has air conditioning system, 0 otherwise. 
Solar panels Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
solar panels, 0 otherwise. 
Gas Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
gas, 0 otherwise. 
Electric blinds Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
- 134 - 
 
electric blinds, 0 otherwise. 
Double glazing Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling has 
double glazing, 0 otherwise. 
Location District Dummy variables for each of the 18 districts of 
Portugal 
Coastal 
municipality 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the dwelling is 
located in a municipality with coast, 0 otherwise. 
Distance to school Distance between the dwelling and the closest school 
(in degrees). 
Distance to city hall Distance between the dwelling and the closest city hall 
(in degrees). 
Distance to hospital Distance between the dwelling and the closest hospital 
(in degrees). 
Distance to 
shopping center 
Distance between the dwelling and the closest 
shopping center (in degrees). 
Distance to garden Distance between the dwelling and the closest garden 
(in degrees). 
Distance to metro Distance between the dwelling and the closest metro 
station (only for municipalities with metro) (in 
degrees). 
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Annex D3 
Table D3.1: Energy Structure by district: All certified buildings in Portugal 
Districts A+ A B B- C D E F G 
Aveiro 3.8% 15.6% 20.5% 16.2% 20.3% 13.1% 6.7% 2.4% 1.4% 
Beja 1.6% 9.8% 18.3% 15.5% 20.9% 18.3% 8.3% 4.1% 3.2% 
Braga 2.9% 17.5% 23.5% 17.1% 18.0% 12.2% 5.5% 2.2% 1.0% 
Bragança 3.8% 25.6% 21.2% 24.4% 7.4% 7.0% 5.1% 3.7% 1.7% 
Castelo 
Branco 
2.0% 6.6% 21.8% 19.3% 18.4% 15.1% 8.6% 4.8% 3.3% 
Coimbra 3.4% 11.5% 23.8% 16.9% 19.6% 12.7% 7.8% 2.6% 1.7% 
Évora 0.8% 8.6% 15.7% 14.9% 22.5% 19.5% 10.3% 4.5% 3.2% 
Faro  3.1% 9.7% 15.1% 13.5% 28.3% 17.0% 9.7% 2.0% 1.5% 
Guarda  3.6% 12.9% 17.8% 27.6% 9.0% 9.8% 8.6% 7.5% 3.2% 
Leiria  2.8% 10.0% 20.9% 16.6% 22.7% 16.9% 6.0% 2.1% 1.9% 
Lisboa  3.5% 9.3% 18.8% 12.3% 35.4% 13.7% 4.7% 1.0% 1.1% 
Portalegre  0.6% 5.4% 16.2% 15.7% 19.0% 17.5% 11.8% 6.8% 6.8% 
Porto  3.5% 14.4% 23.9% 11.5% 15.9% 10.6% 13.7% 4.2% 2.3% 
Santarém  1.7% 7.7% 17.4% 16.9% 24.4% 18.2% 7.9% 3.1% 2.7% 
Setúbal  3.2% 11.9% 14.6% 12.3% 39.5% 12.3% 4.3% 0.8% 1.0% 
Viana do 
Castelo 
4.4% 20.3% 21.0% 18.1% 12.8% 11.8% 6.5% 3.5% 1.6% 
Vila Real 2.8% 24.3% 21.5% 21.3% 8.6% 8.0% 6.6% 4.3% 2.7% 
Viseu  3.7% 15.0% 23.1% 28.1% 10.2% 9.1% 5.8% 3.3% 1.7% 
Source: ADENE/APEMIP 
Table D3.2: Energy Structure by district: certified dwellings in the sample 
Districts A+ A B B- C D E F G 
Aveiro 1.6% 9.4% 12.7% 7.5% 28.0% 26.3% 10% 3.5% 0.3% 
Beja 0% 2.6% 6.6% 4% 18.4% 39.4% 14.5% 14.5% 0% 
Braga 3.8% 6.3% 19.7% 4.7% 30.5% 18.2% 10.8% 6.0% 0% 
Bragança 0% 2.1% 0% 2.1% 25% 35.4% 14.6% 18.7% 2.1% 
Castelo 
Branco 
0% 4.7% 7.0% 2.3% 9.4% 26.6% 26.6% 26.7% 0.8% 
Coimbra 3.4% 16.1% 17.3% 11.3% 24.6% 13.5% 9.3% 4% 0.4% 
Faro 1.4% 3.7% 14.8% 7.4% 37.6% 23.4% 9.5% 1.9% 0.3% 
Guarda 0% 9.5% 2.4% 4.8% 14.3% 28.6% 21.4% 19% 0% 
Leiria 0.3% 1.9% 15.6% 7.3% 25.8% 27.1% 15.1% 6.6% 0.3% 
Lisboa 2.4% 9.0% 14.6% 7.3% 35.4% 21.0% 7.8% 2.1% 0.3% 
Portalegre 0% 1.40% 0% 1.4% 10.5% 35.0% 23.1% 25.2% 3.5% 
Porto 4.4% 14.2% 18. 9% 7.5% 22. 7% 18.7% 9.7% 3.1% 0.7% 
Santarém 0% 1.0% 11.1% 4.0% 25.7% 27.1% 22.6% 6.7% 1.8% 
Setúbal 1.7% 6.4% 9.6% 5.0% 36.3% 25.7% 12.9% 1.8% 0.4% 
Viana do 
Castelo 
5.4% 5.4% 6.8% 2.7% 20.3% 25.7% 18.9% 14.9% 0% 
Vila Real 5% 0% 10% 15% 15% 20% 20% 15% 0% 
Viseu 3.8% 7.8% 9.7% 10.3% 21.3% 23.8% 12.5% 8.1% 2.5% 
Évora 2.3% 0% 5.4% 2.3% 26.9% 33.8% 17.7% 10% 1.5% 
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Annex D4 
Table D4.1: Coefficient estimates for the districts in the model specification with 
EE variables.  
 Log(price/m2) EPC 
District Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Aveiro (reference)     
Beja 0.284*** (0.0639) -0.0237 (0.140) 
Braga -0.351*** (0.0568) -0.881*** (0.0745) 
Bragança 0.480*** (0.0871) 1.065*** (0.294) 
Castelo Branco -0.191*** (0.0665) -0.835*** (0.0930) 
Coimbra 0.0805** (0.0351) -0.143* (0.0793) 
Faro 0.265*** (0.0295) 0.128* (0.0708) 
Guarda -0.0873 (0.0861) -0.786*** (0.138) 
Leiria -0.168*** (0.0364) -0.320*** (0.0754) 
Lisboa 0.458*** (0.0292) 0.366*** (0.0657) 
Portalegre 0.206*** (0.0548) 0.494*** (0.126) 
Porto 0.0999*** (0.0284) 0.00366 (0.0672) 
Santarém 0.128*** (0.0418) -0.378*** (0.0761) 
Setúbal 0.139*** (0.0303) 0.247*** (0.0701) 
Viana do Castelo 0.133** (0.0630) -0.0317 (0.143) 
Vila Real 0.359*** (0.117) 0.0431 (0.264) 
Viseu 0.158*** (0.0428) 0.552*** (0.104) 
Évora 1.082*** (0.0664) 0.690*** (0.145) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table D4.2: Disaggregated EPC. 
 Output equation Selection equation 
Variables Log(price/m2) EPC 
 Coef. s.e. Coef.  s.e. 
Certificate (reference: D) 
A 0.404*** (0.0170)   
B 0.141*** (0.0120)   
C 0.00814 (0.00978)   
F -0.0215 (0.0130)   
E -0.131*** (0.0203)   
G -0.0911** (0.0481)   
Apartment 0.0256 (0.0229) 0.198*** (0.0513) 
Log (size) 
2
 -0.0308*** (0.00513) -0.0115 (0.0125) 
Bedrooms (reference: 0) 
1 -0.135*** (0.0428) -0.288** (0.131) 
2 -0.169*** (0.0513) -0.346** (0.146) 
3 -0.124** (0.0625) -0.287* (0.172) 
4 0.0222 (0.0760) -0.175 (0.203) 
5 0.139 (0.0875) -0.150 (0.229) 
6 or more 0.326*** (0.0972) -0.176 (0.253) 
Construction year (reference: 1300-1970) 
1971-1985 -0.0791*** (0.0165) 0.145*** (0.0405) 
1986-1993 -0.0283* (0.0166) 0.0854** (0.0412) 
1994-1999 0.0699*** (0.0174) 0.0863** (0.0427) 
2000-2003 0.143*** (0.0174) 0.0308 (0.0427) 
2004-2007 0.228*** (0.0183) 0.118*** (0.0440) 
2008-2011 0.415*** (0.0214) 0.364*** (0.0466) 
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2011-2015 0.383*** (0.0206) 0.146*** (0.0483) 
New -0.0262** (0.0124) 0.0715** (0.0336) 
Renovated 0.134*** (0.0137) 0.146*** (0.0359) 
Needs work -0.169*** (0.0254) 0.000445 (0.0644) 
Rented  -0.0303 (0.0222) 0.141** (0.0621) 
Garage 0.0950*** (0.00872)   
Pool 0.273*** (0.0119) 0.0622** (0.0312) 
Garden 0.0818*** (0.00842)   
Terrace 0.0917*** (0.00993) 0.0320 (0.0262) 
Balcony -0.00696 (0.00853) 0.0513** (0.0223) 
Fireplace 0.0198* (0.0102) 0.0755*** (0.0253) 
Elevator 0.0566*** (0.00930)   
Security  0.155*** (0.0113)   
Heating system 0.135*** (0.0105) 0.0823*** (0.0264) 
Air conditioning 0.136*** (0.0107) 0.0530* (0.0290) 
Solar panels -0.0581*** (0.0168) 0.175*** (0.0449) 
Gas -0.0348*** (0.0108) 0.170*** (0.0258) 
Electric blinds -0.0310** (0.0150) -0.0718* (0.0407) 
Double window -0.0471*** (0.0145) -0.0491 (0.0395) 
District (reference: Aveiro) 
Beja 0.299*** (0.0616) -0.0237 (0.140) 
Braga -0.260*** (0.0532) -0.881*** (0.0745) 
Bragança 0.450*** (0.0838) 1.065*** (0.294) 
Castelo Branco -0.135** (0.0699) -0.835*** (0.0930) 
Coimbra 0.0.0910*** (0.0364) -0.143* (0.0793) 
Faro 0.309*** (0.0464) 0.128* (0.0708) 
Guarda -0.0288 (0.0862) -0.786*** (0.138) 
Leiria -0120*** (0.0370) -0.320*** (0.0754) 
Lisboa 0.450*** (0.0277) 0.366*** (0.0657) 
Portalegre 0.181*** (0.0600) 0.494*** (0.126) 
Porto 0.0927*** (0.0271) 0.00366 (0.0672) 
Santarém 0.169*** (0.0403) -0.378*** (0.0761) 
Setúbal 0.142*** (0.0283) 0.247*** (0.0701) 
Viana do Castelo 0.138*** (0.0586) -0.0317 (0.143) 
Vila Real 0.332*** (0.110) 0.0431 (0.264) 
Viseu 0.128*** (0.0403) 0.552*** (0.104) 
Évora 1.011*** (0.0628) 0.690*** (0.145) 
Coastal municipalities 0.190*** (0.0102) 0.110*** (0.0253) 
Distance to school 3.645*** (0.484)   
Distance to city hall 0.256*** (0.118)   
Distance to garden -1.142*** (0.0665)   
Distance to hospital -0.456*** (0.106)   
Distance to shopping 
center 
-0.851*** (0.0576)   
Agency size   -0.000955*** (9.22e-05) 
Lambda 0.334*** (0.0744)   
Constant 7.012*** (0.108) 0.869*** (0.260) 
Observations 21,170  21,170  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
